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 This dissertation focuses on aspects of behavior and public policy related to 
vulnerable populations.  The first essay, coauthored with Christian Gregory and David C. 
Ribar, reviews recent theory and empirical evidence regarding the effect of Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participation on food insecurity and replicates the 
modelling strategies used in the empirical literature.  We find that recent evidence 
suggesting the ameliorative effect of SNAP on food insecurity may not be robust to 
specification choice or data.  Most specifications mirror the existing literature in finding a 
positive association of food insecurity with SNAP participation.  Two-stage least squares 
and control function methods do show that SNAP reduces food insecurity, but effects are 
not consistent across sub-populations and are not always statistically significant. 
 In the second essay, I examine the relationship between SNAP participation and 
food insecurity using data from the 2001-2008 Current Population Survey (CPS-FSS).  A 
behavioral Rasch selection model is proposed and estimated using four subsamples of 
low-income households: unmarried parent households, married parent households, all-
elderly households, and other adult-only households.  The behavioral Rasch selection 
model assumes responses to multiple food hardship questions may be modelled as 
indicators of a single underlying index of food hardships, and concurrently, controls for 
the endogeneity of program participation.  Simultaneously modelling the outcomes this 
way leads to more efficient estimation.  The models are identified using exogenous 
changes in state-level polices related to SNAP.  The results suggest that SNAP has a 
 
strong ameliorative effect on food insecurity for married parent households, all-elderly 
households, and other adult-only households, while SNAP continues to be associated 
with greater food hardships for unmarried parent households.  Participating in SNAP 
reduces the probability of food insecurity by 22.4% for other adult-only households, 18% 
for all-elderly households, and 17% for married parent households. 
 The third and final essay examines the relationship between underage college 
drinking and the initial occupational choices of male college graduates using data from 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97).  Focusing on recent college 
graduates and their initial occupational choices allows me to address important timing 
issues not considered by the existing literature.  For the multivariate analyses, I estimate 
multinomial logistic models of occupational choice, where the occupational choice set is 
specified as employed full-time in white collar occupations, other occupations, enrolled 
in school, and neither in school nor employed full-time.  In addition, I estimate 
multinomial logistic selection models that control for the potential endogeneity of 
underage drinking.  The results suggest underage college drinking is not associated with 
young men’s initial occupational choices, with the exception of the decision to be 
enrolled in school.  Young men with any underage college days where they drank two or 
more drinks are 28.9% less likely to be enrolled in school after completing a bachelor’s 
degree. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The three essays in this dissertation focus on aspects of behavior and public 
policy related to vulnerable populations.  The first essay, “The Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program and Food Insecurity,” reviews the recent theory, literature, and 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) participation on food insecurity and replicates the modeling strategies used in the 
empirical literature.  Essay two, “Measuring the Effect of Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program Participation on Food Insecurity Using a Behavioral Rasch Selection 
Model,” estimates the effectiveness of SNAP participation in reducing food insecurity 
among low-income households.  The third essay, “Underage College Drinking and the 
Occupational Choices of Recent College Graduates,” examines the relationship between 
underage college drinking and the initial occupational choices of college graduates. 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food 
Stamp Program) is intended to help low-income households obtain more nutritious food 
than they could otherwise afford.  In doing so, the SNAP should—in both a normative 
and a positive sense—reduce households’ food hardships.  However, only recently has 
research begun to confirm this common sense association. 
Since 1995, the United States has regularly measured food hardships nationally, 
using the Food Security Scale, a 10- to 18-item index that is intended to capture 
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households’ “access at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life” (Coleman-
Jensen et al., 2012).  The latest data indicate that 85% of U.S. households were food 
secure in 2011, while 15% (17.9 million households with 50.1 million people) were not.  
More often than not, researchers find that the receipt of SNAP benefits is associated with 
more, rather than fewer, food hardships.  Are our common-sense predictions wrong, or 
are there statistical problems that confound the estimates?  What are the methodological 
and, more importantly, the policy and well-being implications of the results?  In the first 
essay, coauthored with Christian Gregory and David C. Ribar, we review the recent 
theory and empirical evidence regarding the effect of SNAP participation on food 
security.  Using data from the Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement 
(CPS-FSS), we estimate most of the modelling strategies used in the empirical literature. 
The main finding of this study is that recent results showing that food assistance 
reduces food insecurity may not be robust to specification choice or data.  As in other 
research, most of our simple models suggest a higher conditional mean of food insecurity 
prevalence associated with SNAP.  Moreover, the results for propensity score and 
longitudinal models mirror those in the empirical literature in showing, quite 
counterintuitively, that SNAP is associated with increases in food insecurity prevalence.  
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) results are a bit more consistent with recent findings, 
although the estimated sizes of the effects are statistically insignificant.  Similarly, our 
findings using dummy endogenous approaches yield somewhat inconsistent results, with 
many of the statistically significant results being for married parent households with 
children.  Most of the results using this method yield parameter estimates with the 
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appropriate sign, even when they are not significant.  The dose-response models are 
consistent with previous research in that they suggest larger amounts of SNAP benefits 
are associated with a reduction in the likelihood of food insecurity. 
In the second essay, “Measuring the Effect of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program Participation on Food Insecurity Using a Behavioral Rasch Selection Model,” I 
examine the effectiveness of SNAP in reducing food insecurity among low-income 
households using data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS.  Low-income households are 
disaggregated into four policy relevant subsamples: unmarried parent households, 
married parent households, all-elderly households, and other adult-only households. 
Estimation of the relationship between SNAP participation and food insecurity is 
complicated by the fact that selection issues may be contributing to counterintuitive 
findings.  Households participating in SNAP are likely to differ in both observable and 
unobservable ways from non-participating households.  However, several studies that 
control for selection on unobservable characteristics generate inconclusive results.  These 
studies rely on a single binary measure of food insecurity.  While the interpretation of the 
food insecure versus food secure comparison is straightforward and easy to implement, 
considerable information is being suppressed.  Information is lost when broad categories 
are created using responses to questions from the Food Security Scale.  Therefore, the use 
of a single binary measure is likely contributing to the generation of insignificant results. 
For the multivariate analyses of food insecurity, I estimate behavioral Rasch 
models.  The Rasch model assumes responses to the Food Security Scale questions may 
be modeled as indicators of a single underlying index of food hardships, such as food 
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insecurity.  Simultaneously modeling the outcomes this way leads to more efficient 
estimation.  I modify the standard Rasch model to incorporate a behavioral component 
and to account for selection on contemporaneous unobservables.  The models are 
identified using exogenous changes in state-level policies and rules related to SNAP.  
Instrumental variables capture information on policies related to vehicle asset rules, 
outreach activities, recertification intervals, and immigrant eligibility. 
Descriptive analyses of my data reproduce the findings of previous studies that 
SNAP receipt is associated with higher rates of food insecurity.  Estimates from the 
multivariate models, which attempt to control for selection on observable characteristics, 
also yield the counterintuitive result of SNAP increasing food insecurity.  However, after 
controlling for selection on unobservable characteristics, I find a highly significant and 
negative relationship between SNAP receipt and food insecurity for all household 
subsamples, with the exception of unmarried parent households.  Participating in SNAP 
reduces the probability of food insecurity by 17% for married parent households, 18% for 
all-elderly households, and 22.4% for other adult-only households.  When using a single 
binary measure of food insecurity instead of the Rasch specification, the results are 
inconclusive.  My findings are robust to the use of alternative program participation 
indicators, the choice of instrumental variables, and sample restrictions based on 
household income. 
My third dissertation essay considers the potential disadvantage of underage 
college drinking.  A distinguishing feature of young adulthood is the number of choices 
made with potentially lifelong consequences.  While in college young adults make 
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choices about their drinking behaviors, which have implications for their health, 
schooling, and labor market outcomes.  Upon completing the requirements for a 
bachelor’s degree, many of these young adults transition from schooling to full-time 
permanent jobs for the first time.  While searching for employment, young adults must 
make critical choices about their industry and occupation.  In the third essay, “Underage 
College Drinking and the Occupational Choices of Recent College Graduates,” I examine 
the relationship between underage college drinking and the initial occupational choices of 
college graduates using data on young men from the 1997 cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).  I depart from the previous literature by 
focusing on initial occupational choices which allows me to construct a sample of young 
men who are facing the same occupational choices and level of education.  This allows 
me to address important timing issues that have received little attention by the previous 
literature. 
For the multivariate analyses, I estimate multinomial logistic (MNL) models of 
occupational choice, where occupational choice is specified as employed full-time in 
white-collar occupations, other occupations, in school, and neither in school or employed 
full-time.  These models control for young men’s demographic and background 
characteristics, survey design, economic characteristics, and region and year fixed-
effects.  In addition, I also estimate MNL selection models (Terza, 2002; Terza & 
Vechnak, 2011) that control for potential unobserved heterogeneity related to underage 
drinking. 
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Based on specification tests and robustness checks, my preferred specification is a 
MNL model that controls for selection on young men’s observable characteristics but that 
omits special controls for unobserved characteristics.  The results suggest underage 
college drinking, regardless of how it is measured, is not associated with the probability 
of being employed full-time in white-collar occupations, other occupations, or neither in 
school nor employed full-time.  In contrast, young men with any underage college days 
with two or more drinks are five percentage points (29.8%) less likely to be enrolled in 
school after completing a bachelor’s degree.  This result, while large, is consistent with 
the findings of Dee and Evans (2003).  As a result, underage drinking has important 
implications for young men who are seeking professional occupations.  For these 
students, any comparative advantages they possess cannot overcome the detrimental 
effects of excessive underage college drinking.  Since professional occupations rely 
heavily on human capital, the mechanism that is occurring here is likely a reduction in 
study effort, which translates into poor grades.  College administrators and public policy 
makers can use the evidence presented in this analysis to target polices at the drinking 
behaviors of students in pre-professional programs.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
AND FOOD INSECURITY 
 
 
Co-authored with Christian Gregory and David C. Ribar1 
 
 
Abstract 
 This chapter reviews recent theory and empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
SNAP on food insecurity and replicates the modelling strategies used in the empirical 
literature.  The authors find that recent evidence suggesting an ameliorative effect of 
SNAP on food insecurity may not be robust to specification choice or data.  Most 
specifications mirror the existing literature in finding a positive association of food 
insecurity with SNAP participation.  Two-stage least squares and control function 
methods do show that SNAP reduces food insecurity, but effects are not consistent across 
sub-populations and are not always statistically significant. 
Introduction 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food 
Stamp Program) is intended to help low-income households obtain more nutritious food 
than they could otherwise afford.  In so doing, the SNAP should—in both a normative 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the “Five Decades of Food Stamps” research conference, 
September 20, 2013 in Washington, DC and at the 16th Labour Econometrics Workshop, August 10, 2013 
in Melbourne, Australia.  The authors thank John Pepper, Steven Stillman, and conference participants for 
helpful comments.  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of 
the ERS or USDA. 
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and a positive sense—reduce households’ food hardships.  However, only recently has 
research begun to confirm this common sense association. 
Since 1995, the United States has regularly measured food hardships nationally, 
using the Food Security Scale, a 10- to 18-item index that is intended to capture 
households’ “access at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life” (Coleman-
Jensen, Nord, Andrews, & Carlson, 2012).  The latest data indicate that 85% of U.S. 
households were food secure in 2011, while 15% (17.9 million households with 50.1 
million people) were not.  More often than not, researchers find that the receipt of SNAP 
benefits is associated with more, rather than fewer, food hardships.  For example, 
Coleman-Jensen et al. (2012) report that among households with incomes below 130% of 
the poverty line (households that meet the gross income test for SNAP receipt), 52% of 
SNAP participants reported being food insecure compared to 28% of non-participants. 
Obviously, this example demonstrates simple association, rather than causation.  
But it hasn’t been until quite recently that any methods have begun to get results 
consistent with the expectation that SNAP would reduce food insecurity.  Are our 
common-sense predictions wrong, or are there statistical problems that confound the 
estimates? What are the methodological and, more importantly, the policy and well-being 
implications of the results?  This chapter reviews and synthesizes previous research on 
these questions and conducts new analyses using several years of data from the Food 
Security Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS-FSS). 
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Measuring Food Insecurity and Other Food Hardships 
The principal instrument for measuring food security in the U.S. is the Food 
Security Module of the CPS-FSS.  The module asks 10 questions of all households and 
an additional eight questions of households with children, regarding progressively more 
severe hardships that range from anxiety over food running out to shortages of amounts 
and kinds of food to episodes of adults and children going without food for an entire day.  
All of the questions refer to the previous 12 months and are framed in terms of either 
shortages of money or affordability.  The CPS-FSS also asks 30-day questions based on 
the same items.  The items in the 12-month module are listed in Appendix A. 
The Food Security Module was developed after extensive research that began 
with a conceptualization of food security and insecurity and proceeded to qualitative 
fieldwork to elicit themes for potential items, the development of candidate items, 
statistical and qualitative analyses of the items’ validity and reliability, a selection of 
items, and a final scaling (see Hamilton et al., 1997).  The testing included formal Item 
Response Theory modelling (specifically Rasch modelling) and indicated that the items 
were consistent with a unidimensional underlying, or latent, measure. 
Household food security status is determined by summing the affirmed responses 
from the module.  Households that affirm two or fewer items are classified as being “food 
secure,” meaning that they have “consistent, dependable access to enough food for active, 
healthy living” (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2012, p. v).  Households without children that 
affirm three to five items and households with children that affirm three to seven items 
are classified as experiencing “low food security,” meaning that they “reported multiple 
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indications of food access problems, but typically . . . reported few, if any, indications of 
reduced food intake” (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2012, p. 4).  Households that affirm more 
items (six or more for households without children and eight or more for households with 
children) are classified as experiencing “very low food security,” meaning that the “food 
intake of one or more members was reduced and eating patterns (were) disrupted because 
of insufficient money and other resources for food” (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2012, p. 4).  
The low and very low food security categories together constitute food insecurity. 
The CPS-FSS Food Security Module has some limitations that should be kept in 
mind.  In a careful review of the food security scale, the National Academy of Sciences 
(Wunderlich & Norwood, 2006) identified several problems, including that the module 
captures other relevant food hardships, such as problems with the supply, safety, or 
quality of food; that the unidimensional model for developing the scale might not be 
appropriate; and that the CPS-FSS is based on a household sampling frame that omits 
institutionalized and homeless people.  Also, to lower the response burden on CPS 
subjects and to reduce the risks of false positive indications, the module is not asked of 
all households in the CPS-FSS but rather only of households that are at risk of insecurity 
because they have incomes below 185% of the poverty line, indicated that they are food 
insufficient, or indicated that they undertook actions to stretch their food budget.  
Although the food security measure is strongly associated with households’ income-to-
needs ratios (see, e.g., Coleman-Jensen et al. 2012), researchers have found that it has 
weak external validity in terms of some nutritional outcomes (Bhattacharya, Currie, & 
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Haider, 2004) and food expenditures (Gundersen & Ribar, 2011) and that items may have 
low reliability among parents and children (Fram et al., 2011). 
In addition to the 12-month, 18-item food security scale, research on the SNAP 
has used other measures of food hardships.  One of these, the food insufficiency measure, 
has already been mentioned.  The food insufficiency question asks households if they 
have, “enough of the kinds of food (they) want to eat, enough but not always the kinds of 
food (they) want to eat, sometimes not enough to eat, or often not enough to eat?” The 
CPS-FSS also follows up affirmative responses to the 12-month food security questions 
with questions about whether the hardships were experienced in the last 30 days; the 
responses from these questions are used to construct a 30-day measure of food insecurity. 
The 18-item food security module has been included in other U.S. surveys, such 
as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey.  However, due to time and budget constraints, some other surveys 
either ask the single-item food sufficiency question or a subset of the food security 
questions.  For example, recent panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) have asked six food security questions covering the previous four 
months; a food security scale has been developed from responses to five of these 
questions.  The National Health Interview Survey currently fields the 10-item 
questionnaire.  In general, measures derived from the full 18-item module, the food 
sufficiency question, and shorter modules are highly correlated. 
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Conceptual Analysis 
To consider the ways in which SNAP might affect food hardships, we rely on 
Barrett’s (2002) theoretical rational-choice model of how household food security is 
determined.2  Barrett extended the household production framework of Becker (1965) 
and Gronau (1977) and the health production framework of Grossman (1972) to include 
household nutrition and food security.  In Barrett’s model, households choose purchases, 
savings or borrowing, and allocations of time to further the objective of maximizing their 
members’ physical well-being and general consumption in the present, where they have 
full information about their circumstances, and in the future, where they have 
expectations about circumstances.  Households pursue these objectives subject to 
production, health, budget, and time constraints.  Specifically, each period’s physical 
well-being depends on the level of well-being from the previous period; inputs of 
nutrition, other goods or services, and activities; and arbitrary shocks from illnesses and 
injuries.  The nutritional inputs to physical well-being, in turn, are produced using inputs 
of food and other goods and of members’ time.  Each of these production functions is 
also conditioned by the household members’ human capital.  Also, households face 
subsistence constraints in the form of minimum amounts of nutrition to avoid hunger and 
minimum amounts of physical well-being to avoid impairment.  With respect to the 
budget constraint, households’ total per-period expenditures on food, other goods, and 
services must not exceed the sum of the members’ earnings plus the return on their 
                                                 
2 Caswell and Yaktine (2013), Gundersen and Gruber (2001), Gundersen and Oliveira (2001), Huffman and 
Jensen (2003), Meyerhoefer and Yang (2011), and Ribar and Hamrick (2003) also provide conceptual 
models. 
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savings and other assets plus any borrowing and less any savings.  The household 
members also have limits on the time available each period to work or participate in other 
activities. 
From Barrett’s framework, we can identify structural characteristics of 
households that increase the risk of food hardships.  First, hardships are more likely to 
occur if household members have low labor productivity (through circumstances such as 
disability, a lack of education, or very young or old age) that reduce their ability to work 
in the home and the labor market.  Second, households are at greater risk for hardships if 
they confront adverse terms of trade in the form of either low wages for the work they 
perform or high prices for the goods they purchase.  Third, households are also at 
increased risk of hardships if they lack access to labor markets or goods markets.  Fourth, 
risks are higher for households with low levels of savings and assets and for households 
with limited abilities to borrow and save.  Fifth, risks increase if households have weak 
social or public support systems.  Sixth, households face higher risks of food insecurity if 
their circumstances frequently leave them near the subsistence or food security 
thresholds, as this increases the chances that a given shock will knock them below the 
thresholds.  Seventh, a general susceptibility to negative shocks, perhaps because of 
marginal health, residence in an area with a volatile economy, or work in a vulnerable 
industry, increases the risks of becoming food insecure. 
We can also use Barrett’s model to consider how the SNAP should affect 
households’ food security.  In principle, the program’s EBT assistance should expand 
participating households’ budget sets and relax their resource constraints.  This should 
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allow households to purchase more food and reduce the incidence of food hardships, 
including food insecurity.  We would also anticipate complementary effects from the 
educational component of SNAP, which should increase household members’ shopping, 
planning, and food preparation skills and thereby make them more effective at 
transforming budgetary and other resources into nutritional inputs and physical well-
being outcomes. 
At the same time, other elements of SNAP participation might work against these 
effects.  First, means-testing of SNAP eligibility and benefits imposes an extra tax on 
market work, reducing poor people’s incentives to work and earn (or possibly 
incentivizing them to work “off-the-books” in less stable informal jobs).  These effects 
might be especially strong for households with children, where the receipt of SNAP 
confers categorical eligibility for free meals under the National School Lunch Program 
(NSLP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP) and adjunctive financial eligibility for the 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) 
program.  Second, program participants are vulnerable to losses of benefits if they fail to 
comply with program rules regarding recertification and mandated work activities (Ribar, 
Edelhoch, & Liu, 2008, 2010).  Ribar and Edelhoch (2008) found that recertification had 
especially detrimental participation effects for recipients who were marginally eligible 
financially and for recipients in very unstable circumstances.  More generally, income 
volatility could both increase the risks of food insecurity (Gundersen & Gruber, 2001) 
and affect eligibility for food assistance (e.g., Jolliffe & Ziliak, 2008).  Third, monthly 
cycles associated with SNAP issuance, spending, and benefit exhaustion could give rise 
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to periodic shortages of food (Wilde & Ranney, 2000).  Fourth, the increased time and 
preparation associated with SNAP-eligible food purchases as compared to other types of 
food purchases might negatively affect families.  Although each of these issues might 
reduce the effectiveness of the SNAP, we would still expect the program’s net effects to 
be positive. 
Although theory predicts a positive effect of SNAP on food security, there are 
many reasons why results produced from an observational empirical analysis might 
differ.  First and foremost, participation in the SNAP is endogenous.  Food security and 
SNAP participation are each influenced by a host of characteristics, and failure to 
measure or account for these characteristics in an empirical analysis can give rise to 
spurious associations.  For example, Joyce et al. (2012) document a host of hardships, 
including health problems, housing insecurity, and losses of utilities, that often 
accompany food hardships.  There is also a possibility that food hardships may prompt 
SNAP participation and that the empirical association may be affected by simultaneity 
bias.  Nord and Golla (2009) examined trajectories of food hardships prior to and after 
entering the SNAP; they found that food hardships rose in the months leading up to 
SNAP entry, suggesting that increased hardships motivated entry.  As we discuss in the 
next section, the endogeneity of SNAP participation has been a predominant 
methodological concern in empirical research.  Finally, mismeasurement and 
misreporting of food hardships and of SNAP participation may alter the observed 
relationships. 
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Previous Research 
A vast number of studies have investigated the impacts of the SNAP on 
American’s food outcomes.  Comprehensive reviews by Barrett (2002), Currie (2003), 
and Fox, Hamilton, and Lin (2004) summarize the research as consistently indicating that 
the SNAP is associated with higher expenditures on food and greater food and nutrient 
availability within households.  However, Currie (2003), Fox et al. (2004), and Wilde and 
Nord (2005) reach much different conclusions regarding the impact of SNAP on food 
insecurity and insufficiency and report that the results across studies are mixed and 
inconsistent.  A more recent review by Caswell and Yaktine (2013) is more sanguine 
about the studies of SNAP and food hardships, although it also acknowledges many 
inconclusive and counter-intuitive results.  Our review will focus on the statistical 
methodologies that studies have employed, summarize findings associated with those 
methodologies, and draw interpretations regarding potential biases.3 
Comparison of SNAP Participants and Non-Participants 
 Most of the research on the potential effects of the SNAP on food hardships has 
been based on comparisons of outcomes for program participants and non-participants.  
The studies generally restrict their analyses to people with incomes that are below or near 
the gross-income eligibility limit for the SNAP.4  The restrictions are intended to make 
the samples of participants and non-participants more comparable.  For studies that use 
the CPS-FSS, the restrictions also ensure that everyone in the samples was asked the 
                                                 
3 In addition to these reviews, Meyerhoefer and Yang (2011) have summarized research on the association 
of SNAP with people’s body weight and health. 
 
4 Borjas’s (2004) multivariate analysis is a notable exception. 
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questions in the food security module and thus avoid an artificial sample selection issue 
that arises from the screening conditions for the module. 
Descriptive results (comparisons of means) from each year’s CPS-FSS are 
reported by the Economic Research Service in its Household Food Security in the United 
States series (e.g., Coleman-Jensen et al., 2012).  Descriptive methods were also used in 
early research, such as Cohen et al. (1999).  The descriptive comparisons indicate that 
food insecurity is substantially higher in SNAP households than in other households. 
Multivariate statistical models include other observed measures, such as 
household size, race, and education of the household head, that are likely to be associated 
with both food hardships and SNAP participation and that may be sources of spurious 
associations.  Several researchers, including Alaimo, Briefel, Frongillo, and Olson (1998) 
and Bhattacharya and Currie (2001) estimated standard binary or continuous regression 
models of food hardships, and Ribar and Hamrick (2003) estimated binary event-history 
models of entry into and exit from these conditions.  Although the use of observed 
controls reduced the associations of SNAP participation and food hardships in these 
studies, substantial positive conditional associations remained. 
A few standard-regression studies have generated different findings using 
narrower analysis samples and alternative participation comparisons in attempts to 
mitigate selection issues.  Kabbani and Kmeid (2006) found that SNAP participation was 
negatively associated with 30-day food insecurity among a low-income sample of CPS-
FSS households that were food insecure according to the 12-month measure.  Rather than 
considering general comparisons of SNAP participants and non-participants, Gundersen 
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and Gruber (2001) and Mykerezi and Mills (2010) focused on households that had lost 
benefits and found that such losses raised households’ risks of food insufficiency and 
insecurity.  Mabli, Ohls, Dragoset, Castner, and Santos (2013) compared food security 
outcomes for SNAP households at the starts of their participation spells and six months 
into those spells and found that food hardships decreased with households’ SNAP 
tenures. 
Matching techniques offer a more general and robust approach to addressing 
selection based on observable characteristics.  Gibson-Davis and Foster (2006) employed 
propensity-score matching (PSM; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) to compare SNAP 
participants and non-participants.  They found that matching led to lower associations 
between SNAP and the incidence of food insecurity than standard logistic binary 
regressions but that many of the associations remained significantly positive.  In a few 
specifications, that jointly (a) considered the food insecurity Rasch score, (b) were 
restricted to households that affirmed at least one food security item, and (c) were limited 
to a narrow range of propensity scores, Gibson-Davis and Foster found the expected 
negative associations. 
Standard regression models and matching techniques address selection based on 
observable variables.  If we assume that the theoretical model is indeed correct, the 
preponderance of counter-intuitive findings from the regression and matching studies 
indicates that selection must be coming from unobservable characteristics or 
simultaneity.  When longitudinal data are available, multivariate fixed-effects methods 
can be used to account for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that might be 
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confounded with both SNAP participation and food hardships.  Wilde and Nord (2005) 
estimated household-level fixed effects models using the two-year panels that can be 
constructed from the CPS-FSS, and Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick (2013) estimated 
fixed effects models using data on households with elderly people from the Health and 
Retirement Survey.  Both studies found that SNAP participation continued to be 
positively associated with food insecurity, even after fixed-effects controls were applied.  
The findings suggest that time-varying unobserved influences or simultaneity are a 
source of bias. 
Instrumental variables methods, including two-stage least squares (2SLS), 
endogenous latent variable models, and dummy endogenous variable models, can address 
these other sources of bias.  2SLS and endogenous latent variable models rely on variable 
exclusions for identification.  For these exclusions to be valid, the excluded variables—
the instruments—must be strongly predictive of SNAP participation and must only affect 
food hardships through their effects on SNAP participation (i.e., must not independently 
predict food hardships).  Dummy endogenous variable models, such as bivariate probit, 
can be formally identified through the functional forms in the model if there is sufficient 
variation in the explanatory variables (Wilde 2000).  In practice, however, this source of 
identification can be weak, and researchers typically bolster identification through 
variable exclusions.  A challenge for endogenous variable studies has been to uncover 
appropriate instruments. 
Results based on two-stage and latent endogenous variable methods have been 
inconclusive.  Borjas (2004) examined the effects of public assistance (including but not 
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limited to SNAP receipt) on food insecurity, using citizenship and years since migration 
as instruments.  Borjas found the anticipated negative associations, but most of his 
estimates were only marginally significant.  Gundersen and Oliveira (2001) and Huffman 
and Jensen (2003) applied endogenous latent variable methods but obtained imprecise 
and statistically insignificant results.  Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick (2013) 
estimated 2SLS models for elderly households from the Health and Retirement Survey in 
specifications that also included household-specific fixed effects.  They generated 
estimates that were imprecise and statistically insignificant.  Shaefer and Gutierrez (2012) 
also estimated 2SLS models using data from three panels of the SIPP and obtained 
statistically insignificant results. 
In contrast, researchers who have applied dummy endogenous variable models 
have estimated strong negative associations.  Yen, Andrews, Chen, and Eastwood (2008) 
found that SNAP participation was negatively associated with households’ 30-day food 
insecurity Rasch scores; however, the researchers used a choice-based sample (the 1996-
7 National Food Stamp Program Survey) with an over-representation of SNAP 
participants.5 Mykerezi and Mills (2010) estimated a negative association between 
households’ SNAP participation and food insecurity using data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics.  Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Zhang (2011) and Shaefer and Gutierrez 
(2012) obtained similar findings with data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation.  Shaefer and Gutierrez estimated dummy endogenous variable models with 
and without variable exclusion restrictions with little change in their results, which 
                                                 
5 The researchers used sampling weights to address this issue. 
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suggested that identification for this entire group of studies may have been obtained 
mainly from functional form. 
The preceding statistical approaches all make strong assumptions in order to 
identify an effect of SNAP on food hardships.  Additionally, these methods differ in what 
they measure.  For example, propensity score matching models identify the average effect 
of the treatment on the treated (ATET), while 2SLS methods isolate the local average 
treatment effect (LATE)—that is, the effect of SNAP participation for those whose 
decision to participate is altered by the value of instruments or excluded variables.  The 
dummy endogenous variables models mentioned here are aimed at identifying the 
average treatment effect (ATE) of SNAP—that is, the expected outcome if SNAP were 
given to a randomly assigned person in the population of interest.  While the ATE might 
also be identified by longitudinal models, such models rely on the additional assumption 
that endogenous unobservables are time-invariant; as noted, this assumption seems to be 
at odds with current evidence.6 
An alternative approach to introducing model assumptions a priori is to bound the 
possible impacts first using logical probability restrictions and then introducing relatively 
weak assumptions (see Manski, 1995 as general reference).  While this approach reduces 
the reliance on strong assumptions, it tends to produce a wide range of plausible effects.  
Gundersen and Kreider (2008) have used the bounds approach to show that the same data 
that generate counter-intuitive differences in participants’ and non-participants’ food 
                                                 
6 A fuller discussion of these issues in relation to food assistance programs can be found in Meyerhoefer 
and Yang (2011). 
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hardships are also consistent with underlying negative impacts when the possible 
influence of measurement error is accounted for. 
Dose-Response Relationships 
 Another branch of the research literature has considered how food hardships 
change with more generous SNAP benefits or more intense participation (i.e., with a 
higher “dose” of the SNAP “treatment”).  For example, in the most recent Household 
Food Security in the United States report, Coleman-Jensen et al. (2012) estimate that the 
rate of food insecurity was 56.0% among households that received SNAP benefits for 1 
to 11 months during the preceding year but only 49.1% among households that receive 
SNAP benefits for all 12 months.  Similarly, Mabli et al. (2013) found that food security 
prevalence decreased significantly for households that participated in SNAP for six 
months. 
Studies with multivariate designs find similar evidence.  Rose, Gunderson, and 
Oliveira (1998) estimated logit models of food insufficiency and found that higher levels 
of SNAP benefits were significantly negatively associated with food insufficiency.  
DePolt, Moffitt, and Ribar (2009) obtained similar results, estimating longitudinal 
multiple-indicator, multiple cause models of food insecurity.  Van Hook and Balistreri 
(2006) used predicted measures of unmet program need in the form of reduced 
probabilities of SNAP participation and reduced SNAP allotments and found that these 
were positivity associated with hardships.  Watson et al. (2012) found a strong dose-
response effect of SNAP in reducing children’s food insecurity. 
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Indirect Analyses 
 All of the preceding studies examined how an individual household’s receipt or 
use of SNAP benefits was associated with its own food hardships.  Several studies have 
investigated how measures of characteristics that are associated with the general 
availability of SNAP are associated with hardships.  For example, Borjas (2004) showed 
how food insecurity for non-citizen immigrants jumped relative to food insecurity for 
native and naturalized citizens following the enactment of the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunities Act of 1996.  Nord and Prell (2011) compared 30-day food 
insecurity before and after SNAP benefits were increased as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; they found that food insecurity fell for 
households that were income-eligible for the SNAP but not for near-eligible households, 
suggesting that the higher benefits reduced hardships.  Other studies, however, have 
found weaker associations or no associations.  Using data from the CPS-FSS, Bartfeld 
and Dunifon (2006) found that state-level SNAP participation was associated with food 
security for above-poverty, low-income households but not for below-poverty 
households.  Using data from Oregon, Bernell, Weber, and Edwards (2006) found that 
county-level SNAP participation was not associated with food insecurity. 
Replication Analysis 
Although there are many consistent results and patterns across the empirical 
studies of SNAP and food hardships, there are also considerable differences.  Besides 
differing in their statistical methodologies, previous studies have differed in their 
measures of food hardships, measures of SNAP receipt, choice of surveys and time 
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periods, and selection of analysis samples within those surveys.  In this section, we 
attempt to replicate previous findings by employing most of the statistical methodologies 
to a single dataset—the 2009-2011 waves of the CPS-FSS.7 
For each of these years of the CPS-FSS, we select households with annual 
incomes at or below 130% of the federal poverty line.  Besides being the income cut-off 
used to examine SNAP in the annual Household Food Security in the United States 
reports, this threshold also leads to a sample that meets the gross-income test for SNAP 
and that satisfies the screen for answering the Food Security Module.  We additionally 
restrict our analysis sample to households that responded to the FSS, that provided 
sufficient information to determine their food security status, and that provided 
information for other FSS measures that we use as explanatory variables. 
For our analyses, we consider a sample that combines all households that meet the 
preceding criteria, but we also consider four mutually exclusive subsets of households: 
unmarried parent households with children under age 18, married parent households with 
children under age 18, households consisting entirely of members who are age 60 or 
older, and other adult-only households.  These types of low-income households differ in 
their susceptibility to food hardships, are subject to different rules under the SNAP, and 
are differently eligible for other types of public assistance.  Disaggregating this way 
increases the comparability of households within groups; it also helps us to ascertain the 
                                                 
7 We focus on 2009-2011 because it is the most recent period available with consistent federal policies.  
The period includes the 15% benefit increase and other provisions from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.  Extending the analysis further back would entail accounting for these policy 
changes. 
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robustness of our findings and the findings of previous studies that have adopted different 
analysis groups. 
The outcome variable in most of our analyses is a binary indicator for the 
household being food insecure, which is constructed from the 12-month, 18-item Food 
Security Module.  Our principal explanatory variables are indicators for the receipt of any 
SNAP benefits and a continuous measure of SNAP benefits.  In some of our analyses, we 
use an indicator for the receipt of SNAP benefits any time during the preceding year.  
This is the first SNAP question that is asked in the CPS-FSS, and its reference period 
corresponds with the reference period for the Food Security Module items.  In other 
analyses, we use an indicator for the receipt of SNAP benefits in the month preceding the 
interview.  Although this question is asked conditional on the annual measure, it may be 
more reliably reported.  We also consider this measure because of its use in previous 
research and because preliminary analyses showed that it led to a distinct result pattern.  
For our final analyses, we use a continuous measure of annual SNAP benefits which 
allows us to examine the dose-response of households to SNAP. 
For our multivariate analyses, we incorporate numerous additional controls that 
are available in the CPS-FSS; most of these are standard and have been used in previous 
research.  The controls include the household head’s gender, age, race, ethnicity, nativity, 
marital status, education, and employment status; numbers of adults, children, and 
disabled members in the household; age of youngest member (households with children); 
an indicator for elderly members; residence in urban area; the state unemployment rate; 
household income; home ownership; food needs; receipt of SBP, NSLP, and WIC 
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benefits (households with children); the use of food banks and soup kitchens; and state 
and year fixed effects.  Means and standard deviations for our explanatory variables, 
calculated separately for SNAP participants and non-participants, for in each of our four 
analysis subsamples are in Appendix B. 
We start our replication analysis by estimating linear probability models (LPMs) 
of households’ food insecurity status.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for the 
SNAP receipt explanatory variable from alternative specifications and analysis samples 
are listed in Table 1.  All of the regressions in Table 1 incorporate sampling weights 
provided with the CPS-FSS that adjust for the CPS sampling design and for differential 
response in the FSS.  Estimates for the entire combined sample of households are 
reported in the first column of the table.  The subsequent columns report estimates 
separately for the mutually exclusive subsamples of unmarried parent households, 
married parent households, households composed entirely of elderly members, and other 
adult-only households.  The top panel lists estimates from models that include measures 
of any SNAP receipt in the previous year, while the bottom panel lists results from 
models of SNAP receipt in the previous month. 
The first row in each panel of Table 1 reports coefficients from simple univariate 
LPMs of food insecurity regressed on SNAP receipt.  The estimates, which represent 
unconditional differences in average food insecurity between SNAP participants and non-
participants, are all strongly positive and consistent with estimates from previous 
descriptive analyses, such as Coleman-Jensen et al. (2012). 
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Table 1 
Coefficients on SNAP Receipt from Linear Probability Models 
  
 
All 
households 
HHs with 
children and 
unmarried 
parents 
HHs with 
children and 
married 
parents 
Households 
with all 
elderly 
members 
 
Other 
adult-only 
households 
Received SNAP in last year 
LPM with no other 
controls 
0.288*** 
(0.007) 
0.188*** 
(0.015) 
0.237*** 
(0.017) 
0.290*** 
(0.018) 
0.314*** 
(0.012) 
LPM with standard 
controls a 
0.226*** 
(0.008) 
0.184*** 
(0.016) 
0.231*** 
(0.018) 
0.229*** 
(0.019) 
0.256*** 
(0.014) 
LPM with standard and  
economic controls b 
0.207*** 
(0.008) 
0.164*** 
(0.016) 
0.209*** 
(0.019) 
0.215*** 
(0.019) 
0.234*** 
(0.014) 
LPM with standard, 
economic, and other 
assistance controls c 
0.136*** 
(0.008) 
0.088*** 
(0.017) 
0.116*** 
(0.019) 
0.174*** 
(0.020) 
0.161*** 
(0.014) 
Received SNAP in last month 
LPM with no other 
controls 
0.256*** 
(0.007) 
0.140*** 
(0.015) 
0.198*** 
(0.018) 
0.272*** 
(0.019) 
0.293*** 
(0.013) 
LPM with standard 
controls a 
0.187*** 
(0.008) 
0.131*** 
(0.016) 
0.188*** 
(0.019) 
0.206*** 
(0.020) 
0.227*** 
(0.014) 
LPM with standard and  
economic controls b 
0.166*** 
(0.008) 
0.108*** 
(0.016) 
0.162*** 
(0.019) 
0.192*** 
(0.020) 
0.204*** 
(0.015) 
LPM with standard, 
economic, and other 
assistance controls c 
0.095*** 
(0.009) 
0.032* 
(0.016) 
0.066*** 
(0.020) 
0.152*** 
(0.020) 
0.132*** 
(0.014) 
Note. LPMs estimated using weighted household data from the 2009-11 CPS-FSS.  Robust standard errors appear in 
parentheses. 
a Control for household head’s gender, age, age squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status, and education; numbers 
of adults, children, and disabled members in household; age of youngest member (households with children);  elderly 
members; residence in urban area; state unemployment rate; and state and year fixed effects.  LPMs for all households 
also control for household type. 
b Control for head’s employment status, log of household income, home ownership, log of food needs, and indicator for 
missing food needs. 
c Control for participation in SBP, NSLP and WIC (households with children) and use of food pantries or soup 
kitchens. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
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The differences are largest for the two groups of adult-only households and 
smallest for single-parent households.  Also consistent with previous analyses, the 
differences in food insecurity are appreciably larger when SNAP receipt is measured on a 
previous-year basis rather than a previous-month basis. 
The second rows in the panels list coefficients from LPMs that add controls for 
demographic characteristics of the households and their heads, geographic attributes, and 
state and time fixed effects.  Adding these controls substantially reduces the estimated 
associations between SNAP receipt and food insecurity for the two groups of adult-only 
households but only slightly reduces the associations for the two groups of households 
with children. 
The third rows report coefficients from specifications that also add controls for 
employment status, household income, home ownership, and subjectively-assessed food 
needs, and the use of these controls attenuates the associations between SNAP receipt and 
food insecurity more.  Finally, the last rows in the panels add controls for SBP, NSLP, 
and WIC program participation for the households with children and food bank and soup 
kitchen use for all households.  Although these controls further reduce the estimated 
coefficients, the conditional associations between SNAP receipt and food insecurity 
remain positive and statistically distinguishable from zero.  The patterns of results are 
consistent with previous research findings that observed controls attenuate but do not 
eliminate the counter-intuitive positive associations between SNAP participation and 
food insecurity. 
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We next consider matching estimates as a more general way to mitigate 
confounding influences from observable characteristics.  Results from this analysis are 
reported in Table 2, which follows the organization from Table 1 with estimates arranged 
by analysis groups in columns, by the periodicity of SNAP receipt in top and bottom 
panels, and by the type or specification of the estimator in rows within panels.  Because 
of questions regarding the interpretation of sample weights in matching analyses, we 
report results computed with unweighted data.  For purposes of comparison with our 
previous estimates, we report unconditional differences in food insecurity between SNAP 
participants and non-participants in the first rows of the panels and report coefficients 
from LPMs with our standard and economic controls (the same parameterizations as the 
third rows from Table 1) in the second rows.  The estimates in the first two rows indicate 
that weighting has no substantive impact on the estimates for households with children 
but modest impacts for the two groups of adult-only households. 
The third rows of the panels in Table 2 list the differences between the average 
rates of food insecurity between our participant samples and matched non-participant 
samples.  The samples were matched using predicted probabilities from logit models of 
SNAP participation that included our standard and economic controls.  For the matching 
itself, we selected nearest match neighbors with replacement and restricted the matches to 
the common support of the predicted probabilities (virtually the entire range of 
probabilities).  Analyses (not shown) confirm that the matched samples were balanced in 
terms of the observed control variables. 
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Table 2 
Coefficients on SNAP Receipt from Simple, LPM, and PSM Comparisons 
  
 
All 
households 
HHs with 
children and 
unmarried 
parents 
HHs with 
children and 
married 
parents 
Households 
with all 
elderly 
members 
 
Other 
adult-only 
households 
Received SNAP in last year 
  Bivariate comparison 0.281
*** 
(0.006) 
0.186*** 
(0.013) 
0.234*** 
(0.015) 
0.274*** 
(0.013) 
0.300*** 
(0.010) 
  LPM 0.197
*** 
(0.007) 
0.165*** 
(0.014) 
0.208*** 
(0.016) 
0.218*** 
(0.013) 
0.227*** 
(0.011) 
  PSM comparison 0.184
*** 
(0.011) 
0.174*** 
(0.022) 
0.207*** 
(0.023) 
0.229*** 
(0.022) 
0.230*** 
(0.018) 
Received SNAP in last month 
  Bivariate comparison 0.252
*** 
(0.006) 
0.144*** 
(0.013) 
0.199*** 
(0.016) 
0.258*** 
(0.013) 
0.278*** 
(0.011) 
  LPM 0.159
*** 
(0.007) 
0.114*** 
(0.014) 
0.166*** 
(0.017) 
0.200*** 
(0.014) 
0.197*** 
(0.012) 
  PSM comparison 0.135
*** 
(0.011) 
0.111*** 
(0.021) 
0.156*** 
(0.024) 
0.165*** 
(0.023) 
0.220*** 
(0.019) 
Note. Estimates from unweighted household data from the 2009-11 CPS-FSS.  LP and PSM models control for 
household head’s gender, age, age squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status, education, and employment status; 
numbers of adults, children, and disabled members in household; age of youngest member (households with children); 
elderly members; residence in urban area; state unemployment rate; log of household income; home ownership; log of 
food needs; missing food needs; and state and year fixed effects.  Models for all households also control for household 
type.  PSM comparisons use nearest-neighbor matching with replacement.  Robust standard errors appear in 
parentheses. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
Turning to the results in the table, differences in food insecurity in the matched 
samples are mostly smaller than the unconditional differences and the regression-based 
conditional differences.  Despite the general attenuation in the estimated differences, all 
of them remain significantly and substantively positive, mirroring the results reported by 
Gibson-Davis and Foster (2006) for the incidence of food insecurity. 
We next consider longitudinal estimators.  The design of the CPS, in which 
rotation groups of households are interviewed for four consecutive months, left alone for 
31 
 
eight months, and then re-interviewed for four more consecutive months, allows the 
construction of short, two-year panels from adjoining years of the CPS-FSS.  As with 
Wilde and Nord (2005), we take advantage of this feature to produce longitudinal 
analysis datasets and to estimate panel data models.  The longitudinal data from the CPS-
FSS have some limitations beyond their short lengths.  Most importantly, the units that 
the CPS follows are physical addresses, not individuals or households.  Thus, people who 
move between surveys cannot be longitudinally linked and effectively attrit from the 
panels.  Also, the CPS does not produce sampling weights for longitudinally-linked CPS-
FSS households, so we conduct our statistical analyses using unweighted data. 
Results from our longitudinal analyses are reported in Table 3.  For purposes of 
comparison, we estimate LPMs with our standard and economic controls but using the 
unweighted longitudinal sample.  Estimates from these specifications in the first rows of 
the panels are all very similar to the LPMs for the full sample.  The results reassure us 
that there is little, if any, selection bias associated with CPS-FSS longitudinal sample 
attrition. 
Estimates from panel-data random- and fixed-effect LPMs are reported in the 
second and third rows of the top and bottom panels of Table 3.  Comparisons of these 
estimates reveal that accounting for unobserved time-invariant characteristics through the 
use of fixed effects reduces the estimated associations between SNAP receipt and food 
insecurity.  However, large positive and statistically significant associations remain for 
all groups except for unmarried parent households when SNAP is measured on the basis 
of the previous month.  Formal specification tests are reported below the random- 
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(Breusch-Pagan) and fixed-effect (Hausman-Wu) LPM estimates in the top and bottom 
panels of Table 3.  The LPMs are strongly rejected by the Breusch-Pagan test in favor of 
the random effect LPMs for all household types, regardless of how SNAP is measured.  
Hausman-Wu tests fail to reject the null that the random effect LPMs are consistent for 
unmarried parent households.  For all other groups, the random effect LPM is rejected in 
favor of the fixed effect LPM.  This result strengthens when SNAP is measured on the 
basis of the previous month. 
 
Table 3 
Coefficients and Marginal Effects for SNAP Receipt from Longitudinal Models 
 
 
 
All 
households 
HHs with 
children and 
unmarried 
parents 
HHs with 
children and 
married 
parents 
Households 
with all 
elderly 
members 
 
Other 
adult-only 
households 
Received SNAP in last year 
  LPM  0.188
*** 
(0.011) 
0.149*** 
(0.024) 
0.184*** 
(0.025) 
0.193*** 
(0.023) 
0.214*** 
(0.019) 
  Random effects LPM  0.176
*** 
(0.010) 
0.135*** 
(0.024) 
0.178*** 
(0.023) 
0.190*** 
(0.018) 
0.193*** 
(0.018) 
  Breusch-Pagan Test      [0.000]      [0.000]      [0.000]      [0.000]      [0.000] 
  Fixed effects LPM  0.114
*** 
(0.016) 
0.090*** 
(0.034) 
0.126*** 
(0.039) 
0.168*** 
(0.031) 
0.098*** 
(0.029) 
  Hausman-Wu Test      [0.000]      [0.175]      [0.150]      [0.000]      [0.000] 
  Logit 0.169
*** 
(0.011) 
0.147*** 
(0.024) 
0.175*** 
(0.024) 
0.163*** 
(0.022) 
0.197*** 
(0.019) 
  Fixed effects logit 0.085 (0.073) 
0.049 
(0.090) 
0.196 
(0.136) 
0.045 
(0.119) 
0.102 
(0.078) 
Received SNAP in last month 
  LPM  0.159
*** 
(0.011) 
0.098*** 
(0.024) 
0.166*** 
(0.026) 
0.183*** 
(0.024) 
0.182*** 
(0.020) 
  Random effects LPM  0.146
*** 
(0.010) 
0.085*** 
(0.023) 
0.154*** 
(0.024) 
0.179*** 
(0.019) 
0.163*** 
(0.019) 
  Breusch-Pagan Test      [0.000]      [0.000]      [0.000]      [0.000]      [0.000] 
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Table 3 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 
 
 
All 
households 
HHs with 
children and 
unmarried 
parents 
HHs with 
children and 
married 
parents 
Households 
with all 
elderly 
members 
 
Other 
adult-only 
households 
Received SNAP in last month (cont.) 
  Fixed effects LPM  0.082
*** 
(0.016) 
0.046 
(0.033) 
0.085** 
(0.038) 
0.155*** 
(0.031) 
0.072** 
(0.029) 
  Hausman-Wu Test      [0.000]      [0.197]      [0.044]      [0.000]      [0.000] 
  Logit 0.140
*** 
(0.011) 
0.095*** 
(0.023) 
0.155*** 
(0.025) 
0.156*** 
(0.021) 
0.165*** 
(0.020) 
  Fixed effects logit 0.051 (0.048) 
0.024 
(0.048) 
0.091 
(0.151) 
0.025 
(0.076) 
0.078 
(0.066) 
Note: Models estimated using unweighted longitudinally-linked household data from the 2009-11 CPS-FSS and control 
for household head’s gender, age, age squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status, education, and employment 
status; numbers of adults, children, and disabled members in household; age of youngest member (households with 
children);  elderly members; residence in urban area; state unemployment rate; log of household income; home 
ownership; log of food needs; missing food needs; and state and year fixed effects.  Models for all households also 
control for household type.  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses .P values are in brackets. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
To investigate the possible sensitivity of these findings to the use of LPMs rather 
than more specialized binary outcome models, we re-estimated the standard and fixed-
effects models using standard and conditional, fixed-effect logit specifications, 
respectively.  Average marginal effects were calculated for these models to facilitate 
comparison with the LPMs.  Marginal effects from the logit models are qualitatively 
similar to the coefficients from the LPMs in most cases, though the marginal effects from 
the fixed-effect logit models are all statistically insignificant. 
Next, we investigate evidence from 2SLS and dummy endogenous variable 
models.  Asymptotic standard errors for the average marginal effects generated by the 
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dummy endogenous variable models are estimated using the delta method.8  For each 
type of model, we consider two potential instruments: an indicator for the household head 
being a non-citizen and an estimate derived from the SNAP Quality Control files of the 
median certification interval from SNAP cases in the household’s state of residence.  
Non-citizen status is a consistently significant explanatory variable in models of SNAP 
participation for our samples.  However, its use as an instrument is controversial because 
cultural and assimilation differences between non-citizens and other U.S. residents could 
contribute directly to experiences and reporting of food hardships.  Certification intervals 
have a stronger theoretical basis for serving as instruments, but they are only modestly 
predictive in our samples.9  To test the sensitivity of our 2SLS and dummy endogenous 
variable results, we estimate models first using both instruments and then using just the 
certification interval instrument.  Estimates from our specifications are reported in Table 
4. 
For convenience, we reproduce the LPM estimates from our specifications with 
standard and economic explanatory variables in the first rows of the panels of Table 4.  
The second rows list estimates and a Hausman-Wu test from 2SLS models that are 
identified from exclusions on non-citizenship status and certification intervals.  The 
coefficient estimates for all households and for households with children are large and 
negative, while the coefficient estimates for households with all elderly members are 
                                                 
8 We also estimate asymptotic standard errors following Terza (2012); however, we report the delta method 
standard errors to increase the replicability of our analysis. 
 
9 In preliminary analyses, we also experimented with state-level measures of broad-based categorical 
eligibility policies and standard utility allowance provisions (two policies that are the focus of debate as the 
U.S. Congress considers the re-authorization of the SNAP).  However, neither of these policy variables was 
predictive of SNAP receipt in our samples. 
35 
 
large and positive.  However, all of the coefficients are wildly imprecise and unable to 
discriminate between large positive or large negative effects. 
 
Table 4 
Coefficients and Marginal Effects for SNAP Receipt from LPM, 2SLS, Probit, & 
Bivariate Probit Models 
 
 
 
All 
households 
HHs with 
children and 
unmarried 
parents 
HHs with 
children and 
married 
parents 
Households 
with all 
elderly 
members 
 
Other 
adult-only 
households 
Received SNAP in last year 
LPM (exogenous) 0.207
*** 
(0.008) 
0.164*** 
(0.016) 
0.209*** 
(0.019) 
0.215*** 
(0.019) 
0.234*** 
(0.014) 
2SLS—citizenship & 
cert. interval instr. 
-0.162 
(0.193) 
-0.123 
(0.568) 
-0.362 
(0.809) 
0.549 
(0.373) 
-0.087 
(0.218) 
Hausman-Wu Test    [0.044] [0.603] [0.442] [0.372] [0.603] 
2SLS—certification 
interval instrument 
-0.086 
(0.437) 
-0.100 
(0.682) 
-0.585 
(0.906) 
-0.063 
(5.128) 
0.286 
(0.611) 
Hausman-Wu Test      [0.490] [0.694] [0.299] [0.956] [0.933] 
Probit (exogenous) 0.199
*** 
(0.008) 
0.164*** 
(0.016) 
0.207*** 
(0.018) 
0.194*** 
(0.019) 
0.227*** 
(0.014) 
Biprobit—citizenship & 
cert. interval instr. 
-0.141*** 
(0.055) 
0.366 
(0.259) 
-0.109 
(0.210) 
-0.032 
(0.071) 
-0.174** 
(0.074) 
Biprobit—certification 
interval instrument 
-0.165*** 
(0.061) 
0.382* 
(0.233) 
-0.127 
(0.197) 
-0.069 
(0.072) 
-0.212*** 
(0.080) 
Biprobit—no 
instruments 
-0.178*** 
(0.061) 
0.423** 
(0.182) 
-0.142 
(0.224) 
-0.066 
(0.071) 
-0.225*** 
(0.074) 
Received SNAP in last month 
LPM (exogenous) 0.166
*** 
(0.008) 
0.108*** 
(0.016) 
0.162*** 
(0.019) 
0.192*** 
(0.020) 
0.204*** 
(0.015) 
2SLS—citizenship & 
cert. interval instr. 
-0.166 
(0.198) 
-0.087 
(0.395) 
-0.321 
(0.761) 
0.772 
(0.572) 
-0.098 
(0.242) 
Hausman Test [0.081] [0.619] [0.510] [0.280] [0.201] 
2SLS—certification 
 interval instrument 
-0.081 
(0.411) 
-0.075 
(0.506) 
-0.578 
(0.856) 
-0.034 
(2.776) 
0.320 
(0.690) 
Hausman-Wu Test [0.538] [0.716] [0.333] [0.933] [0.866] 
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Table 4 
(Cont.) 
 
 
 
All 
households 
HHs with 
children and 
unmarried 
parents 
HHs with 
children and 
married 
parents 
Households 
with all 
elderly 
members 
 
Other 
adult-only 
households 
Received SNAP in last month (cont.) 
Probit (exogenous) 0.158
*** 
(0.008) 
0.108*** 
(0.016) 
0.160*** 
(0.019) 
0.172*** 
(0.019) 
0.196*** 
(0.015) 
Biprobit—citizenship & 
cert. interval instr. 
-0.206*** 
(0.040) 
0.135 
(0.306) 
-0.207 
(0.164) 
-0.019 
(0.070) 
-0.151** 
(0.070) 
Biprobit—certification 
 interval instrument 
-0.228*** 
(0.039) 
0.175 
(0.297) 
-0.227 
(0.145) 
-0.034 
(0.070) 
-0.166** 
(0.077) 
 Biprobit—no 
instruments 
-0.239*** 
(0.037) 
0.253 
(0.264) 
-0.239 
(0.156) 
-0.031 
(0.070) 
-0.176** 
(0.074) 
Note. Models estimated using weighted household data from the 2009-11 CPS-FSS and control for household head’s 
gender, age, age squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status, education, and employment status; numbers of adults, 
children, and disabled members in household; age of youngest member (households with children);  elderly members; 
residence in urban area; state unemployment rate; log of household income; home ownership; log of food needs; 
missing food needs; and state and year fixed effects.  Models for all households also control for household type.  
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.  P values are in brackets. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
The Hausman-Wu test for all households provides evidence that SNAP is 
endogenous at the 5% level; however, this result weakens when SNAP is measured on 
the basis of the previous month.  For the groups separately, we find no evidence of SNAP 
being endogenous.  In the third row, we list results from 2SLS models that rely entirely 
on certification intervals for identification.  These estimates are even less precise than the 
preceding estimates.  In contrast to the previous 2SLS model, the Hausman-Wu tests do 
not indicate SNAP is endogenous for any specifications. 
In the next four rows, we list results from probit specifications.  The first row lists 
average marginal effects from standard probit specifications, and these generate estimates 
that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the LPM estimates.  The next row lists 
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estimates from a bivariate probit model that imposes exclusion restrictions on non-
citizenship status and certification intervals.  The marginal effects for the combined and 
married-parent samples are significantly negative.  While these particular results are 
potentially encouraging for the theoretical model, they appear to stem entirely from 
functional form restrictions in the bivariate probit model.  In the final rows of Table 4, 
where we report results from bivariate probit models without any variable exclusion 
restrictions, the marginal effect estimates are nearly identical in sign, magnitude, and 
precision to the preceding estimates.  Thus, the results from the bottom four rows of 
Table 4 seem to bear out the findings of Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick (2013) and 
Shaefer and Gutierrez (2012). 
Finally, we investigate the dose response of SNAP on food insecurity using cross 
sectional and longitudinal models.  For each model, we consider two measures of SNAP; 
an indicator for receipt of SNAP benefits within the past 12 months and the inflation 
adjusted annual SNAP benefit amount.  Including an indicator for the receipt of SNAP 
benefits allows us to assess the extent of selection bias in the dose-response literature, 
while the annual measure of SNAP benefits facilitates replication of the existing 
literature.  We begin our dose response analysis by estimating LPMs, followed by 
random- and fixed-effect LPMs.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for the SNAP 
receipt and annual SNAP benefit variables from alternative specifications are listed in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Coefficients on SNAP Receipt and Annual Benefit Amount from Cross Sectional and Longitudinal Models 
 
 
 
All Households 
HHs with children 
and unmarried 
parents 
 
HHs with children 
and married parents 
 
Households with all 
elderly members 
 
Other adult-only 
households 
 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
Cross Sectional Models 
LPM with no other 
controls 
0.351*** 
(0.011) 
-0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.283*** 
(0.023) 
-0.029*** 
(0.006) 
0.331*** 
(0.029) 
-0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.345*** 
(0.029) 
-0.045** 
(0.020) 
0.391*** 
(0.019) 
-0.043*** 
(0.009) 
LPM with standard 
controls a 
0.299*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.276*** 
(0.023) 
-0.030*** 
(0.006) 
0.319*** 
(0.030) 
-0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.292*** 
(0.029) 
-0.056*** 
(0.021) 
0.327*** 
(0.020) 
-0.041*** 
(0.009) 
LPM with standard 
and  economic 
controls b 
0.286*** 
(0.011) 
-0.035*** 
(0.004) 
0.264*** 
(0.023) 
-0.035*** 
(0.006) 
0.309*** 
(0.030) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
0.283*** 
(0.029) 
-0.061*** 
(0.021) 
0.312*** 
(0.020) 
-0.045*** 
(0.009) 
LPM with standard, 
economic, and 
other assistance 
controls c 
0.222*** 
(0.011) 
-0.041*** 
(0.004) 
0.194*** 
(0.023) 
-0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.227*** 
(0.030) 
-0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.235*** 
(0.029) 
-0.052*** 
(0.020) 
0.234*** 
(0.020) 
-0.044*** 
(0.009) 
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(Cont.) 
 
 
 
 
All Households 
HHs with children 
and unmarried 
parents 
 
HHs with children 
and married parents 
 
Households with all 
elderly members 
 
Other adult-only 
households 
 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
 
SNAP 
Indicator 
Annual 
SNAP 
Benefit 
Longitudinal Models 
LPM  0.261
*** 
(0.016) 
-0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.245*** 
(0.035) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.270*** 
(0.041) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.251*** 
(0.038) 
-0.054* 
(0.028) 
0.284*** 
(0.029) 
-0.039*** 
(0.013) 
Random effects LPM  0.238
*** 
(0.014) 
-0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.212*** 
(0.034) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.249*** 
(0.037) 
-0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.250*** 
(0.027) 
-0.053*** 
(0.019) 
0.247*** 
(0.026) 
-0.028** 
(0.012) 
Breusch-Pagan Test [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Fixed effects LPM  0.152
*** 
(0.021) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.128*** 
(0.046) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
0.173*** 
(0.052) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
0.238*** 
(0.044) 
-0.053* 
(0.030) 
0.115*** 
(0.039) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
Hausman-Wu Test [0.000] [0.108] [0.074] [0.144] [0.000] 
Note. Models estimated using weighted household data from the 2009-11 CPS-FSS and control for household head’s gender, age, age squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, 
marital status, education, and employment status; numbers of adults, children, and disabled members in household; age of youngest member (households with children);  
elderly members; residence in urban area; state unemployment rate; log of household income; home ownership; log of food needs; missing food needs; and state and year 
fixed effects.  Models for all households also control for household type.  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.  P values are in brackets. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
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The SNAP receipt coefficients are generally consistent with the discussion 
presented above, so we will limit our discussion here to the annual SNAP benefit 
coefficients.  While including observable controls and household fixed-effects reduces 
the association between SNAP receipt and food insecurity, a strong and highly significant 
relationship remains.  The top panel lists estimates from cross sectional models, while the 
bottom panel lists results from longitudinal models. 
The first rows of the top panel list coefficients from simple univariate LPMs of 
food insecurity, SNAP receipt, and the annual benefit amount estimated with the cross 
sectional sample.  The coefficient on annual SNAP benefits is negative and significant for 
all groups of households.  These patterns continue in the second, third, and fourth rows 
when increasing sets of observed controls are added. 
The bottom panel of Table 5 considers longitudinal models.  For the purposes of 
comparison, we estimate LPMs with standard and economic controls.  The first rows 
report coefficients for LPMs.  The associations between food insecurity and annual 
SNAP benefits are smaller for all groups with the exception of married parent households 
when compared to LPMs estimated using the cross sectional sample. 
Estimates from panel-data random- and fixed-effect LPMs are reported in the 
second and third rows of the bottom panel of Table 5.  Comparisons of these estimates 
reveal that accounting for unobserved time-invariant household characteristics through 
the use of fixed effects reduces the estimated associations between annual SNAP benefits 
and food insecurity.  The coefficients on annual SNAP benefits are negative and 
insignificant for all household groups except households with all elderly members.  
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Breusch-Pagan and Hausman-Wu tests are reported below the random- and fixed-effect 
LPMs, respectively.  The LPMs are strongly rejected for all household groups by the 
Breusch-Pagan test in favor of the random-effect LPMs models.  In contrast to the 
participant/non-participant analyses, the Hausman-Wu tests fail to reject the random-
effect LPM for all-elderly households.  For unmarried parent households, the Hausman-
Wu test still fails to reject random-effect LPM; however, the p-value is very close to the 
10% confidence level.  The random-effect LPM is rejected for all other groups. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 The replication analysis is based on a sample of households with incomes at or 
below 130% of the federal poverty line.  However several previous studies estimate 
models with larger income cut-offs.  A concern in these studies is that marginally eligible 
households will adjust their labor supply to ensure program eligibility, potentially 
affecting the observed relationship between SNAP and food insecurity.  We examined the 
sensitivity of our findings to the choice of income limits by estimating models with a 
sample that restricted household income to 185% of the federal poverty line.  We used 
the 185% of the federal poverty line threshold because it is the income screen used by the 
CPS-FSS for the food security questions.  Models estimated using the 185% of the 
federal poverty line threshold (results not shown) were very similar to those using our 
primary (130%) sample. 
Another potential concern is the use of a single binary measure of food insecurity.  
For the replication analysis we concentrate on a binary measure of food insecurity, which 
is consistent with most of the previous studies.  As DePolt et al. (2009), Gundersen, 
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Kreider, and Pepper (2011) and others have pointed out, these comparisons cast aside a 
considerable amount of information.  To examine how the findings are affected by the 
choice of the food insecurity measure we re-estimated models using the count of affirmed 
food security questions, which under the assumptions of the measurement model used to 
determine food security status should be a sufficient statistic of the underlying food 
security scale.  Estimating models with the count of affirmed food security questions 
generated results that were consistent with our reported findings using the binary food 
insecurity measure. 
The replication analysis uses an annual measure of SNAP benefits to examine the 
dose response of SNAP on food insecurity.  An alternative to the dollar amount of SNAP 
benefits is the number months of program receipt.  We tested the sensitivity of our dose 
response findings to the choice of dose variable by estimating models with the count of 
months of SNAP receipt.  A comparison of the estimates suggests our findings are robust 
to the choice of dose variable.  All of our sensitivity analyses are available upon request. 
Conclusion 
It would be hard to overstate the importance of SNAP in the food assistance 
landscape.  It is the largest food assistance program administered by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture in terms of expenditures and participation.  However, despite recent 
research that suggests SNAP reduces food insecurity, the evidence taken as a whole is 
somewhat inconsistent.  In an effort to understand the empirical results that have grown 
up around the question of SNAP’s effectiveness on food insecurity, we have examined 
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theory, literature, and empirical evidence that looks at this question and have replicated 
methods used in previous research. 
 The main finding of this study is that recent results showing that food assistance 
reduces food insecurity may not be robust to specification choice or data.  As in other 
research, most of our simple models suggest a higher conditional mean of food security 
prevalence associated with SNAP.  Moreover, our results for propensity score and 
longitudinal models mirror those in the empirical literature in showing, quite 
counterintuitively, that SNAP is associated with increases in food security prevalence.  
Our 2SLS results are a bit more consistent with recent findings, although the estimated 
sizes of the effects are statistically insignificant.  Similarly, our findings using dummy 
endogenous approaches yield somewhat inconsistent results, with many of the 
statistically significant results being for two-parent households with children.  We note 
that most of the results using this method yield parameter estimates with the appropriate 
sign, even when they are not significant.  Our dose-response models are consistent with 
previous research in that they suggest larger amounts of SNAP benefits are associated 
with a reduction in the likelihood of food insecurity.  Finally, while we did not try to 
replicate the methods of Gundersen and Kreider (2008) or Kreider, Pepper, Gundersen, 
and Joliffe (2012), which involve using data and logical assumptions to identify plausible 
bounds for the effect of food assistance on food insecurity, our results are, broadly 
speaking within the bounds for their least restrictive models.  This is true for models that 
do take account of measurement error and those that do not. 
44 
 
 Taken together, these results suggest some directions for future research.  For 
example, some models that have most consistently found that SNAP reduces food 
insecurity share an assumption about the functional form of the residuals in selection and 
outcome processes—bivariate normal.  A next step could be to examine similar models 
while relaxing the bivariate normal assumption, perhaps by use of maximum simulated 
likelihood methods and factor structures—both discrete and continuous.  Additionally, 
such a consideration should take into account that a full switching regression 
framework—in which the outcome is estimated separately for each treatment state, but 
simultaneously with treatment—may yield different results.10  In addition, given that the 
results of our dose-response models are consistent with both the literature and with 
economic intuition about the effect of SNAP, further exploration into the uses of these 
methods and the design of surveys to exploit these relationships should be a priority.  
Nord and Prell (2011) offer a recent example of this kind of work.  Finally, to the degree 
possible, studies using indirect methods and natural experiments should also be 
encouraged. 
  
                                                 
10 This has recently been found by Gregory and Coleman-Jensen (forthcoming), who find that the ATE for 
SNAP participation is positive in a switching regression framework with bivariate normal errors, but 
negative in a simple bivariate probit. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION ON FOOD INSECURITY USING A 
BEHAVIORAL RASCH SELECTION MODEL 
 
 
Abstract 
 This paper examines the relationship between Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) participation and food insecurity using data from the 2001-2008 
Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS).  A behavioral Rasch 
selection model is proposed and estimated using four subsamples of low-income 
households: unmarried parent households, married parent households, all-elderly 
households, and other adult-only households.  The model is identified using exogenous 
changes in state-level polices related to SNAP.  The results indicate that SNAP has a 
strong ameliorative effect on food insecurity for married parent, all-elderly, and other 
adult-only households, while SNAP continues to be associated with greater food 
hardships for unmarried parent households.  Participating in SNAP reduces the 
probability of food insecurity by 22.4% for other adult-only households, 18% for all-
elderly households, and 17% for married parent households. 
Introduction 
 While the majority of U.S. households have consistent, dependable access to 
enough food for an active healthy life (food secure; Andersen, 1990), a minority of 
households experience food insecurity.  These households have limited access to 
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adequate foods because of a lack of money or other resources.  In 2011, nearly 15% (50.1 
million people living in 17.9 million households) of all U.S. households were food 
insecure, with a third of these households experiencing a more severe level of food 
insecurity known as very low food security (Coleman-Jensen, Nord, Andrews, & 
Carlson, 2012).  The consequences of food insecurity are far-reaching and occur for 
children and adults of all ages (Gundersen et al., 2011).  Households employ a variety of 
methods to meet their basic food needs.  Some rely on help from emergency food 
providers while others participate in one or more of the federal food and nutrition 
assistance programs. 
 The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food 
Stamp Program) is the largest food and nutrition assistance program funded by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), accounting for 73% ($75 billion) of federal food and 
nutrition assistance spending in fiscal year 2011 (Oliveira, 2012).  The goal of SNAP is 
to help low-income households obtain access to food, a healthful diet, and nutrition 
education.  By improving nutrition and diet, the program is also intended to advance 
other goals, such as improving food security.  The effectiveness of SNAP in reducing 
food insecurity is an important policy issue for program administrators and policymakers. 
 Estimation of the relationship between SNAP participation and food insecurity is 
complicated by the fact that selection issues may be contributing to counterintuitive 
findings.  Households participating in SNAP are likely to differ in both observable and 
unobservable ways from non-participating households.  In particular, households with 
greater food needs and fewer resources are more likely to participate in SNAP.  Failure to 
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account for these differences could be confounding household characteristics with 
participation behavior, resulting in biased estimates. 
 Several studies control for selection on unobservable characteristics and generate 
inconclusive results.   These studies rely on a single binary measure of food insecurity.  
While interpretation of the food insecure versus food secure comparison is 
straightforward and easy to implement, considerable information is being suppressed.  
The USDA measures food insecurity using a set of 18 questions from the Household 
Food Security Module (HFSSM), which is fielded by the Current Population Survey 
Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS).  Information is lost when broad categories are 
created using responses to questions from the HFSSM.  Therefore, the use of a single 
binary measure is likely contributing to the generation of insignificant results. 
 This study examines the effectiveness of SNAP in reducing food insecurity 
among low-income households using data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS.  Low-income 
households are disaggregated into four policy relevant subsamples: unmarried parent 
households, married parent households, all-elderly households, and other adult-only 
households. 
For the multivariate analyses of food insecurity, I estimate behavioral Rasch 
models.  The Rasch model assumes responses to the HFSSM questions may be modeled 
as indicators of a single underlying index of food hardship, such as food insecurity.  
Simultaneously modeling the outcomes this way leads to more efficient estimation.  I 
modify the standard Rasch model to incorporate a behavioral component and to account 
for selection on contemporaneous unobservables.  The models are identified using 
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exogenous changes in state-level policies and rules related to SNAP.  Instrumental 
variables capture information on policies related to vehicle asset rules, outreach activities, 
recertification intervals, and immigrant eligibility. 
Descriptive analyses of my data reproduce the findings of previous studies that 
SNAP receipt is associated with higher rates of food insecurity.  Estimates from the 
multivariate models, which attempt to control for selection on observable characteristics, 
yield the counter intuitive result of SNAP increasing food insecurity.  After controlling 
for selection on unobservable characteristics, I find a highly significant and negative 
relationship between SNAP receipt and food insecurity for all household subsamples, 
with the exception of unmarried parent households.  When using a single binary measure 
of food insecurity, the results are inconclusive.  My findings are robust to the use of 
alternative program participation indicators, the choice of instrumental variables, and 
sample restrictions based on household income. 
Conceptual Model 
  To motivate the empirical analyses, I begin with a discussion of Barrett’s (2002) 
theoretical model.11  For a more detailed discussion of Barrett’s model, see Gregory, 
Rabbitt, and Ribar (2013) and Ribar (2013).  Barrett’s model extends the household 
production framework of Becker (1965) and the health production framework of 
Grossman (1972) to include food insecurity.  Food insecurity falls out of the model as an 
indicator of risk exposure.  The model assumes utility in each period is a function of 
physical well-being and consumption.  Physical well-being in each period depends on 
                                                 
11 Alternative conceptual models have been proposed by Gundersen and Gruber (2001), Gundersen and 
Oliveira (2001), Huffman and Jensen (2003), and Ribar and Hamrick (2003). 
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physical well-being in the previous period and nutritional intake, activity level, non-food 
consumption, and stochastic shocks in the current period.  Nutritional inputs are 
determined by food consumption, the nutrient content of food, and stochastic shocks.  All 
production functions are conditioned on the household’s information set, which includes 
household members’ human capital.  The household chooses levels of consumption, 
physical well-being, savings, and activity levels so that utility is maximized subject to 
budget, time, and production constraints. 
 Barrett’s model identifies structural characteristics of households that are 
associated with an increased risk of food hardships.  First, food hardships are more likely 
to occur if household members have low labor productivity, which reduces their ability to 
work at home and in the labor market.  Second, households that face adverse terms of 
trade in the form of higher food prices and lower labor market wages are at an increased 
risk of food hardships.  Third, households with limited access to labor markets or goods 
markets are more likely to experience food hardships.  Urban households have better 
access to these markets than rural households.  Fourth, households with low savings and 
assets may find it difficult to smooth consumption over time, increasing the likelihood of 
food hardships.  Fifth, households with a general susceptibility to shocks, because of poor 
health or residence in an area with a volatile economy are at an increased risk of food 
hardships.  Sixth, households are more likely to face food hardships if they have 
unreliable social safety nets. 
  The largest public food assistance safety net in the U.S. is the SNAP.  Program 
benefits are federally funded but administered at the state level.  The SNAP is means-
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tested, and eligibility is usually determined using financial eligibility thresholds.  
Households without an elderly (age 60 or older) or disabled member must satisfy gross-
income, net-income, and asset tests, while households with elderly or disabled members 
need only satisfy the net income test.  Under the gross income test, basic monthly income 
must fall below 130% of the federal poverty line.  The net income test restricts countable 
monthly income (gross monthly income less deductions12) to less than 100% of the 
federal poverty line.  Prior to benefit calculation, households must also satisfy the asset 
test, which permits households without elderly or disabled members to have up to $2,000 
in countable assets or $3,250 in countable assets if at least one member is elderly or 
disabled.  Notable examples of countable assets include cash on hand, checking and 
savings accounts, savings certificates, stocks and bonds, and vehicles. 
 Alternatively, households are categorically eligible for SNAP if they receive 
benefits funded by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cash assistance, or state General Assistance (GA).  
Households that receive benefits from these programs bypass the gross income and, more 
importantly, asset tests. 
 Barrett’s model can also be used to consider how SNAP should affect households’ 
food security.  The receipt of SNAP benefits should expand the household’s budget set 
and relax resource constraints.  Program benefits allow households to purchase more food 
and should reduce the incidence of food hardships.  I also anticipate complementary 
                                                 
12 SNAP deductions include a standard deduction, earned income deduction, child support deduction, 
dependent care deduction, excess shelter deduction, and any out-of-pocket medical expenses (households 
with elderly or disabled members). 
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effects from the educational component of SNAP, which increases household member’s 
meal planning, shopping, and preparation skills, making them more effective at 
transforming resources into nutritional inputs and physical well-being. 
 Meanwhile, other components of SNAP may be working against these effects.  As 
with all means-tested programs, eligibility requirements effectively tax labor market 
activities, reducing household members’ incentives to work.  Depending on how strong 
these incentive effects are, SNAP receipt may increase food hardships.  Participating 
households are also vulnerable to losses of benefits if they fail to comply with 
recertification and work requirements.  Wilde and Ranney (2000) note the monthly cycle 
associated with benefit issuance, spending, and benefit exhaustion may give rise to food 
shortages.  SNAP eligible food items, when compared to other types of food purchases, 
may potentially negatively affect households, as they require additional time and 
preparation when compared to other types of food items.  While these factors might 
reduce the effectiveness of SNAP, the program’s net effect is expected to be positive. 
 Although theory predicts SNAP participation decreases food hardships, several 
empirical studies have generated contradictory results.  SNAP participation is clearly 
endogenous.  The household’s participation decision and determination of food insecurity 
are influenced by a host of characteristics, observable and unobservable.  Failure to 
account for these characteristics will result in a spurious correlation.  Barrett’s model 
identifies several characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher such as household 
member’s health status, food consumption patterns, and preferences.  Joyce et al. (2012) 
also suggests that housing security and utility losses are often associated with food 
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hardships.  Mismeasurement and misreporting of food insecurity and SNAP may also be 
affecting the observed relationship. 
Previous Literature 
 Empirical studies examining the relationship between SNAP and food insecurity 
have generated equivocal results.  Studies employ a variety of methods and find a 
mixture of results.13 Some studies use unconditional associations between SNAP receipt 
and food insecurity and find a positive relationship (Cohen et al., 1999).  For example, 
the latest national food insecurity report (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2012) estimates that, 
among households with income less than 130% of the federal poverty line, 52% of SNAP 
participant households reported being food insecure, while only 28% of non-participant 
households reported this condition.  Several other studies use multivariate analyses that 
attempt to control for observable differences between participant and non-participant 
households, yet find positive associations (Alaimo, Briefel, Frongillo, & Olson, 1998; 
Ribar & Hamrick, 2003; Gibson-Davis & Foster, 2006).14  In contrast, studies that use 
narrower and alternative participation comparisons generate negative associations 
(Kabbani & Kmeid, 2006; Gundersen & Gruber, 2001; Mykerezi & Mills, 2010). 
Assuming Barrett’s (2002) theoretical model is correct, the preponderance of 
counterintuitive findings indicates that selection must be coming from unobservable 
                                                 
13 See Barrett (2002), Currie (2003), Fox, Hamilton, and Lin (2004), and Gregory et al. (2013) for 
comprehensive reviews of the literature. 
 
14 A notable exception is Bhattacharya and Currie (2001).  They use data from the third National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANESIII) to estimates OLS models and find that SNAP 
participation is negatively associated with food insecurity.  Unfortunately all of the authors’ models 
simultaneously control for participation in the National School Breakfast (SBP) and National School Lunch 
Programs (NSLP). 
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household characteristics.  Studies using longitudinal methods to account for time-
invariant unobservable differences between participants and non-participants generate the 
same results as studies that control for selection on observables.  Wilde and Nord (2005) 
use the longitudinal structure of the CPS-FSS to construct a two-year panel and estimate 
a household-level fixed-effect model.  Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick (2013) also 
estimate fixed-effects models, using data on elderly households from the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS).  Both studies find SNAP participation continues to be 
positively associated with food insecurity after controlling for household-level fixed 
effects.  Wilde and Nord (2005) suggest time-varying unobservable household 
characteristics may be an additional source of bias. 
Several studies use instrumental variables methods and endogenous latent 
variable models to control for contemporaneous unobservable characteristics, but 
generate inconclusive results.  Borjas (2004) examines the relationship between public 
assistance (including SNAP) and food insecurity using the natural policy experiment that 
occurred when immigrant eligibility for public assistance programs was restricted by the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996.  
Borjas’s findings are consistent with the anticipated negative association; however, the 
majority of his estimates are only marginally significant.  Gundersen and Oliveira (2001) 
and Huffman and Jensen (2003) estimate endogenous latent variable models, but obtain 
imprecise and statistically insignificant results.  Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick 
(2013) use data on elderly households from the HRS to estimate 2SLS models with 
household-level fixed effects.  Their models generate estimates that are imprecise and 
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insignificant.  Schaefer and Gutierrez (2012) also estimate 2SLS models using data from 
three panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and obtain 
statistically insignificant results. 
While the majority of studies find inconclusive results, studies using dummy 
endogenous variable models estimate strong negative associations.  Yen, Andrews, Chen, 
and Eastwood (2008) uses state-level policy and stigma variables as exclusion restrictions 
to estimate a dummy endogenous Tobit model and finds SNAP participation is negatively 
associated with households’ 30-day food insecurity Rasch scores; however, their analysis 
uses data from the 1996-1997 National Food Stamp Program Survey (NFSPS), which is a 
choice-based sample with an overrepresentation of SNAP participants.15  Mykerezi and 
Mills (2010) also find a negative association between SNAP and food insecurity using 
data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID).  They use state-level error rates 
in benefit payments as instrumental variables, but do not include state-level controls.  
This opens up the possibility their instruments may be capturing state-level 
characteristics other than error rates.  Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Zhang (2011) and 
Schaefer and Gutierrez (2012) both use data from the SIPP to estimate bivariate probit 
models and obtain similar results.  Schaefer and Gutierrez (2012) estimate models with 
and without exclusion restrictions with little change in their results, suggesting 
identification for this entire group of models may be obtained from functional form. 
A shortcoming of many of the previous studies may be the measures of food 
insecurity.  Nearly all of the studies rely on a single binary measure of food insecurity 
                                                 
15 The authors address this issue by using sampling weights. 
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(food insecure vs. food secure).  However, the USDA measures food security using a set 
of 18 questions from the HFSSM.  These questions capture information about a variety of 
conditions, experiences, and behaviors related to food hardships.  Information is lost 
when broad categories are created using responses to questions from the HFSSM.  For 
example, consider two households: the first household affirms 3 questions, while the 
second household affirms all 18.  Both households are considered food insecure, yet the 
latter household has a greater level of food insecurity.  Discarding this information may 
be contributing to the preponderance of inconclusive results. 
Data 
 Data for the empirical analyses come from the 2001-2008 December Current 
Population Survey Food Security Supplements (CPS-FSS).  The CPS is the official 
source of government statistics on employment status and poverty.  Approximately 
60,000 households are interviewed each month with data collected on labor force 
participation status, income, household demographics, and state identifiers.  After 
weighting, CPS households are representative at the state and national levels of the 
civilian, noninstitutionalized population. 
 The Food Security Supplement is conducted as a supplement to the CPS for the 
Economic Research Service (ERS) of the USDA.  The purpose of the CPS-FSS is to 
estimate the prevalence of food insecurity in the U.S.  Each year, ERS estimates national 
prevalence rates of food insecurity in its Household Food Security in the United States 
series.16  It was first fielded in April 1995 and has since been administered every 
                                                 
16 The most recent report in this series is Coleman-Jensen et al. (2012). 
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subsequent year.17  After 2000, the CPS-FSS was administered in December.  
Consistently fielding the CPS-FSS in December increases the comparability of food 
insecurity estimates because the reporting of food hardship will likely vary by month.  
The 2009-2012 CPS-FSS waves are not used because of changes to SNAP under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2008, which made the program 
less comparable to previous years.  Households are asked questions about their food 
expenditures and basic food needs.  To reduce respondent burden, households with 
income above 185% of the federal poverty line and households that show no signs of 
food stress18 are not asked the food security questions.  This screen is also applied to the 
food assistance program participation questions. 
Dependent Variables 
  The empirical analyses examine responses to a series of food hardship questions 
taken from the HFSSM as dependent variables.  The HFSSM asks all households 10 
questions and asks households with children an additional eight questions.  These 
questions elicit information to determine whether or not household members experienced 
difficulty meeting basic food needs.  The severity of hardships experienced by the 
household ranges from anxiety over food running out to shortages of the amounts and 
                                                 
17 The CPS-FSS was fielded in April 1995, September 1996, April 1997, August 1998, April 1999, 
September 2000, April 2001, and December 2001-present. 
 
18 The following preliminary screening questions are asked to determine if a household shows signs of 
food-access problems: 
1. People do different things when they are running out of money for food in order to make their 
food or their food money go further.  In the past 12 months, since December of last year, did you 
ever run short of money and try to make your food or your food money go further? 
2. Which of these statements best describes the food eaten by your household-enough of the kinds of 
food we want to eat, enough but not always the kinds of food we want to eat, sometimes not 
enough, or often not enough to eat? 
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kinds of foods to episodes of adults and children going without food for an entire day.  
All of the questions refer to the previous 12 months and are framed in terms of either 
shortages of money or affordability.  A complete listing of the questions and the methods 
used to convert them into binary indicators is in Appendix A. 
The descriptive analysis and some alternative specifications use the household’s 
food security status as a dependent variable.  A household’s food security status is 
determined by summing the affirmed responses from the HFSSM.  Households are 
classified as food insecure if they affirm three or more items.  Food insecure households 
may be further classified as having either low food security or very low food security.   
Households that affirm two or fewer items are classified as food secure.  Childless 
households that affirm three to five items and households with children that affirm three 
to seven items are classified as experiencing low food security.  These households report 
multiple indications of food access problems; however, there is little, if any, indication of 
reduced food intake.  Households that affirm additional items (six or more for households 
without children and eight or more for households with children) are classified as 
experiencing very low food security.  Common experiences for households with very low 
food security include reduced food intake for one or more members and disrupted eating 
patterns. 
Explanatory Variables 
 The principal explanatory variable is an indicator of receipt of SNAP benefits 
within the past 12 months, where the indicator equals one if anyone in the household 
participated in SNAP, zero otherwise.  In alternative specifications, the annual SNAP 
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measure is replaced with an indicator of SNAP receipt within the past 30 days.  The 30-
day SNAP measure is useful because it facilitates comparison with previous studies that 
use this measure as their primary explanatory variable.  Some specifications also include 
measures of participation in the National School Breakfast Program (SBP), National 
School Lunch Program (NSLP), Special Supplemental Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children (WIC), local food pantries, and soup kitchens.  These variables describe 
additional resources that are available to households and provide additional controls for 
household behaviors not addressed by other household characteristics.  Including 
information on participation in multiple food assistance programs may control for 
additional heterogeneity, such as community food resources, preferences for private 
versus public food assistance, and stigma.  However, caution should be exercised when 
interpreting these coefficients because households self-select into these food assistance 
programs. 
 One potential weakness of the CPS-FSS is the underreporting of SNAP 
participation.  Estimates suggest the CPS underreports SNAP participation by up to 50% 
(Parker, 2011; Wheaton, 2008); however, these estimates are based on the March CPS 
Supplement and not the CPS-FSS.  The direction of bias will depend on the nature of the 
misreporting.  If households with greater (less) food hardships are less (more) likely to 
report participation for reasons unobservable to the researcher, then the effect of SNAP 
participation on food insecurity will be biased downwards (upwards). 
 Another potential weakness of the CPS-FSS is that total household income is 
reported categorically and not continuously.  Categorical income is converted into a 
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continuous measure using the midpoints of the income ranges and adjusted for inflation 
using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U).   Household income is 
directly useful as a measure of short-term household resources and indirectly valuable as 
a potential control for SNAP eligibility. 
 In addition to weak income measures, the CPS-FSS also provides very little 
information on household assets.  CPS-FSS respondents were asked if the household’s 
current living quarters was owned or being bought by a household member.  I use their 
responses to construct a homeownership status indicator.  This measure describes the 
long-term economic resources of a household. 
 Additional controls include other demographic, geographic, and economic 
characteristics.  These measures include the respondent’s gender, age (and age-squared), 
race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status, employment status, and educational attainment.  
The analysis also includes measures of the number of adults, children, and disabled 
members; age of the youngest member (households with children); an indicator for the 
presence of an elderly member (age 60 or older); residence in an urban area; the state 
unemployment rate; and state and year fixed-effects.  Means and standard deviations for 
the explanatory variables are in Appendix C. 
Instrumental Variables 
 Estimation of the effectiveness of SNAP in reducing food insecurity is 
complicated by the endogeneity of SNAP.  This problem is addressed by estimating a 
behavioral Rasch selection model.  Changes in state-level policies related to SNAP are 
used to identify the model.  Information on state-level policies is obtained by linking the 
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food stamp rules database with the CPS-FSS using state identifiers and year.  The food 
stamp rules database was first compiled by the Urban Institute (Finegold, Margrabe, & 
Ratcliffe, 2006) and updated by researchers at the ERS.  The database provides a rich set 
of information on state-level policies and rules related to SNAP and other public 
assistance programs.  From this database, I identified four instrumental variables for the 
empirical analyses related to vehicle asset rules, outreach spending, and recertification 
periods.  I also constructed a measure that captures immigrant eligibility rules using 
household head’s citizenship status from the CPS-FSS. 
 The first instrumental variable is a measure of vehicle asset rules for SNAP.  
Beginning in 2001, states were given flexibility with respect to how vehicles are treated 
in the asset test.  States now have the option of using the SNAP vehicle deduction,19 
exempting some vehicles, or exempting all vehicles from the asset test.  States with more 
generous vehicle asset rules are expected to have higher SNAP participation rates 
because they are effectively removing the asset test by excluding the value of vehicles.  
Similarly, categorical eligibility removes the asset test for eligibility purposes.20  To 
capture the generosity of state SNAP vehicle asset rules, I constructed a binary measure 
                                                 
19 The SNAP vehicle deduction excludes the first $4,650 of a vehicle’s fair market value while any excess 
is applied to the asset test. 
 
20 I tested specifications that included broad based categorical eligibility (BBCE), but it was found to be a 
weak predictor of the SNAP participation decision. 
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that equals one if a state exempts all vehicles from the asset test, zero otherwise.21  This 
captures the most generous form of vehicle asset rules. 
 The second instrumental variable is a measure of outreach activities.  A priori, 
higher levels of outreach are expected to increase SNAP participation rates.  Outreach 
activities are intended to provide information to persons who may not be aware they are 
eligible for SNAP benefits and help current participants maintain their participation.  
Outreach activities include public service announcements, informational brochures, and 
projects designed to increase retention rates and simplify the application process.  I 
constructed a measure of outreach spending per capita that is adjusted for inflation and 
lagged 12 months. 
 The third instrument is a measure of the state’s recertification period for SNAP 
households with earnings.  Periodically, households must show they continue to meet 
requirements for program eligibility.  The recertification period varies by state, typically 
ranging from three months to one year.  Studies have shown the length of the 
recertification period has a significant effect on SNAP participation rates (Ratcliffe, 
McKernan, & Finegold, 2008; Ribar, Edelhoch, & Liu, 2008, 2010).  Shorter 
recertification rates increase the transaction costs of SNAP (e.g., travelling to a program 
office, filling out paperwork, etc.), reducing the likelihood of participation.  I constructed 
a measure of the state’s recertification period using the median recertification period.22 
                                                 
21 Alternative specifications were tested using the following measures of vehicle asset rules: any vehicle 
exemptions, one vehicle exempt per SNAP unit, one vehicle exempt per adult in SNAP unit, and all 
vehicles exempt.  Combinations were considered were appropriate. 
 
22 In alternative specifications, I examined the percentage of caseloads with a 1-3 month recertification 
period. 
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 The final instrument is a measure of immigrant eligibility.  With the passage of 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity (PROWA) Act of 1996, immigrants 
were effectively ineligible for SNAP.  Therefore, noncitizen immigrants are much less 
likely to participate in SNAP.  I constructed a measure of immigrant eligibility using the 
household head’s citizenship status.  Specifically, I constructed an indicator that equals 
one if the head is not a U.S. citizen, zero otherwise.  While this measure has proven 
strong in previous studies (Borjas, 2004; Ratcliffe et al., 2011), it may be questionable on 
theoretical grounds, as cultural differences and assimilation into a new culture could alter 
how respondents report food hardships. 
Analysis Sample 
 The paper considers households with incomes below 130% of the federal poverty 
line.  Restricting the sample using this income threshold approximates the gross income 
test for SNAP eligibility.  At the same time, it increases the comparability of SNAP 
participants and non-participants.  The descriptive and empirical analyses are adjusted for 
nonresponse and the complex survey design of the CPS-FSS using weights.   The initial 
sample consists of 59,247 households.  Households residing in Alaska and Hawaii are 
dropped from the sample because market prices and program benefits differ significantly 
from households located in the contiguous U.S.  This reduces the sample to 58,001 
households.  An additional 1,706 households are dropped because they were asked 
experimental food security questions in 2007, reducing the sample to 56,295 households.  
Households failing to provide usable responses to one or more of the questions used to 
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form the explanatory variable are excluded, leaving a final analysis sample of 54,298 
households. 
 Households are disaggregated into four mutually exclusive subsamples: 
unmarried parent households with children under age 18, married parent households with 
children under age 18, households consisting entirely of members who are age 60 or 
older, and other adult-only households.  These household types differ in their 
susceptibility to food hardships, are subject to different eligibility requirements under 
SNAP, and are differently eligible for other types of public assistance.  Disaggregating 
households this way increases the comparability of households within groups. 
 Table 6 lists the proportions of low-income households experiencing food 
insecurity and those experiencing very low food security, calculated separately for SNAP 
participants and non-participants in each of the four analysis subsamples.  Among the 
subsamples of low-income households, food insecurity is the highest among unmarried 
parent households (46%), followed by married parent households (37.8%), other adult-
only households (33.4), and all-elderly households (18.1%).  These findings are 
consistent with the most recent national food security report (Coleman-Jensen et al., 
2012).  Contrary to the food insecurity results, the prevalence of very low food insecurity 
is highest among other adult-only households (17.3%), followed by unmarried parent 
households (14.4%), married parent households (9.6%), and all-elderly households 
(7.2%). 
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Table 6 
 
Food Hardships and SNAP Participation for Households with Income Less Than 130% of 
the Federal Poverty Threshold 
  All Households 
SNAP 
Participants 
SNAP 
Non-
Participants 
Unmarried Parents 
Food Insecure v.  Low Food Security 46.0 (%) 53.5
*** (%) 37.7 (%) 
14.4 17.3*** 11.2 
N 12,918 6,850 6,068 
 
Married Parents 
Food Insecure v.  Low Food Security 37.8 54.4
*** 31.5 
9.6 15.8*** 7.2 
N 9,317 2,591 6,726 
 
All Elderly 
Food Insecure v.  Low Food Security 18.1 37.9
*** 14.3 
7.2 16.8*** 5.3 
N 13,417 2,187 11,230 
 
Other Adults 
Food Insecure 33.4 56.2*** 27.3 
V.  Low Food Security 17.3 32.2*** 13.3 
N 18,646 4,214 14,432 
    
Note. Means estimated using weighted household data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS.  Differences in 
means were tested using t-tests. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
 Comparisons of the proportion of households experiencing food insecurity for 
SNAP participants and non-participants within subsamples reveal higher rates of food 
insecurity among SNAP participants.  For example, 53.5% of unmarried parent 
households participating in SNAP are food insecure, while only 37.7% of non-
participating unmarried parent households experience this condition.  Similarly, the 
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proportion of households experiencing very low food security is highest among SNAP 
participants for all four subsamples.  These results are consistent with the pervious 
literature when examining bivariate associations. 
 SNAP participation is the highest among unmarried parent households (53%) and 
lowest among all-elderly households (16%).  Approximately one quarter of married 
parent households (28%) and other adult-only households (23%) participate in SNAP.  
Previous studies have consistently found SNAP participation to be the highest among 
households with children and the lowest among elderly households. 
Econometric Specification 
 The USDA uses a Rasch (1960) measurement model to relate responses to 
HFSSM questions to a single underlying latent trait, food security.  The Rasch model is a 
psychometric model from the field of Item Response Theory (IRT).  The central idea 
behind the Rasch model is that multiple outcomes that can be observed (i.e., reports of 
food hardships) all derive from a single underlying variable, such as food security.  Let 
household i’s underlying continuous index of food hardship be denoted by θi, with the 
property that higher values of the index correspond to greater levels of hardship.  While 
the researcher is unable to observe θi directly, suppose he has j continuous indicators, 
Yij*, that are related to θi such that each depends on the index and some random 
measurement error, νj.  The relationship between the observable indicators and the 
underlying latent index can be expressed as 
 
 *i j i jY .θ ν= +   (1) 
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Equation (1) describes a factor analytic relationship in which the hardship index, θi, is the 
underlying factor and the factor loadings (discrimination parameters) are constrained to 
be equal across all items and normalized to one.  While this may appear to be a strong 
assumption, Hamilton et al. (1997) found that most items in the HFSSM had similar 
factor loadings when they are allowed to vary, suggesting this assumption will only alter 
the scaling of model parameters. 
Up to this point, the model has been expressed in terms of a set of continuous 
indicators of food hardships (the Yij* variables); however, the observed indicators are 
discrete variables.  The Rasch model assumes the continuous indicators, Yij*, are related 
to the binary responses as follows: 
 
 
*
i j j
i j *
i j j
1 if Y
Y
0 if Y
+ δ
δ
 >=
+ ≤+
+

  (2) 
 
where δj is the threshold (calibration) parameter.  The above specification of the 
relationship between the latent continuous indicators and the observed categorical 
responses is the same used in standard probit and logistic models.  The thresholds (δj) are 
estimated as part of the multivariate model and take on different values for each type of 
food hardship.  Higher values of the thresholds indicate items that capture greater severity 
of food hardships.  Given equations (1)-(2) and the assumption that the random 
measurement error (νj) is distributed logistically, the probability that household i’s 
respondent answers affirmatively to the jth food hardship item is 
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where exp ( ) is the exponential function. 
The Rasch model assumes the errors in the responses are conditionally 
independent.  This implies that the probability of an affirmative response to a given 
hardship question for a given value of θi (the latent trait) does not depend on the response 
to another question.  Of the 18 items that constitute the food security scale, 3 are follow-
ups of two-part items.  Opsomer, Jensen, Nusser, Drignei, and Amemiya (2002) point out 
items with follow-ups often violate the assumption of conditional independence.  Nord 
(2012) estimates Rasch models that directly model the structure of the follow-up 
questions using CPS-FSS data and finds that differences are negligible. 
 The conditional independence assumption implies the conditional probability of a 
given response vector is the product of the probabilities for each item.   By stacking the 
households’ responses (Yij) into a vector Yi, the probability of observing a given response 
pattern is given by 
 
 ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )i j i jY 1 Y
i j i j
i i i j
i j i j
J
j 1
exp exp
P Y y | , 1
1 exp 1 exp
−
=
θ δ θ δ
θ δ
θ δ θ δ
   − −
= = −   
+ − + −      
∏   (4) 
 
where j runs over the 10 adult items for households without children and over all 18 items 
for households with children. 
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 A useful property of equation (4) is that the conditional probability of a given 
response pattern can be factored using the count of affirmative responses (raw score).23  
This suggests that a household’s food security status can be ranked and compared using 
simple counts of the affirmed items.  Assuming households’ responses to the food 
hardship items follow the Rasch model and households are asked and answer all J food 
hardship items, there are J+1 (0,1,…,J) potential values for θi that can be identified.  
Under the assumptions of the Rasch model, the count of affirmative items is a minimal 
sufficient statistic for θi. 
Another attractive property of the Rasch model is its ability to compare food 
security scores among households who are asked different subsets of questions.  For 
example, the food security scale consists of 18 items for households with children, but 
only 10 items for households without children.  The 19 food security scores for 
households with children and 11 food security scores for households without children can 
be estimated and compared to determine a household’s food security status.  An 
additional benefit of this property is the ability to account for missing data on the food 
security items.  As long as households provide a valid response to at least one of the food 
security items, their food security score can be computed and compared to other 
households. 
  
                                                 
23 See the technical appendix to Wilde (2007) for a complete derivation of this factorization. 
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Behavioral Rasch Model 
 For my empirical analyses, household characteristics are incorporated into the 
Rasch model using a Generalized Linear Mixture Model (GLMM).  Specifically, I re-
express the hardship index as 
 
 i s i i
'
X iS X e ,θ β β= + +   (5) 
 
where Si is a SNAP participation indicator, Xi is a vector of observable control variables 
related to food insecurity, βS is a scalar coefficient, βX is a matrix of coefficients, and ei is 
a random variable that is normally distributed with mean zero and unknown variance σ2.  
At first glance, the error-component distributional assumption may appear to be an overly 
restrictive; however, this distribution represents the remainder of household heterogeneity 
after controlling for observable household characteristics and state and year fixed effects, 
not food insecurity itself (Opsomer, Jensen, & Pan, 2003). 
 Combining equations (1)-(3), (5), and the conditional independence assumption, 
the probability of observing a given response pattern may be re-expressed as 
 
 ( ) ( )( )( )( )
*
i j s i X i i j* *i
i i i i i i
'J
'
j
i
i j s i X i i j1
exp q S X e e1P Y y | S ,X ,u ,e de
1 exp q S X e
∞
=−∞
β β δ+ + −  
= = ϕ 
+ + + − σ σβ  β δ
∏∫  , (6) 
 
where j runs over the 10 adult items for households without children and over all 18 items 
for households with children, qij = 2Yij – 1, and φ( ) is the standard normal probability 
density function (pdf).  Assuming observations are independent, the likelihood function is 
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the product of the probabilities of observing a given response pattern for all observations.  
This model will serve as the baseline specification for the empirical analyses. 
Endogenous Behavioral Rasch Model 
 Estimation of the causal effect of SNAP benefit receipt on food insecurity is 
complicated by the endogeneity of the SNAP participation decision.  Baseline behavioral 
Rasch models attempt to control for selection on observables, but fail to account for 
selection on unobservables.  The household’s SNAP participation decision is modeled as 
 
 X i
'
Z i
i
'
i1 if  X Z u 0S
0 other                  wise       
α α + + >
= 

  (7) 
 
where Si is defined above, Xi represents observable confounders, Zi is a set of 
instrumental variables, αx and αz are coefficient matrices, and ui is a stochastic error-
component that is standard normally distributed.  The resulting model is consistent with a 
probit model for the decision to participate in SNAP. 
 Following Terza (2009), I assume the error-component specified in equation (5) 
can be decomposed into ui and e* such that ei = λui + ei*.  As a result, the food hardship 
index is now 
 
 '* *i s i X i i iS X u e ,= +θ +β λ+β   (8) 
 
where λ is an unknown parameter to be estimated,  and ei* represents the new random-
effect after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  The random-effect, 
ei*, is normally distributed with mean zero and unknown variance η2.  The error-
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component, ui, generates correlation between the participation variable (Si) and the food 
hardship indicators through λ.  If λ is nonzero, ui influences the household’s selection into 
SNAP and the likelihood of affirming food hardship conditions, rendering the baseline 
model inconsistent. 
 Equations (6)-(8) imply the following likelihood function for a sample of size N: 
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where the ‘i’ subscript denotes the ith sample household (i = 1, …, N).  All of the model 
parameters are estimated simultaneously.  The parameter estimate for λ is a factor loading 
parameter with the property that its nullity is a sufficient statistic for the exogeneity of the 
program participation variable.  For estimation purposes, I conduct a line search with 
respect to the most troublesome parameter (λ in the present model) from -5 to 5 by 
increments of 1.  All parameters are estimated conditional on the value of λ.  The value of 
λ that yields the best fit (in terms of the log-likelihood) is used as its starting value in the 
unrestricted model.  This ensures the results represent a global maximum. 
 The estimated SNAP coefficient describes how participation affects the food 
hardship index.  However, the current study is interested in SNAP’s effectiveness in 
reducing food insecurity.  Causal inferences of SNAP’s effect on food insecurity are 
based on the average treatment effect (marginal effect): 
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where P(Yi ≥ 3|Si = 1, Xi, ui, ei*) denotes food insecurity if anyone in the household 
participates in SNAP, and P(Yi ≥ 3|Si = 0, Xi, ui, ei*) denotes food insecurity if no one in 
the household participates in SNAP.  Thus, the average treatment effect describes how 
the probability of food insecurity would differ if all households participate in SNAP 
versus the probability if none of the households participate.  The average treatment effect 
is calculated using simulation methods. 
The principal advantage of Terza’s (2009) framework is flexibility to account for 
contemporaneous unobservable confounders in the behavioral Rasch model.  Previous 
studies that estimate dummy endogenous variable models rely on the assumption that the 
error-components are bivariate normally distributed (Mykerezi & Mills, 2010; Ratcliffe 
et al., 2011; Shaefer & Gutierrez, 2012; Yen et al., 2008).  Terza’s framework does not 
require the bivariate normality assumption, relying instead on separate error-component 
assumptions for the outcome and switching equations. 
 A disadvantage of the current approach is that it makes strong and potentially 
incorrect assumptions about functional form.  If the data are not generated according to 
the probit and logistic models specified, then the analysis will suffer from 
misspecification bias.  An additional disadvantage is the model’s reliance on instrumental 
variables for identification.  Therefore, interpretation of the results is conditional on the 
validity of the instrumental variables.  I test the sensitivity of my results to the 
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instrumental variables by estimating models with and without specific instrumental 
variables. 
Results 
Estimation results from alternative specifications of the behavioral Rasch model 
are listed in Table 7.  The top panel contains results from the baseline specification of the 
behavioral Rasch model that attempts to control for selection on observables.  The bottom 
panel lists results from a behavioral Rasch model that corrects for selection on 
observables and unobservables.  The columns report coefficient estimates, standard 
errors, and average marginal effects for the four subsamples: unmarried parent 
households, married parent households, all-elderly households, and other adult-only 
households. 
 The first rows of the top panel report estimates from behavioral Rasch models 
with no controls.  This is the Rasch model equivalent of unconditional differences in 
average food insecurity between SNAP participants and non-participants.  All of the 
marginal effects are strongly positive and consistent with the descriptive analysis findings 
and previous studies such as Coleman-Jensen et al. (2012).  The marginal effects are 
largest for other adult-only households and smallest for unmarried parent households. 
  
74 
 
Table 7 
 
Estimates of the Effect of SNAP Participation on Food Insecurity for Households with 
Income Less Than 130% of the Federal Poverty Threshold 
 Unmarried 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
All 
Elderly 
Other 
Adults 
     
Behavioral Rasch Models 
No Controls 1.373*** 2.084*** 3.755*** 3.610*** 
 (0.064) (0.087) (0.121) (0.090) 
 0.160 0.226 0.224 0.285 
     
Standard Controlsa 1.314*** 1.883*** 2.539*** 2.587*** 
 (0.067) (0.090) (0.114) (0.094) 
 0.160 0.210 0.166 0.209 
     
Standard and Economic Controlsb 1.190*** 1.742*** 2.472*** 2.421*** 
 (0.071) (0.094) (0.119) (0.096) 
 0.141 0.196 0.147 0.193 
     
Standard, Economic, and Other 0.689*** 0.931*** 2.072*** 1.598*** 
Assistance Controlsc (0.069) (0.092) (0.121) (0.093) 
 0.077 0.101 0.119 0.126 
     
Corrected Behavioral Rasch Models 
Standard and Economic Controlsd 4.170*** -1.108*** -1.993*** -2.725*** 
 (0.278) (0.322) (0.293) (0.337) 
 0.420 -0.111 -0.083 -0.162 
Note. Models estimated using weighted household data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS. 
a Standard controls include households head’s gender, age, age-squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital 
status (HHs without children), education; number of adults, children, and disabled members in household; 
age of the youngest member (HHs with children); elderly members, residence in an urban area; state 
unemployment rate, and state and year fixed effects. 
b Economic controls include household head’s employment status, log of household income, and home 
ownership. 
c Other assistance controls include participation in SBP, NSLP, and WIC (households with children) and 
use of food pantries and soup kitchens. 
d Instrumental variables include annual outreach per non-SNAP participant, state median recertification 
period, vehicle asset rules, and head’s citizenship status.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in italics. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
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 The second rows report estimates from specifications that add controls for the 
household respondent’s gender, age, age-squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status 
(households without children), education, number of adults, number of children, and the 
number of disabled members; age of the youngest member (households with children); 
presence of an elderly member; residence in an urban area; state unemployment rate; and 
state and year fixed-effects.  Adding these controls reduces substantially the marginal 
effects for households without children, but only slightly for households with children.  
Yet the marginal effects remain positive and highly significant, indicating SNAP receipt 
is associated with greater food hardships, including food insecurity. 
 The third rows report estimates from specifications that also add controls the 
respondent’s employment status, the natural log of household income, and home 
ownership status.  The use of these controls continues to attenuate the association 
between SNAP receipt and food insecurity.  The marginal effects, while smaller with the 
inclusion of additional controls, continue to indicate that SNAP is associated with food 
hardships.  Finally, the last row of the top panel adds controls for SBP, NSLP, and WIC 
for households with children and food bank and soup kitchen use for all households.  
Even after controlling for alternative food assistance programs, the association between 
SNAP receipt and food insecurity remains positive and significant.  When compared to 
specifications with no controls, adding the full set of controls reduces the marginal effects 
by approximately 50% for all subsamples; however, they remain positive.  These findings 
are consistent with the findings of Alaimo et al. (1998), Ribar and Hamrick (2003), and 
Gregory et al. (2013). 
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 The bottom panel of Table 7 lists estimates from behavioral Rasch models that 
control for selection on observables and unobservables.  After controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, the marginal effects change direction from positive to negative for married 
parent, all-elderly, and other adult-only households, while the marginal effect remains 
positive for unmarried parent households.  All of the coefficients are highly significant (at 
the 1% level or better).  For unmarried parent households, adjusting for sample selection 
bias has made the SNAP coefficient and marginal effect more positive.  After controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity, SNAP receipt is associated with a 42 percentage point 
increase in the probability of food insecurity among unmarried parent households, while 
the baseline specification estimates a 7.7 percentage point increase.  This unexpected 
result is likely being generated by additional unobserved heterogeneity for unmarried 
parent households.  These households likely have a complex structure that is not being 
captured by the model, as the group includes single parent households, cohabiting parent 
(unmarried) households, and households with other family members.  However, a second 
explanation may be that the instruments are not valid for this group. 
 In addition, the Barrett model may also provide some theoretical reasons for why 
I am finding this counterintuitive result.  Unlike other types of households, unmarried 
parent households do not have multiple incomes, which translates into fewer resources to 
purchase food.  Households with children also have greater food requirements.  Fewer 
resources and greater food needs increase food hardships.  When unmarried parent 
households do work, they are more likely to require childcare, which reduces the 
effectiveness of their labor market resources.  Unmarried parent households may also be 
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more vulnerable to losses of benefits because they have less time to comply with 
recertification requirements.  For example, married parent households have at least two 
adults who can work, care for children, and comply with program requirements, while 
unmarried parent households have a single adult with the same responsibilities. 
 All other subsamples’ marginal effects are consistent with the expected result that 
SNAP receipt reduces food insecurity after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.  
The ameliorative effect of SNAP is the largest for other adult-only households and 
smallest for all-elderly households.  For other adult-only households, SNAP receipt 
reduces the probability of food insecurity by 16.2 percentage points.  Approximately one-
quarter of other adult-only households receive SNAP benefits, suggesting SNAP has a 
substantial effect on low-income other adult-only households.  This result can be placed 
into context using the estimated marginal effect and descriptive statistics to convert the 
percentage point decline into a percentage decline in food insecurity.  Recall 56.2% of 
other-adult only households participating in SNAP are food insecure (Table 6).  The 
corrected behavioral Rasch model results suggest that 72.4% of other adult-only 
households would be food insecure without SNAP benefits, suggesting SNAP reduces 
food insecurity among these households by 22.4%.  While other studies do not 
specifically examine food insecurity among other adult-only households, the results are 
similar to previous studies that examine adult-only households. 
 After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, SNAP receipt reduces the 
probability of food insecurity among married parent and all-elderly households by 8 to 11 
percentage points.  Nearly one-third of married parent households and one-fifth of all-
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elderly households participate in SNAP.  For married parent households that participate 
in SNAP, 54.4% are food insecure.  Based on the corrected behavioral Rasch model 
results, food insecurity among married parent households would be 11.1 percentage 
points higher (65.5%) if no SNAP benefits were available.  This suggests that SNAP 
receipt reduces food insecurity among married parent households by 17%.  The corrected 
behavioral Rasch model results also suggest that 46.2% of all-elderly households would 
be food insecure without SNAP, which corresponds to an 18 percentage point decline in 
food insecurity among all-elderly households.  These results are consistent with previous 
studies, such as Ratcliffe et al. (2011) and Shaefer and Gutierrz (2012).  Table 8 lists 
additional coefficients and standard errors for the SNAP participation and food insecurity 
equations from the corrected behavioral Rasch model.  This is the same model listed in 
the bottom panel of Table 7.  The columns report estimates separately for the four 
subsamples described above.  SNAP receipt coefficients are listed fist, followed by the 
instrumental variables, respondent and household demographic characteristics, economic 
characteristics, calibration parameters, and the error-components. 
 The second panel of Table 8 lists coefficients for the instrumental variables.  The 
first instrumental variable is a measure of the state outreach activities per capita, lagged 
12 months.  All of the coefficients are of the expected direction (positive) with the 
exception of married parent households; however, it is imprecisely estimated.  Outreach 
activity is a significant predictor of program participation for other adult-only households 
(at the 5% level), which is surprising because outreach activities are also specifically 
targeted at elderly households.  Perhaps, other adult-only households are more likely to 
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be influenced by the information provided by outreach activities.  The second instrument 
is all vehicles are exempt from the asset test.  It is positive and significant (at the 10% 
level) for married parent households.  For all other subsamples, it is imprecisely 
estimated.  The predictive power of the vehicle asset rules may be limited by the decision 
to restrict the sample to households with income less than 130% of the federal poverty 
line. 
 The third instrumental variable is the state median recertification rate.  
Recertification period coefficients are positive and significant (at the 5% level) for 
unmarried parent and all-elderly households, suggesting these households are more 
sensitive to the costs associated with recertification of SNAP eligibility.  Potential 
reasons for this increased sensitivity to recertification may be limited mobility or higher 
opportunity costs.  The fourth and final instrument is an indicator for the household head 
being a non-citizen immigrant.  The immigrant coefficients are negative and significant 
for all subsamples with the exception of all-elderly households. 
 To determine the overall predictive power of the set of instruments for the SNAP 
participation decision, I conducted a Wald test of their joint significance.  The p-values 
for these tests are listed at the bottom of Table 8.  The tests indicate that the set of 
instruments are highly jointly significant (at the 1% level or better) for unmarried and 
married parent households, and other adult-only households.  For all-elderly households, 
the Wald test indicates that the set of instruments are only marginally jointly significant 
(at the 10% level). 
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Table 8 
Corrected Behavioral Rasch Model Coefficient Estimates for Households with Income Less Than 130% of the Federal Poverty 
Threshold 
 Unmarried Parent Married Parent All Elderly Other Adult 
  
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
         
SNAP Participation, Past 12 
Months  
4.170*** 
(0.278)  
-1.108*** 
(0.322)  
-1.993*** 
(0.293)  
-2.725*** 
(0.337) 
Instrumental Variables 
Real Annual Outreach Per Cap, 
L1 
0.003 
(0.030)  
-0.019 
(0.044)  
0.027 
(0.034)  
0.065** 
(0.027)  
All Vehicles Exempt -0.021 (0.056)  
0.135* 
(0.077)  
0.061 
(0.068)  
-0.020 
(0.052)  
State Median Recertification 
Period 
0.015** 
(0.008)  
0.015 
(0.010)  
0.022** 
(0.009)  
0.000 
(0.007)  
Head is a Non-Citizen, 
Immigrant 
-0.240*** 
(0.057)  
-0.167*** 
(0.054)  
-0.052 
(0.079)  
-0.318*** 
(0.060)  
Head Demographic/HH Characteristics 
Female 0.215
*** 
(0.035) 
-0.118 
(0.099)   
0.147*** 
(0.033) 
0.017 
(0.117) 
0.224*** 
(0.023) 
0.557*** 
(0.087) 
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(Cont.) 
 
 Unmarried Parent Married Parent All Elderly Other Adult 
  
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
Head Demographic/HH Characteristics (cont.) 
Age -0.003 (0.007) 
0.155*** 
(0.020) 
-0.039*** 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.027) 
0.343*** 
(0.058) 
0.804*** 
(0.221) 
0.077*** 
(0.005) 
0.325*** 
(0.020) 
Age Squared -0.000 (0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Black  0.198
*** 
(0.030) 
-0.205** 
(0.085) 
-0.027 
(0.050) 
0.290** 
(0.135) 
0.164*** 
(0.039) 
1.699*** 
(0.145) 
0.269*** 
(0.029) 
1.058*** 
(0.114) 
Other  0.080 (0.058) 
-0.085 
(0.163) 
0.028 
(0.061) 
0.171 
(0.164) 
0.159** 
(0.080) 
0.422 
(0.285) 
0.159*** 
(0.052) 
0.212 
(0.179) 
Hispanic 0.010 (0.041) 
0.064 
(0.120) 
-0.064 
(0.049) 
0.411*** 
(0.138) 
0.163*** 
(0.059) 
0.601*** 
(0.209) 
0.229*** 
(0.044) 
0.664*** 
(0.153) 
Married, Spouse Present     -0.188
** 
(0.088) 
0.079 
(0.338) 
-0.085** 
(0.036) 
-0.252** 
(0.128) 
Some College -0.160
*** 
(0.028) 
-0.122 
(0.079) 
-0.188*** 
(0.035) 
-0.190** 
(0.096) 
-0.269*** 
(0.032) 
-1.040*** 
(0.119) 
-0.167*** 
(0.027) 
-0.711*** 
(0.102) 
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(Cont.) 
 Unmarried Parent Married Parent All Elderly Other Adult 
  
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
Head Demographic/HH Characteristics (cont.) 
College Graduate -0.372
*** 
(0.068) 
-0.240 
(0.197) 
-0.483*** 
(0.071) 
-1.613*** 
(0.193) 
-0.161** 
(0.067) 
-1.870*** 
(0.259) 
-0.577*** 
(0.048) 
-2.663*** 
(0.166) 
Immigrant -0.236
*** 
(0.054) 
0.040 
(0.123) 
-0.284*** 
(0.058) 
-0.662*** 
(0.124) 
0.213*** 
(0.058) 
-0.246 
(0.196) 
-0.154*** 
(0.051) 
-0.920*** 
(0.144) 
Number of Adults -0.056
*** 
(0.016) 
0.044 
(0.046) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
0.109** 
(0.055) 
-0.103 
(0.078) 
-0.965*** 
(0.311) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
-0.184*** 
(0.057) 
Number of Children 0.213
*** 
(0.013) 
-0.100** 
(0.039) 
0.185*** 
(0.013) 
0.239*** 
(0.042)     
Number of Disabled  0.344
*** 
(0.032) 
0.150* 
(0.090) 
0.443*** 
(0.035) 
1.092*** 
(0.103) 
0.417*** 
(0.033) 
1.821*** 
(0.135) 
0.449*** 
(0.021) 
1.440*** 
(0.100) 
Age Youngest HH -0.025
*** 
(0.003) 
0.076*** 
(0.009) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.011)     
Elderly HH Member -0.069 (0.103) 
-0.295 
(0.292) 
-0.142 
(0.126) 
-0.176 
(0.334)   
0.074 
(0.065) 
-0.118 
(0.242) 
Urban HH -0.044 (0.033) 
0.190** 
(0.092) 
-0.003 
(0.041) 
0.505*** 
(0.112) 
-0.072** 
(0.035) 
0.355*** 
(0.129) 
-0.149*** 
(0.030) 
-0.067 
(0.109) 
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Table 8 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 Unmarried Parent Married Parent All Elderly Other Adult 
  
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
Economic Characteristics 
State Unemployment Rate 0.027 (0.026) 
0.080 
(0.070) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
0.227** 
(0.090) 
-0.087*** 
(0.031) 
0.260** 
(0.115) 
0.024 
(0.024) 
0.274*** 
(0.085) 
Head Employed -0.346
*** 
(0.027) 
0.064 
(0.086) 
-0.263*** 
(0.032) 
-0.623*** 
(0.095) 
-0.614*** 
(0.069) 
-1.502*** 
(0.219) 
-0.443*** 
(0.028) 
-1.016*** 
(0.106) 
LN Real Total HH Income 
($10,000) 
-0.418*** 
(0.019) 
0.376*** 
(0.061) 
-0.357*** 
(0.025) 
-0.385*** 
(0.089) 
-0.301*** 
(0.031) 
-0.534*** 
(0.119) 
-0.152*** 
(0.019) 
-0.356*** 
(0.069) 
Own Home -0.418
*** 
(0.031) 
-0.184** 
(0.093) 
-0.495*** 
(0.034) 
-0.984*** 
(0.109) 
-0.630*** 
(0.031) 
-1.497*** 
(0.129) 
-0.471*** 
(0.028) 
-1.597*** 
(0.119) 
Calibration Parameters 
δ1  
-10.270*** 
(0.157)  
-10.739*** 
(0.270)  
-8.071*** 
(0.130)  
-7.124*** 
(0.070) 
δ2  
-9.164*** 
(0.156)  
-9.695*** 
(0.269)  
-7.299*** 
(0.128)  
-6.372*** 
(0.068) 
δ3  
-8.003*** 
(0.155)  
-8.887*** 
(0.269)  
-7.386*** 
(0.128)  
-6.165*** 
(0.068) 
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Table 8 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 Unmarried Parent Married Parent All Elderly Other Adult 
  
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
Calibration Parameters (cont.) 
δ4  
-6.579*** 
(0.155)  
-6.875*** 
(0.268)  
-4.607*** 
(0.123)  
-4.261*** 
(0.065) 
δ5  
-6.594*** 
(0.155)  
-6.958*** 
(0.268)  
-4.717*** 
(0.123)  
-4.193*** 
(0.065) 
δ6  
-5.816*** 
(0.155)  
-6.067*** 
(0.269)  
-4.059*** 
(0.122)  
-3.576*** 
(0.064) 
δ7  
-4.938*** 
(0.155)  
-5.302*** 
(0.269)  
-2.469*** 
(0.122)  
-2.487*** 
(0.063) 
δ8  
-3.875*** 
(0.157)  
-4.297*** 
(0.271)  
-1.787*** 
(0.124)  
-1.536*** 
(0.064) 
δ9  
-3.475*** 
(0.158)  
-3.556*** 
(0.274)  
-0.408*** 
(0.134)  
-0.714*** 
(0.066) 
δ10  
-2.885*** 
(0.160)  
-2.965*** 
(0.277)     
δ11  
-8.728*** 
(0.155)  
-9.324*** 
(0.269)     
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Table 8 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 Unmarried Parent Married Parent All Elderly Other Adult 
  
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
Calibration Parameters (cont.) 
δ12  
-6.979*** 
(0.155)  
-7.745*** 
(0.268)     
δ13  
-5.482*** 
(0.155)  
-6.107*** 
(0.269)     
δ14  
-3.329*** 
(0.158)  
-3.650*** 
(0.273)     
δ15  
-2.818*** 
(0.160)  
-3.301*** 
(0.275)     
δ16  
-1.948*** 
(0.166)  
-2.462*** 
(0.282)     
δ17  
-1.498*** 
(0.171)  
-1.933*** 
(0.289)     
Error Components 
LN(σ2)  2.159
*** 
(0.037)  
2.255*** 
(0.042)  
2.758*** 
(0.040)  
2.698*** 
(0.043) 
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Table 8 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 Unmarried Parent Married Parent All Elderly Other Adult 
  
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
 
SNAP 
Food 
Insecurity 
Error Components (cont.) 
λ  -1.804
*** 
(0.166)  
1.725*** 
(0.191)  
2.670*** 
(0.178)  
3.014*** 
(0.203) 
Log-Likelihood -63,484.20 -38,892.90 -27,997.08 -56,730.70 
N     
NJ 232,206 167,518 133,985 186,142 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. IVs P-
Value [0.000] [0.003] [0.080] [0.000] 
Note. Models estimated using weighted household data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS and control for households head’s gender, age, age-squared, race, ethnicity, 
nativity, marital status (HHs without children), education, employment status; number of adults, children, and disabled members in household; age of the youngest 
member (HHs with children); elderly members, residence in an urban area; state unemployment rate, log of household income, home ownership, and state and year fixed 
effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. 
** Significant at 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at 0.01 level
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 The remainder of Table 8 lists estimates for observable household and economic 
characteristics.  Respondent and household characteristics are generally of the expected 
direction.  For example, increasing the household head’s level of education is associated 
with a decrease in the probability of SNAP participation and food insecurity.  Households 
headed by females are more likely to participate in SNAP and experience food hardships. 
Increasing the number of adults in a household reduces the probability of 
participation and food insecurity, while increasing the number of children has the 
opposite effect.  Increasing the state unemployment rate is associated with higher SNAP 
participation (except all-elderly households) and increased food hardships.  Households 
with an employed head that own their own home, or have higher incomes are less likely 
to participate in SNAP or experience food insecurity (except for unmarried parent 
households). 
 Finally, the bottom of Table 8 lists item calibration parameters and error-
components.  All of the calibration parameters for the Rasch model are highly significant 
and are consistent with the severity ordering determined by the USDA (Bickel et al., 
2000).  The error-components are also highly significant.  The lambda parameter is 
positive and highly significant for all household groups except unmarried parent 
households, where it is negative and highly significant.  This indicates that unobservables 
in the SNAP participation equation are positively correlated with those in the food 
insecurity equation for married parent households, all-elderly households, and other 
adult-only households, which is consistent with Yen et al. (2008), Mykerezi and Mills 
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(2010), Ratcliffe et al. (2011), and Schaefer and Gutierrez (2012).  The negatively signed 
lambda for unmarried parent households is unexpected and requires further analysis.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
The corrected behavioral Rasch model results differ markedly from the 
descriptive analysis and the majority of previous studies by indicating that SNAP 
participation has a negative and highly significant relationship with food insecurity.  An 
important question is: what specification and model assumptions lead to this result?  
Previous studies have typically used a binary food hardship indicator to examine the 
relationship between SNAP participation and food hardships with results depending on 
specific methodology.  Studies that use instrumental variables methods typically find an 
insignificant relationship.  I demonstrate the efficiency gains from the corrected 
behavioral Rasch model by estimating alternative models that use the more restrictive 
binary measure of food hardships. 
 Table 9 reports coefficient estimates, standard errors, and marginal effects for a 
logistic model that corrects for selection bias and a bivariate probit model.  Separate 
results are presented in the columns for the four household subsamples.  The logistic 
model closely parallels the behavioral Rasch model without making some of the more 
restrictive assumptions, such as conditional independence, but uses a less efficient 
measure of food hardships.  The bivariate probit model has been employed in previous 
studies (Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Shaefer & Gutierrez, 2012) and produced some of the 
stronger evidence to date on the ameliorative effects of SNAP.  For convenience, I 
reproduced the results from the preferred specification, the corrected behavioral Rasch 
89 
 
 
model.  The discussion focuses on marginal effects because of scaling differences 
between the three models. 
 
Table 9 
SNAP Coefficients and Marginal Effects from Corrected Logistic and Bivariate Probit 
Models 
 Unmarried 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
All 
Elderly 
Other 
Adults 
Corrected Behavioral Rasch Model 
 
 
4.170*** 
(0.278) 
0.420 
-1.108*** 
(0.322) 
-0.111 
-1.993*** 
(0.293) 
-0.083 
-2.725*** 
(0.337) 
-0.162 
Corrected Logistic Model 
 
   
0.517 
(0.364) 
0.123 
-0.018 
(0.447) 
-0.004 
-0.968* 
(0.494) 
-0.090 
-0.103 
(0.259) 
-0.019 
Bivariate Probit Model 
 
 
0.318 
(0.230) 
0.122 
-0.004 
(0.259) 
-0.001 
-0.185 
(0.195) 
-0.041 
0.009 
(0.144) 
0.003 
Note: Models estimated using weighted household data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS and control for 
households head’s gender, age, age-squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status (HHs without children), 
education, employment status; number of adults, children, and disabled members in household; age of the 
youngest member (HHs with children); elderly members, residence in an urban area; state unemployment 
rate, log of household income, home ownership, and state and year fixed effects.  Instrumental variables 
include annual outreach per non-SNAP participant, state median recertification period, vehicle asset rules, 
and head’s citizenship status.    Standard errors are in parentheses and average marginal effects are in 
italics. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
 The second rows of Table 9 list estimates from a logistic model that corrects for 
unobservable heterogeneity.  A comparison of these results with results from the 
corrected behavioral Rasch model demonstrates that the SNAP coefficients are less 
precisely estimated in the logistic model specification.  Corrected logistic model standard 
errors are larger than the corrected behavioral Rasch model for all subgroups.  Only all-
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elderly households have a significant coefficient for SNAP participation.  When 
compared to the marginal effects for the preferred specification, marginal effects for the 
corrected logistic model are very small (with the exception of all-elderly households). 
 The bivariate probit model generates results that are insignificant for all 
household subsamples.  The marginal effects are closely related for the bivariate probit 
and correct logistic model for all subsamples except elderly households.  The more 
precisely estimated coefficients and larger marginal effects of the corrected behavioral 
Rasch model are most likely due to the use of a more efficient measure of food hardships 
(i.e., the set of food security questions versus a single food insecurity indicator). 
 For my next robustness check, I examined how sensitive results from the 
corrected behavioral Rasch model are to the choice of instrumental variables.  As with all 
instrumental variables analyses, the results are contingent on the validity of the 
instruments.  To test this, I estimated specifications without the measure of immigrant 
eligibility rules, an indicator that is equal to one if the household head is a noncitizen 
immigrant, zero otherwise.  This is weakest instrument on theoretical grounds. 
 Table 10 lists estimates from alternative specifications of the corrected behavioral 
Rasch model.  The columns report coefficient estimates, standard errors, and marginal 
effects for the four subsamples.  The top panel contains models that use an annual 
measure of SNAP participation while the bottom uses a measure of SNAP receipt in the 
past 30 days.  Estimates from the preferred specification are reproduced in the first row of 
the top panel for convenience. 
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Table 10 
SNAP Coefficients and Marginal Effects from Alternative Corrected Behavioral Rasch 
Model Specifications 
 Unmarried 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
All 
Elderly 
Other 
Adults 
SNAP Participation, Past 12 Months 
IVs—Outreach, Vehicle Asset Rules, 
   Recertification Period, and Citizenship 
 
4.170*** 
(0.278) 
0.420 
-1.108*** 
(0.322) 
-0.111 
-1.993*** 
(0.293) 
-0.083 
-2.725*** 
(0.337) 
-0.162 
IVs—Outreach, Vehicle Asset Rules, and 
   Recertification Period 
 
4.289*** 
(0.273) 
0.426 
-1.015*** 
(0.272) 
-0.103 
-1.985*** 
(0.291) 
-0.083 
-2.736*** 
(0.374) 
-0.163 
HH’s income less than 185% FPL 
 
 
3.921*** 
(0.284) 
0.398 
-3.145*** 
(0.266) 
-0.242 
-2.139*** 
(0.297) 
-0.086 
-2.566*** 
(0.328) 
-0.152 
SNAP Participation, Past 30 Days 
IVs—Outreach, Vehicle Asset Rules, 
Recertification Period, and Citizenship 
Status 
3.280*** 
(0.398) 
0.345 
-3.939*** 
(0.313) 
-0.290 
-2.004*** 
(0.311) 
-0.084 
-2.489*** 
(0.344) 
-0.152 
Note. Models estimated using weighted household data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS and control for 
households head’s gender, age, age-squared, race, ethnicity, nativity, marital status (HHs without children), 
education, employment status; number of adults, children, and disabled members in household; age of the 
youngest member (HHs with children); elderly members, residence in an urban area; state unemployment 
rate, log of household income, home ownership, and state and year fixed effects.  Instrumental variables 
include annual outreach per non-SNAP participant, state median recertification period, vehicle asset rules, 
and head’s citizenship status.    Standard errors are in parentheses and average marginal effects are in 
italics. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
 The second row of Table 10 lists estimates from specifications that use real 
annual outreach per capita (lagged 12 months), vehicle asset rules, and the median 
recertification period as instrumental variables.  The immigrant eligibility measure is 
excluded from the specification to determine if the results are sensitive to this instrument.  
92 
 
 
A comparison of the marginal effects for rows 1 and 2 of the top panel suggests that the 
results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the immigrant eligibility instrument.  Marginal 
effects either do not change or change very little if this instrument is excluded.  The 
largest change occurs for married parent households, as the marginal effect decreases by 
0.008 percentage points. 
 As an additional robustness check, I examine how sensitive the results are to 
income restrictions placed on the sample.  Previous studies show that households who are 
marginally eligible for SNAP may adjust their labor supply to ensure eligibility.  The 
current analysis is restricted to households with income less than 130% of the poverty 
line; however, this is not a perfect measure of gross income eligibility because the CPS 
only provides a measure of annual income, not monthly income (which is used to 
calculate benefit eligibility), and no information on assets.  By restricting the analysis to 
130% of the poverty line, I may be missing households that are gross income eligible on 
a monthly basis, but not on an annual basis.  To test the sensitivity of the results to this 
assumption, I increased the income cutoff to 185% of the federal poverty line.  For all 
subsamples except unmarried parent households and other adult-only households, 
increasing the income threshold for the sample has increased the marginal effect in 
absolute magnitude.  The marginal effect has doubled for married parent households (-
0.111 vs.  -0.242).  The increase in strength of the SNAP effect with a more generous 
income threshold is consistent with previous studies findings.  The opposite is true for 
unmarried parent and other adult-only households. 
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 As a final robustness check, I used an alternative version of the SNAP 
participation variable.  I estimated alternative specifications with the annual SNAP 
measure replaced by a measure of SNAP participation within the past 30 days.  
Households that report receiving SNAP benefits within the past 30 days are more likely 
to participate in SNAP for the full year.  The 30-day SNAP measure is also utilized 
extensively in the previous literature.  For married parent and all-elderly households, the 
30-day SNAP measure generates larger marginal effects, while the opposite is true for 
unmarried parent and other adult-only households.  To put this into perspective, when the 
30-day SNAP measure is used, SNAP decreases food insecurity among married parent 
households by 34.8% (17% with annual measure). 
Conclusion 
This paper uses nationally representative data from the 2001-2008 CPS-FSS to 
estimate a behavioral Rasch model that corrects for selection on observables and 
unobservable household characteristics.  Based on the preferred model specifications, I 
find strong evidence of the ameliorative effects of SNAP participation on food insecurity 
for low-income married parent, all-elderly, and other adult-only households.  Results 
from the preferred specification suggest that SNAP participation reduces the probability 
of food insecurity by 16.2 percentage points (22.4%) for other adult-only households, 
11.1 percentage points (17%) for married parent households, and 8.3 (18%) percentage 
points for all-elderly households.  For unmarried parent households, the association 
between participation in SNAP and food insecurity remains positive after correcting for 
selection on contemporaneous unobservables. 
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 In alternative specifications, I estimated models that used a binary food hardship 
measure (food insecure), rather than the full set of food security questions utilized by the 
corrected behavioral Rasch model.  Both a logistic model that corrects for selection bias 
and a bivariate probit model were estimated using the same data.  When compared to the 
corrected behavioral Rasch model, it is clear that the use of a binary food hardship 
indicator is less efficient.  The majority of SNAP coefficients are insignificant, with one 
exception, in which case it is marginally significant.  This reinforces the hypothesis that 
previous studies have found no association, or a weak association, between SNAP 
participation and food insecurity because they use inefficient measures of food hardships. 
The results presented in this paper are robust to various assumptions; however, 
there are potential weaknesses.  First, the Rasch model assumptions may not be realistic 
for the food security questions.  While the model appears to fit the data well, the follow-
up food security questions violate the conditional independence assumption.  Future work 
should relax this assumption while maintaining the efficiency gains from a Rasch 
analysis.  Second, I use instrumental variables to identify the models.  As such, 
interpretation of the results is subject to the validity of the instruments.  To test this, I 
excluded the weakest instrument, head’s citizenship status, and found that the results did 
not change.  Finally, the behavioral Rasch model, as it is formulated, does not account for 
the ordinal nature of some of the food security questions.  Future work should address 
this by directly modeling these responses as ordinal and not discrete. 
 While the corrected behavioral Rasch model formulated in this paper is directly 
useful in the SNAP participation and food insecurity literature, it is also indirectly useful 
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in other areas of research.  The corrected behavioral Rasch model is equivalent to a 
random-effects logistic model with item fixed effects and controls for contemporaneous 
unobservable heterogeneity.  The model can be applied in any situation where a random-
effects logistic model is warranted and there is concern about contemporaneous 
unobservables.  The model can also be applied to discrete-time event history model to 
estimate the causal effect of a binary variable on the hazard. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
UNDERAGE DRINKING AND THE OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES 
OF RECENT COLLEGE GRADUATES 
 
 
Abstract 
 This analysis examines the relationship between underage college drinking and 
the initial occupational choices of recent male college graduates using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97).  We exploit the longitudinal 
structure of the NLSY97 to identify the year in which young men transitioned from 
college to work.  Focusing on recent college graduates and their initial occupational 
choices allows us to address important timing issues not considered by previous studies.  
For the multivariate analyses, we estimate multinomial logistic models of occupational 
choice, where the occupational choice set is specified as employed full-time in white-
collar occupations, other occupations, enrolled in school, and not in school nor employed 
full-time.  In addition, we estimate multinomial logistic selection models to control for 
any potential unobserved heterogeneity between drinkers and abstainers.  The results 
suggest that underage college drinking is not associated with young men’s initial 
occupational choices, with the exception of the decision to be enrolled in school.  Young 
men with any underage college days where they drank two or more drinks are 28.9% less 
likely to be enrolled in school after completing a bachelor’s degree. 
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Introduction 
 A distinguishing feature of young adulthood is the number of choices made with 
potentially lifelong consequences.  Schooling allows young adults to invest in 
themselves, acquiring occupational skills for the labor market.  According to the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES), 42% of young adults were enrolled in college in 
2011.  During the 2013-2014 academic year, colleges and universities awarded 1.8 
million bachelor’s degrees to young adults.  Upon completing the requirements for a 
bachelor’s degree, many of these young adults transition from schooling to full-time, 
permanent jobs for the first time.  While searching for employment, young adults 
compare jobs based on their wages, fringe benefits, and the potential for career 
advancement.  The search also involves critical choices about their initial industry and 
occupation.  A considerable amount of evidence suggests early labor market history, 
including initial occupational choices, influence job mobility and income trajectories 
(Light, 2005; Oreopoulos & von Wachter, 2012).  In addition, early occupational choices 
have an effect on health behaviors (Kelly et al., 2011). 
 Young adults must also make choices about their drinking behaviors, which have 
implications for their health, schooling, and labor market outcomes.  For better or for 
worse, drinking during college has become part of the higher-education experience for 
most young adults.  Approximately four out of five college students drink alcohol and 
half of those who drink report drinking in excess (National Institute for Alcohol Abuse 
and Alcoholism [NIAAA], 2014).  According to the NIAAA, 25% of college students 
report academic consequences of their drinking such as missing class, falling behind, and 
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poor performance on exams and papers.  Research suggests drinking is associated with a 
reduction in the quality (Anderson et al., 1993; Carrell et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2003) 
and quantity of skills, lower employment status (Johansson et al., 2007; Mullahy & 
Sindelar, 1996; Terza, 2002), and reduced income (Mullahy & Sindelar, 1991). 
 Several studies examine the relationship between drinking and occupational 
choice.  These studies typically focus on the occupational choices of males between the 
ages of 25 and 59.  While truncating the sample at these ages removes individuals who 
are still in school or close to retirement, considerable heterogeneity remains because of 
differences in educational attainment, labor market experience, health, and drinking 
history.  The timing of occupational choices for these individuals is also very different.  
Younger individuals are making initial occupation choices, while mid-career individuals 
may be switching occupations and older individuals are moving from career-type 
employment to periods of “bridge employment” as they progress towards retirement.  
However, for many of these individuals, their occupational choice was made prior to their 
inclusion in the sample.  Studies also tend to focus on contemporaneous drinking 
behaviors, which are subject to concerns about reverse causality.  For these studies, it is 
unclear if drinking behaviors are causing men to choose a specific occupation or if their 
occupations are causing them to drink. 
 This analysis examines the relationship between underage college drinking and 
the initial occupational choices of college graduates using data from the 1997 cohort of 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).  We exploit the longitudinal 
structure of the NLSY97 to identify the year in which a young adult transitioned from 
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college to work after completing a bachelor’s degree.  We extend the previous literature 
by focusing on initial occupational choices, which allows us to construct a sample of 
young adults who are facing the same occupational choices and level of education.  This 
allows us to address important timing issues that have received little attention by the 
previous literature.  Focusing on underage drinking also allows us to identify drinking 
measures that are better aligned with the occupational choices of young adults. 
 For the multivariate analyses, we estimate multinomial logistic (MNL) models of 
occupational choice, where occupational choice is specified as employed full-time in 
white-collar occupations, other occupations, in school, and neither in school nor 
employed full-time.  These models control for young adults’ demographic and 
background characteristics, survey design characteristics, economic characteristics, and 
region and year fixed-effects.  In addition, we estimate MNL selection models (Terza, 
2002; Terza & Vechnak, 2011) that control for potential unobserved heterogeneity 
between drinkers and abstainers. 
Background 
Previous studies suggest the principal mechanism that drives the relationship 
between underage college drinking and occupational choice is the acquisition of 
occupational skills.  While attending college, young adults acquire occupational skills.  
Upon graduation and entry into the labor market, employers use these skills to 
differentiate between higher and lower quality employees.  Empirical evidence suggests 
drinking adversely affects the acquisition of occupational skills by affecting the cognitive 
abilities needed to learn.  Reduced cognitive ability leads to lower productivity as a 
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student (diminished capacity to acquire occupational skills), which generates lower 
quality (less skilled) employees (Anderson et al., 1993; Carrell et al., 2011; Williams et 
al., 2003). 
 A closely related mechanism that links drinking to occupational choice is health 
status.  Light or moderate drinking may generate health benefits (Hamilton & Hamilton, 
1997; Heien, 1996).  For example, drinking can benefit health by reducing stress and 
tension levels and lowering the incidence of illness.  College students are particularly 
susceptible to high levels of stress and tension.  Improved health leads to reduced 
absenteeism from classes and increased productivity, which generates higher quality 
(more skilled) future employees.  Conversely, excessive drinking can result in negative 
consequences for health that translate into increased absenteeism from classes and 
decreased productivity. 
 There are other mechanisms that might link drinking and occupational choice.  
Individuals’ college experiences often involve social events where students interact with 
peers, faculty, and alumni.  Drinking can have a “socializing” effect if part of the 
drinking is associated with time spent with peers.  Young adults can use this time to 
develop social skills.  Peters and Stringham (2006) examine the effect of drinking on 
productivity (measured by earnings) and find that social drinking increases productivity.  
Spending time with faculty and alumni while drinking may also be associated with a 
“networking” effect (Hutcheson et al., 1995).  During this time young adults may obtain 
information about potential employment opportunities, reducing information 
asymmetries. 
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These mechanisms provide important insights for the present analysis.  Specific 
mechanisms are more likely to affect certain occupations because of the skills required 
for young men to be productive workers.  White-collar occupations and enrollment in 
school represent the highest-skilled occupational choices.  For young men to be 
productive in these occupations they must have acquired skills in critical thinking, 
speaking, comprehension, and active learning while in college.  The skills needed for 
these occupations are particularly susceptible to the effects of drinking during acquisition 
when these skills are developed.  Drinking may decrease the cognitive skills needed to 
learn new skills, which will reduce the likelihood of young adult’s being employed in 
higher-skilled occupations.  Other occupations typically rely on physical skills.  For 
example, construction occupations require coordination, monitoring, and strength skills 
for young adults to be productive workers.  Drinking may potentially improve or decrease 
health which affects young adult’s motor skills and strength.  Drinking associated with 
“networking” is anticipated to increase the number of job opportunities for young adults 
by reducing information asymmetries, while “social” drinking will increase the likelihood 
of employment in occupations that place a high value on communication skills. 
In addition to the multiple mechanisms outlined above, there are also empirical 
considerations that might link underage college drinking and occupational choice.  
Failure to account for unobserved individual characteristics (unobserved heterogeneity) 
that are correlated with occupational choice and underage college drinking could bias the 
results.  Potential omitted variables include young adult’s tastes and preferences, non-
wage job attributes, and innate ability.  For example, empirical evidence suggests 
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drinkers have a high marginal utility of leisure, which is known by the individual and 
unobservable by the researcher.  The theory of rational addiction suggests reverse 
causality might also affect the empirical relationship (Becker & Murphy, 1988; Kenkel & 
Wang, 1999).  In the present context, reverse causality is a concern if individuals are 
more likely to become drinkers because of their occupation (and its attributes).  
Mismeasurement and misreporting of drinking behaviors may also affect the observed 
relationship. 
Early studies of problem drinking (alcohol abuse or dependence) and occupational 
choice focus on the life-cycle effects of drinking.  Mullahy and Sindelar (1989) estimate 
MNL models of occupational choice using data from the first wave of the Epidemiologic 
Catchment Area (ECA) survey for males between the ages of 25 and 59.  Their models 
specify the occupational choice set as employed full-time in white-collar, blue-collar, and 
service-sector occupations (the base outcome is not employed full-time).  The 
construction of their sample suggests males are making different occupational choices 
based on their labor market histories.  For example, younger males are likely making 
initial occupational choices while older males are switching from career-type 
employment to “bridge employment” as they prepare for retirement.  Their findings 
suggest the early onset of problem drinking (between the ages of 19 and 22) decreases the 
likelihood of being employed in a white-collar occupation and increases the likelihood of 
being employed in a blue-collar occupation.  Yet, these effects are only marginally 
statistically significant. 
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Anderson et al. (1993) also use the ECA to estimate MNL models of occupational 
choice for males age 25 to 55, where the occupational choice set is specified as being 
employed in low- and high-skilled white-collar and blue-collar occupations, and 
unemployed (base category); however, they focus on substance abuse generally (problem 
drinking and drug abuse) rather than problem drinking.  Disaggregating the occupational 
choice set this way increases the likelihood of their models detecting drinking effects 
related to skills acquisition; however, their sample consists of males at different stages in 
their careers.  The authors estimate a generalized method of movements (GMM) variant 
of the MNL model to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity caused by 
differences in educational attainment.  Model specification tests fail to reject the MNL 
models that control for selection on observables.  The results suggest substance abuse has 
no effect on occupational choice with the exception of low-skilled white-collar 
occupations and educational attainment; however, these results are marginally significant.  
According to their results, substance abuse has a strong negative effect on educational 
attainment. 
Other studies focus on contemporaneous problem drinking and occupational 
choice.  Kenkel and Wang (1999) use data from the 1989 wave of the 1979 cohort of the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NSLY79) to estimate conditional means and 
probit models of occupational choice for males between the ages of 24 and 31.  While 
Kenkel and Wang’s sample is less heterogeneous than those of previous studies, it is still 
subject to concerns about the timing of occupational choices.  They define the 
occupational choice set using three binary variables for employment in a white-collar, 
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blue-collar, or service-sector occupation.  Descriptive analyses using comparisons of the 
proportions of drinkers and abstainers in each occupational category suggest 
contemporaneous problem drinking reduces the likelihood of a young man being 
employed in a white-collar occupation, but increase the likelihood of being employed in a 
blue-collar occupation.  Unfortunately, they did not test the statistical significance of 
these differences.  Probit models for white-collar occupations reveal a similar relationship 
after controlling for male’s observable characteristics; however, the result is marginally 
significant.  Additionally, these models do not control for selection or potential reverse 
causality. 
Terza and Vechnak (2011) estimate MNL selection models of occupational choice 
that control for unobserved heterogeneity related to substance abuse (problem drinking 
and drug abuse).  The authors use data from the 1992 National Longitudinal 
Epidemiological Survey (NLAES) and focus on males and females between the ages of 
24 and 59.  Like other studies, Terza and Vechnak do not address timing issues related to 
occupational choice.  Additionally, they do not estimate separate models for males and 
females, which increases the heterogeneity of their sample.  Their models specify the 
occupation choice set as employed full-time in white-collar, blue-collar, and service-
sector occupations; unemployed; and out of the labor force (base category).  The MNL 
selection models were identified using information on parent’s problem drinking, and 
alcohol and cigarette excise taxes.  The results suggest current substance abuse is 
endogenous and reduces the probabilities of being employed full-time in a white-collar 
occupation and employed part-time. 
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A shortcoming of many of the previous studies is that they do not account for 
timing issues related to occupational choices.  Many of the previous studies estimate 
models of occupational choice using heterogeneous samples.  These samples include 
individuals (typically males) who are at various stages in their work lives.  Some 
individuals are transitioning from school to work and making initial occupational choices, 
while others are switching careers or moving from career-type employment to “bridge 
employment” as they prepare for retirement.  These occupational choices are very 
different.  In addition, studies that focus on contemporaneous drinking are also subject to 
reverse causality, where it is possible that the person’s job is causing his or her drinking 
behaviors. 
We extend the previous literature by focusing on initial occupational choices for 
recent college graduates.  This allows us to address the timing of occupational choices 
because all of the young adults in our sample face the same choices.  Restricting our 
sample to recent college graduates also reduces the heterogeneity in our sample because 
all of the young adults have bachelor’s degrees and lessens concerns about reverse 
causality because drinking is being measured and observed prior to those initial 
occupational choices. 
Data 
 Estimation of the relationship between underage college drinking and subsequent 
occupational choices requires a data set that includes schooling, labor market, and 
drinking behaviors at the relevant points in time.  The 1997 cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) is perhaps the best publicly available, 
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nationally representative data set that meets these requirements.  The NLSY97 is 
designed to document transitions from school to work and into adulthood.  The first wave 
of the NSLY97 was conducted in 1997 and included interviews with youths who were 
between the ages of 12 and 16.  The NLSY97 has followed these youths each year with 
more than 82% of the sample still involved in 2012. 
The NSLY97 consists of a sample of 8,984 youths and oversamples Hispanics 
and blacks.  The present analysis considers male youths who completed a bachelor’s 
degree.  The analysis is limited to males because our focus is on underage college 
drinking and previous studies have shown males and females differ in their labor market 
behaviors, schooling experiences, and alcohol use patterns (Mullahy & Sindelar, 1992, 
1996).  Additional focus is placed on recent college graduates because college students 
are more susceptible to underage drinking (Wechsler et al., 2002) and they are an 
important policy group. 
 Of the 4,599 male youths interviewed in the first wave of the NSLY97, 841 
received bachelor’s degrees between 2001 and 2012.  Graduates who reported being 
currently employed in farming or military occupations are excluded from the sample to 
enhance the comparability of young men across occupational categories.  The labor 
market behavior of young men in farming and military occupations is likely to be very 
different from those in other occupations; also, these were infrequent transitions in the 
sample.  Dropping these transitions results in an initial sample of 834 college graduates.  
An additional 123 young men are excluded from the analysis because of missing 
information for the dependent and principal explanatory variables.  All men who 
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completed a bachelor’s degree in 2012 are excluded from the analysis sample because of 
missing information on beer excise taxes used to construct the instrumental variables (15 
men).  Young men failing to provide valid responses to one or more of the questions used 
to form the explanatory variables are also excluded, leaving a final analysis sample of 
680 young men. 
Dependent Variables 
 The empirical analyses examine responses to questions about the young men’s 
schooling and labor market behaviors immediately following graduation as dependent 
variables.  In each wave young men were asked to provide information about their 
current school enrollment and employment status.  If young men reported working for an 
employer, then additional information was collected on each young man’s employment 
history, number of jobs held, weeks worked, and hours worked per week; employer 
characteristics; and industry and occupation.  In some instances, young men reported 
working for multiple employers.  Because the focus of our analysis is on the initial 
occupational choices of young men, it is important to identify each young man’s main 
job.  When young men enter the labor market for the first time, it is common for some to 
experience periods of “bridge employment” prior to accepting a career-type position.  We 
address this issue by defining each young man’s main job as the job at which he reports 
working the most hours per week at the time of the survey. 
 Young men’s responses to the schooling and labor market behaviors are used to 
construct a categorical measure of occupational choice with four categories.  The first 
occupational category denotes men who are employed full-time in a white-collar 
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occupation, where full-time is defined as working at least 35 hours per week at a job 
when the interview was conducted.  The second occupational category describes males 
who are employed full-time in other occupations.  These occupational categories are 
aggregations from the 2002 Census Bureau Occupational Classification System Codes.  
While these are rather broad occupational groupings, it is necessary for the tractability of 
the analysis and increases the comparability with previous studies.  However, aggregating 
occupations into broad groups also imposes the assumption that drinking effects are 
homogeneous across finer categories.  The white-collar and other occupation categories 
capture young men who are successful at finding career-type jobs. 
 The third occupational category captures young men who continued their 
schooling and were pursuing professional or graduate degrees.  Young men are 
considered full-time students if they were enrolled in school and not associated with an 
employer at the time of the interview.  Expanding the occupational choice set to include 
the schooling decision allows us address the endogeneity of young men’s skills 
acquisition and capture men who will accept career-type jobs as professionals.  The 
fourth and final category denotes men who were neither enrolled in school nor employed 
full-time.  Men who fall under this category failed to find career-type employment at the 
time of the interview.  Because the NLSY97 labor market behavior questions are tied to a 
specific employer, we cannot differentiate between young men who are unemployed and 
those who are not currently employed by a specific employer.  This reduces the 
comparability of the analysis to previous studies where the occupational choice set is 
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based on the young man’s labor force participation status.24  Additionally, the 
occupational choice set does not include young men who are unemployed and not 
searching for work (discouraged workers) or those who are out of the labor force and 
engaged in household production.  While these omissions restrict the occupational choice 
set, they are mitigated by the analysis’s focus on recent male college graduates because 
they are less likely to be discouraged workers or participate in household production. 
 The categorical occupational choice variable is similar to the specification used in 
Mullahy and Sindelar (1989).  Anderson et al. (1993) disaggregates white-collar and 
other occupations into high- and low-skilled occupations.  While this analysis does not 
group occupations in this fashion, their results are comparable with our white-collar and 
other occupation categories.  Terza and Vechnak (2011) include an occupational 
alternative for those who are out of the labor force (in school and discouraged workers).  
Sample restrictions and data limitations reduce the comparability of our results with this 
particular category because we do not include discouraged workers; however, the 
remaining occupational categories are similar in spirit to those used here. 
Explanatory Variables 
 The principal explanatory variables concerning underage alcohol consumption are 
constructed using responses to the drinking questions collected by the NSLY97.  An 
advantage of the NLSY97 for this analysis is that respondents are asked in each wave 
about the number of days they consumed alcohol, drinks per day, and days they typically 
had five or more drinks within the past 30 days.  Other data sets only ask questions about 
                                                 
24 The NLSY97 collected information on each young man’s labor force participation status using questions 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in waves 1, 4, and 10. 
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drinking behaviors in some years or rely on the respondent’s ability to recall previous 
alcohol consumption, which is subject to recall bias.  A limitation of the NLSY97 is that 
it does not collect the information necessary to construct clinical measures of alcohol 
abuse or dependence.  In addition, young men’s reports of drinking may be subject to 
misreporting.  However, studies assessing the measurement of drinking in household 
surveys find that requests for detailed information about drinking yield reliable estimates 
(Poikolainen & Karkkainen, 1985; Williams et al., 1985). 
 We used information on young men’s drinking behaviors to construct three binary 
measures of underage college drinking.  We measure underage college drinking using 
binary variables to facilitate comparison with existing drinking policies for social, binge, 
and heavy drinking.  The first drinking measure is a binary variable set to one if young 
men ever reported any drinking while underage and enrolled in college, zero otherwise.  
Measuring drinking as “any underage college drinking” likely captures moderate or 
“social” drinking along with heavier drinking and is comparable to previous studies that 
define drinking as “any consumption” (Dee et al., 2003; Mullahy & Sindelar, 1992).  The 
second drinking measure is a binary variable set to one if young men ever reported 
drinking five or more drinks on one or more days while underage and enrolled in college, 
zero otherwise.  This drinking measure is consistent with binge drinking (CDC, 2014; 
Jennison, 2004; NIAAA, 2004; Wechsler & Nelson, 2001).  The third drinking measure 
is a binary variable that is set to one if young men ever reported drinking two or more 
drinks per day while underage and enrolled in college, zero otherwise.  The “two or more 
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drinks per day” measure captures drinking behaviors that are consistent with heavy 
drinking (Baer et al., 2001; Dee & Evans, 2003). 
 Our multivariate empirical analyses additionally control for demographic, 
geographic, and economic characteristics.  The demographic measures include each 
young man’s age, race, ethnicity, marital status, and subjective health status.  The 
analysis also includes a measure of each young man’s innate ability, which is measured 
by their Armed Services Vocational Battery (CAT-ASVAB) percentile score.25  State-
level economic controls include per-capita beer consumption and real income (in $1,000); 
and the percentage of the state population age 25 and older with at least a bachelor’s 
degree.  Information on state-level per-capita beer consumption and real income was 
obtained from the National Institute for Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively.  The U.S. Census Bureau provided 
information on the percentage of the population age 25 and older with at least a 
bachelor’s degree.  Other controls include residence in an urban area; months since 
college graduation; an indicator for missing information for at least one wave; 
membership in the NLSY97 oversample; county-level unemployment rate (from the 
NSLY97 geocode files); and region and time fixed-effects.  Means and standard 
deviations for the explanatory variables are in Appendix D. 
Exclusion Restrictions 
  We estimate MNL models that do and do not account for possible selection in the 
underage drinking variable.  Estimation of the MNL model with selection controls 
                                                 
25 Missing information on the young man’s ASVAB score and residence in an urban area was imputed 
using the sample means.  Indicators for missing data were included in all models. 
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requires exclusion restrictions that predict drinking but do not predict occupational 
choice.  We use state-level policies related to drinking and lagged delinquency and 
drinking behaviors as exclusion restrictions.  State-level drinking policies are enacted to 
alter drinking behaviors and are not intended to affect occupational choices.  These 
policies may be linked to occupational choices for empirical reasons if they are capturing 
state-level economic conditions.  We address this by including state-level economic 
controls (described above).  Lagged delinquency and drinking behaviors are far removed 
from young men’s occupational choices, but strongly predictive of other drinking 
behaviors. 
 Information on cigarette (a complementary good) and beer excise taxes was 
obtained from the Tobacco Tax Council (2012) and the Beer Institute’s Brewer’s 
Almanac (2013), respectively.  Data on state-level drinking policies was obtained from 
the Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS).  The Tobacco Tax Council and APIS 
provide information on the exact date a policy was introduced, while the Brewer’s 
Almanac provides information for the year.  Information used to construct the exclusion 
restrictions was merged with the NLSY97 data using state identifiers provided by the 
NSLY97 geocode files. 
 The first set of exclusion restrictions measure cigarette and beer excise taxes for 
each state.  The beer excise tax provides an indicator for interstate differences in alcohol 
beverage prices (Cook et al., 1994).  Researchers also often use beer excise taxes to proxy 
for alcohol prices (Ruhm et al., 2012).  Beer excise taxes are expected to affect young 
men’s drinking behaviors by altering the price of alcohol.  Higher taxes (prices) are 
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anticipated to reduce drinking behaviors.  Terza (2002) and Terza and Vechnak (2011) 
use measures of beer and cigarette excise taxes as instrumental variables.  We construct 
measures of state beer and cigarette excise taxes for each young man over the previous 
four years using the state where he resided at the time of the survey.26 
 The second set of exclusion restrictions measure state drinking polices for blood 
alcohol content (BAC), social hosting, and Sunday sales of alcohol.  BAC laws limit the 
amount alcohol allowed in an individual’s bloodstream while operating a motor vehicle.  
Low BAC limits are consistent with stricter policies on drinking behaviors, reducing the 
likelihood of a young man drinking.  Social host laws are targeted at reducing underage 
drinking by imposing liability on adults who host parties, and Sunday sale laws restrict 
the sale of alcohol on Sundays (Dills, 2009).  Yoruk (2013) finds that states who repealed 
their laws restricting Sunday alcohol sales experienced significant increases in per-capita 
drinking.  BAC and Sunday sale laws are expected to increase the opportunity costs of 
drinking.  We construct measures of BAC, social host, and Sunday sale laws by taking 
the average of the proportion of time these laws were in effect over the previous four 
years, using the state where the young man resided at the time of the survey.27 
 The third set of exclusion restrictions measures lagged behaviors for young men 
prior to college from the NSLY97.  The first measure uses the delinquency index created 
by Child Trends, Inc. for the NLSY97.  The index was constructed using responses to 
questions in the first wave (1997) of the NSLY97.  The questions elicited information 
                                                 
26 We also tested alternative specifications for beer and cigarette excise taxes using the current year and 
yearly lags. 
 
27 We also tested alternative specifications for drinking policies using the current year and yearly lags.  In 
addition, we examined state vertical ID laws and retailer scanner provisions for IDs. 
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about various delinquent activities young men participated in during the previous year.  
For a complete listing of the delinquency index questions, see Appendix E.  Higher 
values of the index indicate more severe levels of delinquency.  Greater delinquency is 
expected to increase the likelihood of young men exhibiting other behavioral problems, 
such as underage drinking.  The second instrument is a measure of previous drinking: 
drinking during high school.  Mullahy and Sindelar (1989) find that prior drinking 
experiences increase the likelihood of an individual reporting future drinking.  We use 
this information to construct measures of delinquency and high school drinking. 
Econometric Specification 
The multivariate analysis uses a multinomial logistic model (MNL; Nerlove & 
Press, 1973) to describe how young men make occupational choices.  These choices can 
be motivated by a random utility model.  We assume each young man’s utility is a 
function of potential lifetime productivity, demographic and background characteristics, 
and unobserved taste shifters.  Suppose the ith individual is faced with four mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive choices (Yi): full-time employment in white-collar occupations, 
full-time employment in other occupations, in school, and neither in school nor employed 
full-time.  Further, assume the utility of choice j is 
 
 
j ji j i A i X i j
V A X ,β+ + εβ=   (11) 
 
where Ai (an indicator for underage college drinking) and Xi (a matrix of control 
variables) are reduced form determinants of the individual’s lifetime utility for choice j; 
and εij is stochastic error-component that is distributed according to a type 1 -extreme 
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value (Gumbel) distribution.  We assume young men will choose the occupational 
alternative that provides the maximum lifetime utility among the J choices. 
 Given equation (1) and the assumption that the stochastic error component (εij) is 
distributed according to a type 1 extreme value distribution, the probability choice j is 
made is 
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where exp( ) is the exponential function.  Equation (2) and the independence of 
observations lead to a likelihood-function that is the product of the probabilities for the J 
choices for all individuals.  The model as it is formulated above normalizes one of the 
occupational choice set’s parameters to be zero for identification purposes.  This 
alternative will serve as the base category.  Therefore, all coefficients must be interpreted 
relative to the base category.  For the current analysis, full-time employment in white-
collar occupations will serve as the base category. 
 An alternative approach to the MNL model is to model each young man’s choice 
set using a series of J binary logistic models; however, simultaneously modeling the 
choice set leads to more efficient estimation.  Yet, this approach relies on the assumption 
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which follows from the initial 
assumption that the stochastic error-components for the J choices are independent and 
homoscedastic.  While this property is convenient for estimation purposes, it is not an 
appealing restriction to place on young men’s behavior.  The IIA assumption implies that 
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a series of pairwise comparisons are unaffected by the characteristics of alternatives other 
than the pair under consideration.  Thus, the conditional probability of a choice does not 
depend on the alternatives.  We will test this property using the Hausman test (Hausman 
& McFadden, 1984). 
Endogenous Multinomial Logistic Model 
Additionally, we estimate MNL models that control for the potential 
endogeneity/selectivity of underage college drinking.  Selectivity may arise because of 
unobserved heterogeneity between drinkers and abstainers.  We address this issue by 
assuming the young man’s decision to drink while underage is 
 
 ( )i X i i i' 'ZA I X Z u 0= α +α + >   (13) 
 
where I( ) is an indicator function that equals one if the condition is true, zero otherwise, 
Xi is a matrix of the young man’s observable characteristics that are common to the 
occupational decision, Zi is a set of variables that are only associated with the underage 
drinking decision (the excluded variables described in the previous section) and ui is a 
stochastic error-component that is assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed according to a normal distribution.  The resulting model is consistent with a 
standard probit model for the decision to drink while underage and in college. 
Following Terza (2009), we assume the error-component specified in equation (1) 
can be decomposed into ui and eij* such that εij = λjui + eij*.  As a result, the utility for 
choice j is now 
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where λj is an unknown parameter to be estimated, and eij* represents the new stochastic 
error-component of utility after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  
The error-component, ui, generates correlation between the underage drinking variable 
(Ai) and the occupational choice variable (Yj) through λj.  If λj is nonzero, ui influences 
the young man’s underage drinking decision and the likelihood of choosing a specific 
occupational category, rendering the baseline model inconsistent. 
Equations (2)-(4) imply the following likelihood function for a sample of size N, 
which is the same model as that used by Terza (2002) and Terza and Vechnak (2011): 
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where φ( ) is the standard normal probability density function.  All model parameters are 
estimated simultaneously.  The estimates for the λj’s are factor loading parameters with 
the property that their nullity is a sufficient statistic for the exogeneity of the underage 
drinking variable (Terza, 2009).  For estimation purposes, we conduct a line search with 
respect to the most troublesome parameters (the λj’s in the present model) from -3 to 3 by 
increments of 0.25.  All parameters are estimated conditional on the value of λj.  The 
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value of λj that yields the best fit (in terms of the log-likelihood function) is used as its 
starting value in the unrestricted model.  This ensures the results represent a global 
maximum. 
The principal advantage of Terza’s (2009) framework is its flexibility to account 
for unobservable characteristics in the MNL model.  Terza’s framework does not require 
the bivariate normality assumption, relying instead on separate error-component 
assumptions for the outcome and switching equations.  Further, Terza’s framework is 
particularly useful with respect to the MNL model.  The stochastic error-components re-
parameterization has the potential to alleviate concerns about IIA.  Specifying the error-
component according to the Terza framework allows the researcher to account for any 
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the occupational categories and underage 
drinking behaviors, relaxing the independence of stochastic error-components across 
alternatives.  By accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, this approach reduces the 
likelihood that the occupational outcomes are correlated because of omitted variables, 
reducing the likelihood of IIA issues manifesting. 
 A disadvantage of the current approach is that it makes strong and potentially 
incorrect assumptions about functional form.  If the data are not generated according to 
the probit and logistic models specified, then the analysis will suffer from 
misspecification bias.  An additional disadvantage is the model’s reliance on instrumental 
variables for identification.  Therefore, interpretation of the results is conditional on the 
validity of the instrumental variables.  We test the sensitivity of our results to the 
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instrumental variables by estimating models with and without specific instrumental 
variables. 
The estimated underage college drinking coefficients describe how underage 
college drinking affects men’s valuations of occupational choices, relative to their 
valuations of the base outcome.  To facilitate comparisons with previous studies, we 
estimate average marginal effects for the probabilities of making the choices.  The 
average marginal effect of underage college drinking on the probability of choosing 
occupation category j is 
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where P(Yi = j | Ai = 1, Xi) denotes the probability of choosing occupational category j if 
an individual consumes alcohol while underage and P(Yi = j | Ai = 0, Xi) denotes the 
probability of choosing occupational category j if each individual abstains from underage 
drinking.  Thus, the average marginal effect describes how the probability of choosing 
occupational category j would differ if all individuals drink while underage versus all 
individuals abstaining.  The average marginal effect is calculated using Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature. 
Results 
Table 11 lists the proportions of recent college graduates by occupational 
category, calculated separately for underage college drinkers and abstainers.  The top 
panel contains estimates using any underage college drinking to measure young men’s 
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drinking behaviors.  Estimates from the middle panel were produced using five or more 
underage college drinks on one or more days to describe drinking.  The bottom panel 
measures drinking using any underage college days with two or more drinks.  
Comparisons of the proportions of young men in white-collar and other occupations for 
drinkers and abstainers reveal an increased likelihood of finding career-type jobs for 
drinkers, regardless of how drinking is measured. 
For example, 30.3% of young men with any underage college drinking are 
employed full-time in other occupations, while only 24% of abstainers are employed in 
other occupations.  This result is consistent with the descriptive analysis presented in 
Kenkel and Wang (1999).  Conversely, the proportions of young men enrolled in school 
and neither in school nor employed full-time are the highest for abstainers, suggesting 
drinking decreases the likelihood of not finding a career-type job; however, it appears to 
reduce the probability of accepting a professional career (through schooling).  Yet, the 
differences in proportions are only statistically significant for other occupations when 
drinking is measured by any underage college days with two or more drinks. 
 We begin the multivariate analyses by estimating MNL models and MNL 
selection models.  Estimated coefficients, standard errors, and marginal effects for young 
men’s drinking behaviors from alternative specifications are listed in Table 12.  Estimates 
for employed full-time in white-collar occupations are reported in the first column of the 
table.  The subsequent columns report estimates separately for other occupations, in 
school, and neither in school nor employed full-time.  The top panel lists estimates from 
models that include any underage college drinking, while the middle and bottom panels 
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list results that use five or more drinks on one or more days and any underage college 
days with two or more drinks to describe drinking, respectively. 
 
Table 11 
 
Occupational Choice and Drinking Behaviors for Male College Graduates 
 
 Drinkers Abstainers 
Any Underage College Drinking 
Full-time, White-collar Occupations 0.365 (%) 0.363 (%) 
Full-time, Other Occupationsa 0.303 0.240 
In School 0.110 0.144 
Not In School Nor Employed Full-Time 0.221 0.253 
N 534 146 
5 or More Underage College Drinks on One or More Days 
Full-time, White-collar Occupations 0.365 0.364 
Full-time, Other Occupationsa 0.310 0.262 
In School 0.112 0.126 
Not In School Nor Employed Full-Time 0.213 0.248 
N 394 286 
Any Underage College Days with Two or More Drinks 
Full-time, White-collar Occupations 0.370 0.356 
Full-time, Other Occupationsa 0.311* 0.251 
In School 0.104 0.142 
Not In School Nor Employed Full-Time 0.215 0.251 
N 441 239 
Note. Means estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Differences in means were 
tested using t-test.  Farming and military occupations are excluded from the sample. 
a Other occupations is defined as full-time blue-collar/service occupations. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 12 
Multinomial Logistic Models of Occupational Choice for Male College Graduates 
 
 
Full-time, 
White-Collar 
Occupation 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupation 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Emp. Full-
Time 
Any Underage College Drinking 
No Controls 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
0.230 
(0.243) 
0.064 
-0.270 
(0.298) 
-0.033 
-0.143 
(0.244) 
-0.033 
Standard Controlsb 
 
 
 
 
-0.009 
0.288 
(0.261) 
0.070 
-0.284 
(0.344) 
-0.035 
-0.095 
(0.263) 
-0.026 
Corrected MNL 
 
 
 
 
-0.069 
0.353 
(0.621) 
0.042 
0.289 
(0.945) 
0.008 
0.283 
(0.808) 
0.019 
5 or More Underage College Drinks on One or More Days 
No Controls 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
0.161 
(0.195) 
0.047 
-0.125 
(0.259) 
-0.014 
-0.157 
(0.206) 
-0.035 
Standard Controlsb 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
0.187 
(0.217) 
0.053 
-0.230 
(0.300) 
-0.024 
-0.144 
(0.228) 
-0.030 
Corrected MNL 
 
 
 
 
-0.068 
0.419 
(0.457) 
0.061 
0.085 
(0.668) 
-0.013 
0.290 
(0.569) 
0.020 
Any Underage College Days with Two or More Drinks 
No Controls 
 
 
 
 
0.014 
0.175 
(0.205) 
0.060 
-0.349 
(0.263) 
-0.038 
-0.192 
(0.213) 
-0.036 
Standard Controlsb 
 
 
 
 
0.018 
0.170 
(0.223) 
0.062 
-0.507* 
(0.301) 
-0.050 
-0.192 
(0.229) 
-0.029 
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Table 12 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 
 
Full-time, 
White-Collar 
Occupation 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupation 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Emp. Full-
Time 
Any Underage College Days with Two or More Drinks (cont.) 
Corrected MNL 
 
 
 
 
-0.065 
0.426 
(0.501) 
0.064 
0.308 
(0.732) 
0.011 
0.147 
(0.590) 
-0.010 
Note: Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
and marginal effects are in italics. 
a Other occupations is defined as full-time blue-collar/service occupations. 
b Standard controls include age, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children, subjective health status, ASVAB 
score, missing ASVAB score, residence in an urban area, missing residence in an urban area, months since college 
graduation, non-response in at least one wave, NLSY97 oversample, county unemployment rate, state per-capita beer 
consumption, state percent of population with college education or higher, state real income per-capita, and region and 
year fixed effects. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
 The first row of each panel of Table 12 reports estimates from MNL models of 
occupational choice that control for drinking behaviors.  The marginal effects are positive 
and statistically insignificant for white-collar and other occupations.  Additionally, the 
magnitude of the marginal effects for white-collar occupations is effectively zero.  In 
contrast, the marginal effects suggest underage college drinking, regardless of how it is 
measured, is negatively associated with the school enrollment and neither in school nor 
employed full-time occupational alternatives.  These results are consistent with the 
descriptive analysis. 
 The second row of each panel of Table 12 reports results from specifications that 
add controls for each young man’s age, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children, 
subjective health status, CAT-ASVAB percentile score (and missing CAT-ASVAB 
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percentile score), residence in an urban area (and missing residence in an urban area), 
months since college graduation, non-response to at least one wave of the NLYS97, 
membership in the NSLY97 oversample; local unemployment rate, state per-capita beer 
consumption and real income, the percentage of the state population 25 and older with at 
least a bachelor’s degree,  and region and year fixed-effects.  Adding these controls 
increases the marginal effects (in absolute magnitude) for the school enrollment, white-
collar (except when drinking is measured by any underage college drinking), and other 
occupation alternatives.  Conversely, adding the controls decreases the marginal effects 
for the neither in school nor employed full-time occupational outcome.  When compared 
to the MNL models with no additional controls, adding the full set of controls reduces the 
marginal effects by approximately 5–10%.  Adding the controls also results in a 
marginally significant (at the 10% level) coefficient estimate for any underage college 
days with two or more drinks in the school enrollment equation.  All of the other drinking 
coefficients are imprecisely estimated. 
 After controlling for selection on young men’s observable characteristics, the 
marginal effect for any underage college days with two or more drinks is associated with 
a five percentage point reduction in the likelihood of young men enrolling in school after 
completing a bachelor’s degree.  This result can be placed into context using the marginal 
effect and the proportion of young men who are enrolled in school to convert the 
percentage point decline into a percentage decline.  Recall, 11.8% of young men are 
enrolled in school.  The baseline MNL model (controls for selection on young men’s 
observable characteristics) results suggest 16.8% of young men would be enrolled in 
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school if they did not have any underage college days in which they drank two or more 
drinks, suggesting underage drinking reduces the likelihood of being enrolled in school 
by 29.8%.  This suggests “heavy” underage college drinking may have a strong effect on 
the graduate schooling decisions of young men, which will impact the likelihood of them 
obtaining career-type jobs in professional occupations in the future.  Dee and Evans 
(2003) are similar in their findings, which suggest teen heavy drinking reduces the 
likelihood of young men and women entering college by 8.8 percentage points. 
 The third row of each panel of Table 12 reports estimates from MNL models that 
control for selection on young men’s observable and unobservable characteristics.  After 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the marginal effects change sign from negative 
to positive for the schooling enrollment decision and neither in school nor employed full-
time occupational choices.  The marginal effects remain negative for white-collar 
occupations when drinking is measured by any underage college drinking and change 
from negative from positive when drinking is specified as five or more underage college 
drinks on one or more days or any college days with two or more drinks.  However, all of 
the underage college drinking coefficients for the MNL selection model are imprecisely 
estimated. 
 Tables 13–15 list additional coefficients and standard errors for the occupational 
choice equations from MNL models and selection models.  These are the same models 
listed in Table 12.  The columns report estimates separately for the baseline MNL models 
(control for selection on observables) and MNL selection models (control for selection on 
observables and unobservables).  Underage college drinking behavior coefficients are 
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listed first, followed by demographic characteristics, survey design characteristics, 
economic characteristics, and the error-components. 
 The second panels of Tables 13–15 list coefficient estimates for young men’s 
demographic characteristics.  The number of children and subjective health status of 
young men are the only statistically significant predictors of occupational choice.  
Increasing the number of children is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of 
young men being enrolled in school or neither in school nor employed full-time relative 
to being employed full-time in white-collar occupations, regardless of how drinking is 
measured or if the model controls for selection on unobserved heterogeneity.  Better 
health also appears to increase the likelihood of being enrolled in school (relative to being 
employed full-time in white-collar occupations). 
 The second panels of Tables 13–15 list estimates for the survey design 
characteristics and variables created using the longitudinal structure of the NSLY97.  The 
only statistically significant variable for this group is the number of months since college 
graduation.  The coefficient estimates suggest young men are less likely to be enrolled in 
school or employed full-time in other occupations the further they are removed from their 
college graduation.  This result is similar for all models regardless of how drinking 
behaviors are measured and consistent with prior evidence that increasing the length of 
time of one’s exit from formal schooling reduces the likelihood of returning.  For the 
employed full-time in other occupations result, this may be suggestive of early-career 
“bridge employment.” 
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Table 13 
 
Selected Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Models of Occupational Choice and Any Underage College Drinking for 
Male College Graduates 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Drinking Behavior 
       
Any Underage College Drinking 0.288 0.353 -0.284 0.289 -0.095 0.283 
 (0.261) (0.621) (0.344) (0.945) (0.263) (0.808) 
       
Demographic Characteristics 
       
Age 0.131 0.131 0.104 0.115 0.053 0.060 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.122) (0.126) (0.105) (0.107) 
Black -0.027 -0.010 0.067 0.231 0.156 0.261 
 (0.408) (0.439) (0.501) (0.590) (0.415) (0.471) 
Other  0.092 0.094 0.630 0.697 0.304 0.336 
 (0.349) (0.353) (0.453) (0.497) (0.390) (0.398) 
Hispanic 0.029 0.027 0.611 0.620 -0.727 -0.725 
 (0.366) (0.366) (0.489) (0.497) (0.485) (0.486) 
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Table 13 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Demographic Characteristics (cont.) 
Married -0.178 -0.170 0.183 0.230 0.264 0.303 
 (0.344) (0.347) (0.458) (0.478) (0.352) (0.362) 
Number of Children  -0.347 -0.352 -0.892* -0.917* -0.955** -0.982** 
 (0.277) (0.282) (0.514) (0.509) (0.414) (0.420) 
Subjective Health Status 0.148 0.146 0.332** 0.311* 0.139 0.127 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.162) (0.165) (0.144) (0.149) 
ASVAB Percentile Score in 1999 -0.789 -0.794 0.892 0.876 0.369 0.345 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.821) (0.828) (0.545) (0.549) 
Missing ASVAB Score  0.057 0.057 0.192 0.202 -0.275 -0.275 
 (0.291) (0.291) (0.394) (0.399) (0.346) (0.348) 
Urban Residence  0.009 0.013 0.143 0.187 -0.253 -0.224 
 (0.293) (0.296) (0.427) (0.435) (0.314) (0.324) 
Missing Urban Residence  -0.287 -0.293 0.454 0.356 -0.295 -0.346 
 (0.493) (0.497) (0.676) (0.725) (0.544) (0.559) 
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Table 13 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Survey Characteristics 
       
Months Since College Graduation  -0.028* -0.028* -0.238*** -0.240*** -0.041 -0.042 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.049) (0.049) (0.037) (0.037) 
Missing Information At Least 1 
Wave 
0.109 0.109 -0.063 -0.062 -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.306) (0.306) (0.436) (0.438) (0.326) (0.330) 
NLSY Oversample 0.287 0.290 -0.051 -0.088 0.437 0.421 
 (0.407) (0.408) (0.542) (0.543) (0.461) (0.466) 
       
Economic Characteristics 
       
County Unemployment Rate 0.568 0.569 1.222 1.227 -0.378 -0.381 
 (0.694) (0.694) (0.939) (0.944) (0.725) (0.732) 
State Per-Capital Beer 
Consumption 
-0.411 -0.432 -2.114** -2.251** -0.628 -0.719 
 (0.690) (0.692) (0.949) (0.985) (0.792) (0.827) 
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Table 13 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Economic Characteristics (cont.) 
State Percent of Population with  8.683** 8.769** 14.216*** 14.698*** 7.030 7.375 
College Educ. or Higher (4.326) (4.328) (5.341) (5.481) (4.820) (4.887) 
State Real Income Per Capita  -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.168*** -0.171*** -0.064 -0.066 
($1,000) (0.039) (0.038) (0.050) (0.051) (0.042) (0.042) 
       
Error-Components 
       
λ  -0.043  -0.395  -0.261 
  (0.396)  (0.609)  (0.513) 
       
Log-Likelihood -832.21 -1,101.11 -832.21 -1,101.11 -832.21 -1,101.11 
N 680 680 680 680 680 680 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value  [0.850]  [0.850]  [0.850] 
Note. Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are 
in brackets.  Models also include region and time fixed effects. 
a Other occupations is defined as full-time blue-collar/service occupations. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 14 
 
Selected Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Models of Occupational Choice and 5 or More Underage College Drinks for 
Male College Graduates 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Drinking Behavior 
       
Five or More Underage College  0.187 0.419 -0.230 0.085 -0.144 0.290 
Drinks on One or More Days (0.217) (0.457) (0.300) (0.668) (0.228) (0.569) 
       
Demographic Characteristics 
       
Age 0.129 0.133 0.108 0.113 0.051 0.058 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.121) (0.123) (0.104) (0.106) 
Black -0.013 0.080 0.060 0.189 0.135 0.318 
 (0.414) (0.452) (0.514) (0.579) (0.417) (0.486) 
Other  0.098 0.133 0.626 0.678 0.292 0.363 
 (0.351) (0.356) (0.456) (0.486) (0.392) (0.405) 
Hispanic 0.026 0.022 0.603 0.598 -0.721 -0.727 
 (0.370) (0.371) (0.489) (0.490) (0.483) (0.486) 
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Table 14 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Demographic Characteristics (cont.) 
Married -0.163 -0.106 0.144 0.215 0.244 0.347 
 (0.344) (0.359) (0.470) (0.482) (0.354) (0.377) 
Number of Children  -0.320 -0.324 -0.928* -0.926* -0.966** -0.961** 
 (0.273) (0.275) (0.530) (0.532) (0.413) (0.418) 
Subjective Health Status 0.151 0.145 0.329** 0.320** 0.139 0.126 
 (0.127) (0.128) (0.161) (0.161) (0.143) (0.147) 
ASVAB Percentile Score in 1999 -0.751 -0.732 0.866 0.896 0.347 0.378 
 (0.499) (0.500) (0.818) (0.835) (0.545) (0.546) 
Missing ASVAB Score  0.050 0.044 0.195 0.190 -0.270 -0.282 
 (0.289) (0.290) (0.395) (0.397) (0.346) (0.347) 
Urban Residence  -0.010 -0.017 0.166 0.161 -0.244 -0.254 
 (0.294) (0.297) (0.428) (0.428) (0.313) (0.319) 
Missing Urban Residence  -0.271 -0.296 0.453 0.411 -0.294 -0.343 
 (0.491) (0.497) (0.665) (0.691) (0.543) (0.555) 
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Table 14 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Survey Characteristics 
       
Months Since College Graduation  -0.028* -0.029* -0.241*** -0.243*** -0.042 -0.044 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.049) (0.049) (0.038) (0.038) 
Missing Information At Least 1  0.108 0.103 -0.065 -0.069 -0.015 -0.022 
Wave (0.304) (0.304) (0.430) (0.433) (0.327) (0.331) 
NLSY Oversample 0.286 0.283 -0.071 -0.080 0.429 0.414 
 (0.408) (0.410) (0.540) (0.539) (0.460) (0.465) 
       
Economic Characteristics 
       
County Unemployment Rate 0.586 0.604 1.188 1.213 -0.388 -0.358 
 (0.683) (0.688) (0.951) (0.948) (0.729) (0.735) 
State Per-Capital Beer  -0.411 -0.475 -2.135** -2.221** -0.615 -0.729 
Consumption (0.689) (0.689) (0.931) (0.950) (0.793) (0.825) 
State Percent of Population with  8.647** 8.788** 14.194*** 14.423*** 7.026 7.298 
College Educ. or Higher (4.317) (4.324) (5.407) (5.438) (4.811) (4.879) 
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Table 14 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Economic Characteristics (cont.) 
State Real Income Per Capita  -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.169*** -0.172*** -0.064 -0.067 
($1,000) (0.039) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) (0.042) (0.043) 
       
Error-Components 
       
λ  -0.171  -0.233  -0.320 
  (0.305)  (0.421)  (0.362) 
       
Log-Likelihood -832.46 -1,176.51 -832.46 -1,176.51 -832.46 -1,176.51 
N 680 680 680 680 680 680 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value  [0.784]  [0.784]  [0.784] 
Note. Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are 
in brackets.  Models also include region and time fixed effects. 
a Other occupations is defined as full-time blue-collar/service occupations. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 15 
 
Selected Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Models of Occupational Choice and Any Underage College Days with Two 
or More Drinks for Male College Graduates 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Drinking Behavior 
       
Any Underage College Days with 0.170 0.426 -0.507* 0.308 -0.192 0.147 
Two or More Drinks (0.223) (0.501) (0.301) (0.732) (0.229) (0.590) 
       
Demographic Characteristics 
       
Age 0.130 0.137 0.095 0.117 0.050 0.058 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.123) (0.128) (0.104) (0.106) 
Black -0.023 0.081 -0.054 0.264 0.115 0.253 
 (0.410) (0.454) (0.512) (0.594) (0.416) (0.489) 
Other  0.091 0.120 0.596 0.723 0.292 0.333 
 (0.350) (0.354) (0.460) (0.503) (0.391) (0.402) 
Hispanic 0.036 0.049 0.584 0.627 -0.733 -0.718 
 (0.370) (0.374) (0.493) (0.509) (0.485) (0.489) 
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Table 15 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Demographic Characteristics (cont.) 
Married -0.180 -0.137 0.127 0.220 0.243 0.298 
 (0.344) (0.352) (0.464) (0.487) (0.351) (0.364) 
Number of Children  -0.325 -0.332 -0.930* -0.928* -0.958** -0.959** 
 (0.274) (0.277) (0.524) (0.539) (0.415) (0.413) 
Subjective Health Status 0.153 0.150 0.337** 0.324** 0.138 0.133 
 (0.127) (0.128) (0.160) (0.164) (0.143) (0.145) 
ASVAB Percentile Score in 1999 -0.749 -0.717 0.817 0.943 0.340 0.378 
 (0.499) (0.502) (0.818) (0.866) (0.545) (0.548) 
Missing ASVAB Score  0.041 0.027 0.236 0.193 -0.262 -0.283 
 (0.290) (0.293) (0.392) (0.407) (0.346) (0.346) 
Urban Residence  -0.013 -0.023 0.167 0.160 -0.238 -0.249 
 (0.294) (0.297) (0.432) (0.440) (0.313) (0.318) 
Missing Urban Residence  -0.256 -0.258 0.400 0.352 -0.305 -0.309 
 (0.493) (0.500) (0.664) (0.706) (0.545) (0.547) 
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Table 15 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Survey Characteristics 
       
Months Since College Graduation  -0.027* -0.028* -0.244*** -0.250*** -0.042 -0.043 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.049) (0.051) (0.038) (0.039) 
Missing Information At Least One  0.115 0.115 -0.069 -0.073 -0.016 -0.013 
Wave (0.306) (0.307) (0.432) (0.445) (0.324) (0.329) 
NLSY Oversample 0.275 0.251 -0.006 -0.105 0.448 0.414 
 (0.409) (0.416) (0.544) (0.553) (0.460) (0.473) 
       
Economic Characteristics 
       
County Unemployment Rate 0.551 0.534 1.282 1.215 -0.356 -0.381 
 (0.689) (0.691) (0.942) (0.966) (0.728) (0.737) 
State Per-Capital Beer  -0.408 -0.481 -2.037** -2.256** -0.616 -0.711 
Consumption (0.693) (0.693) (0.930) (0.978) (0.790) (0.828) 
State Percent of Population with  8.524** 8.574** 14.364*** 14.627*** 7.105 7.167 
College Educ. or Higher (4.319) (4.330) (5.376) (5.601) (4.799) (4.846) 
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Table 15 
 
(Cont.) 
 
  
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
 
MNL 
Corrected 
MNL 
  
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupations 
 
 
 
In School 
 
 
 
In School 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Not In 
School Nor 
Employed 
Full-Time 
Economic Characteristics (cont.) 
State Real Income Per Capita  -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.167*** -0.171*** -0.064 -0.066 
($1,000) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.052) (0.042) (0.042) 
       
Error Components 
       
λ  -0.184  -0.599  -0.244 
  (0.331)  (0.480)  (0.379) 
       
Log-Likelihood -831.08 -1,171.16 -831.08 -1,171.16 -831.08 -1,171.16 
N 680 680 680 680 680 680 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value  [0.583]  [0.583]  [0.583] 
Note. Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are 
in brackets.  Models also include region and time fixed effects. 
a Other occupations is defined as full-time blue-collar/service occupations. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
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 The third and fourth panels of Tables 13–15 list estimates for economic 
characteristics and the error-components.  The estimated coefficients suggest per capita 
beer consumption, real income, and the percentage of the state population 25 and older 
with at least a bachelor’s degree are strong predictors of occupational choice.  State per-
capita beer consumption and real income are associated with a reduction in the likelihood 
of young men being enrolled in school or employed full-time in other occupations, 
relative to being employed full-time in white-collar occupations.  Conversely, increasing 
the percentage of the state population 25 and older with at least a bachelor’s degree is 
linked to an increase in the likelihood of young men being enrolled in school or 
employed full-time in other occupations (related to being employed full-time in white-
collar occupations).  All of the MNL selection models have error-components that are 
imprecisely estimated (the λj’s).  A formal test of their joint significance using a Wald 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero (which is the 
baseline model).  Therefore, we fail to reject the baseline MNL model which controls for 
selection on young men’s observable characteristics. 
 The failure to reject the baseline MNL model that controls for selection on 
observables suggests underage college drinking may be exogenous.  Because this result 
runs counter to Terza and Vechnak (2011) and other studies, we explore potential reasons 
for why the results may differ.  First, it is possible that the MNL selection model is 
poorly identified because of weak exclusion restrictions.  We test for the presence of 
weak instruments by conducting a Wald test of the joint significance of the exclusion 
restrictions.  P-values for these tests are displayed at the bottom of Table 16 and suggest 
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we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level or better, providing some evidence that 
the exclusion restrictions are strong predictors of drinking.  An additional concern is that 
the exclusion restrictions are predictive of occupational choice. 
 We informally tested this by including the exclusion restrictions as explanatory 
variables in the occupational choice equations.  The results indicate exclusion restrictions 
are poor predictors (jointly and independently) of occupational choice.  A second 
possibility is that we have sufficiently controlled for young men’s unobserved 
heterogeneity with the restrictions placed on the sample.  All of the young men included 
in our analysis are entering the labor market for the first time and have the same levels of 
education.  A third possibility is that there is insufficient power because of a limited 
sample size; however, simulation results at similar sample size contradict this hypothesis. 
 
Table 16 
Probit Model Coefficients for Underage College Drinking Behaviors 
 
 
Any 
Underage 
College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage 
College Drinks 
on One or 
More Days 
Any 
Underage 
College Days 
with 2 or 
More Days 
Demographic Characteristics 
Age -0.058 -0.042 -0.078 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.053) 
Black -0.659*** -0.908*** -0.860*** 
 (0.218) (0.225) (0.214) 
Other  -0.345* -0.443** -0.369** 
 (0.209) (0.181) (0.186) 
Hispanic -0.092 -0.057 -0.182 
 (0.238) (0.204) (0.203) 
Married -0.184 -0.389** -0.200 
 (0.201) (0.188) (0.183) 
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Table 16 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 
 
Any 
Underage 
College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage 
College Drinks 
on One or 
More Days 
Any 
Underage 
College Days 
with 2 or 
More Days 
Number of Children  0.242 -0.144 -0.044 
 (0.177) (0.203) (0.166) 
Subjective Health Status 0.067 0.004 -0.045 
 (0.082) (0.074) (0.072) 
ASVAB Percentile Score in 1999 0.508* 0.034 -0.208 
 (0.306) (0.281) (0.278) 
Missing ASVAB Score  -0.084 0.040 0.230 
 (0.189) (0.162) (0.169) 
Urban Residence  -0.489** -0.122 -0.059 
 (0.198) (0.174) (0.173) 
Missing Urban Residence  0.348 0.132 -0.192 
 (0.466) (0.267) (0.284) 
    
Survey Characteristics 
Months Since College Graduation  0.008 0.006 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Missing Information At Least 1 Wave 0.071 0.080 -0.004 
 (0.195) (0.167) (0.174) 
NLSY Oversample 0.106 0.139 0.375* 
 (0.228) (0.224) (0.222) 
 
Economic Characteristics 
    
County Unemployment Rate -0.057 -0.205 0.377 
 (0.422) (0.374) (0.375) 
State Per-Capital Beer Consumption 1.274*** 0.596 0.730* 
 (0.476) (0.394) (0.412) 
State Percent of Population with College -3.536 -2.607 -0.589 
Education or Higher (2.866) (2.388) (2.529) 
State Real Income Per Capita ($1,000) 0.033 0.028 0.006 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) 
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Table 16 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 
 
Any 
Underage 
College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage 
College Drinks 
on One or 
More Days 
Any 
Underage 
College Days 
with 2 or 
More Days 
Instrumental Variables 
Mean State Real Cigarette Tax previous 4 0.074 0.355 0.424 
years ($) (0.390) (0.350) (0.349) 
Mean State Real Cigarette Tax previous 4 0.064 -0.118 -0.044 
years ($) squared (0.155) (0.134) (0.132) 
Mean State Beer Tax previous 4 years ($) 1.645 0.011 -0.753 
 (1.171) (0.897) (0.916) 
Mean State Beer Tax previous 4 years ($) -0.641 -0.129 0.270 
Squared  (1.150) (0.751) (0.792) 
Mean State  Blood Alcohol Content Law -0.236 -0.241 -0.239 
Previous 4 years (0.304) (0.263) (0.266) 
Mean State Social Host Law previous 4 -0.016 0.093 0.157 
years (0.167) (0.138) (0.143) 
Mean State Sunday Sale Ban Law previous 0.017 -0.041 0.192 
4 years  (0.186) (0.156) (0.158) 
Delinquency Index Score in 1997 0.193*** 0.190*** 0.162*** 
 (0.053) (0.045) (0.046) 
High School Drinking  1.091*** 1.147*** 1.096*** 
 (0.141) (0.120) (0.121) 
    
Wald Test, Joint Sig. IVs P-Value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
N 680 680 680 
Note. Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.  Models also include region and time fixed effects. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We test the sensitivity of this analysis to different model assumptions by 
estimating alternative specifications.  An important question is: what specification and 
model assumptions are driving the results?  Table 17 reports coefficients, standard errors, 
marginal effects, and p-values for tests of the endogeneity of underage college drinking 
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behaviors for various specifications.  The top panel lists estimates from models where 
drinking is measured as any underage college drinking.  The middle and bottom panels 
list results from models that specify drinking as five or more underage college drinks on 
one or more days and any underage college days with two or more drinks, respectively. 
 The first row of each panel of Table 17 reports estimates from the MNL models 
that control for selection on young men’s observable characteristics, which are 
reproduced for convenience.  The second row list estimates from MNL models that 
control for unobservable heterogeneity using the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) 
method developed by Terza et al. (2008).  These models provide an alternative method 
for estimating the relationship between underage college drinking and occupational 
choice without making the strong parametric assumptions necessary to estimate the MNL 
selection models.  The MNL 2SRI estimates fail to produce any significant coefficient 
estimates and a joint test of the endogeneity parameters fails to reject the MNL model 
that controls for selection on observables (the p-value is 0.574). 
The third row of each panel of Table 17 lists results from MNL models that 
control for unobservable heterogeneity using the two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) 
method.  The estimated coefficients are all imprecisely estimated except for the any 
underage college days with two or more drinks coefficient for the enrollment in school 
alternative, which is statistically significant at the 5% level.  The marginal effects suggest 
that young men with any underage college days with two or more drinks are 6.9 
percentage points less likely to be currently enrolled in school after completing a 
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bachelor’s degree; however, a joint test of the endogeneity parameters fails to reject the 
MNL model that controls for selection on observables (the p-value is 0.441). 
 
Table 17 
Alternative Models of Occupational Choice and Drinking Behaviors for Male College 
Graduates 
 
 
Full-time, 
White-Collar 
Occupation 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupation 
 
 
In 
School 
Not In 
School Nor  
Employed 
Full-Time 
Any Underage College Drinking 
Standard Controlsb  - 0.288 -0.284 -0.095 
          (-) (0.261) (0.344) (0.263) 
 -0.009 0.070 -0.035 -0.026 
     
Two Stage Residual Inclusionc - 0.338 0.556 0.484 
          (-) (0.619) (0.939) (0.653) 
 -0.093 0.021 0.027 0.045 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value [0.574] [-] [-] [-] 
     
Two Stage Predictor Substitutionc - 0.282 -0.437 -0.205 
          (-) (0.298) (0.377) (0.282) 
 0.008 0.080 -0.048 -0.040 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value [0.574] [-] [-] [-] 
     
Corrected Logistic Modelc -0.372 0.204 0.183 0.154 
 (0.524) (0.609) (0.926) (0.726) 
 -0.081 0.039 0.016 0.025 
Wald Test λ [0.490] [0.747] [0.537] [0.654] 
     
Two State Least Squaresc -0.117 0.023 0.042 0.053 
 (0.122) (0.120) (0.090) (0.107) 
Hausman-Wu Test [0.199] [0.617] [0.243] [0.296] 
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Table 17 
(Cont.) 
 
 
Full-time, 
White-Collar 
Occupation 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupation 
 
 
In 
School 
Not In 
School Nor  
Employed 
Full-Time 
Five or More Underage College Drinks on One or More Days 
     
Standard Controlsb  - 0.187 -0.230 -0.144 
          (-) (0.217) (0.300) (0.228) 
 0.001 0.053 -0.024 -0.030 
     
Two Stage Residual Inclusionc - 0.334 0.301 0.245 
          (-) (0.469) (0.678) (0.504) 
 -0.064 0.041 0.011 0.013 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value [0.794] [-] [-] [-] 
     
Two Stage Predictor Substitutionc - 0.149 -0.368 -0.244 
          (-) (0.254) (0.335) (0.250) 
 0.018 0.057 -0.034 -0.041 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value [0.794] [-] [-] [-] 
     
Corrected Logistic Modelc -0.323 0.322 -0.092 0.122 
 (0.400) (0.414) (0.635) (0.516) 
 -0.069 0.063 -0.009 0.020 
Wald Test λ [0.344] [0.869] [0.771] [0.500] 
     
Two Stage Least Squaresc -0.055 0.034 0.002 0.019 
 (0.087) (0.084) (0.058) (0.076) 
Hausman-Wu Test [0.373] [0.829] [0.573] [0.413] 
Any Underage College Days with 2 or More Drinks 
     
Standard Controlsb  - 0.170 -0.507* -0.192 
          (-) (0.223) (0.301) (0.229) 
 0.018 0.062 -0.050 -0.029 
     
Two Stage Residual Inclusionc - 0.262 0.466 0.286 
          (-) (0.507) (0.766) (0.530) 
 -0.066 0.020 0.027 0.020 
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Table 17 
 
(Cont.) 
 
 
 
Full-time, 
White-Collar 
Occupation 
 
Full-time, 
Othera 
Occupation 
 
 
In 
School 
Not In 
School Nor  
Employed 
Full-Time 
Any Underage College Days with 2 or More Drinks (cont.) 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value [0.441] [-] [-] [-] 
     
Two Stage Predictor Substitutionc - 0.151 -0.727** -0.299 
          (-) (0.254) (0.333) (0.253) 
 0.036 0.072 -0.069 -0.040 
Wald Test, Joint Sig. λs P-Value [0.441] [-] [-] [-] 
     
Corrected Logistic Modelc -0.346 0.341 0.171 0.007 
 (0.424) (0.466) (0.708) (0.534) 
 -0.074 0.066 0.015 0.001 
Wald Test λ [0.254] [0.944] [0.285] [0.703] 
     
Two Stage Least Squaresc -0.051 0.006 0.006 0.038 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.066) (0.082) 
Hausman-Wu Test [0.377] [0.486] [0.308] [0.315] 
Note. N = 680.  Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, marginal effects are in italics, and p-values are in brackets. 
a Other occupations is defined as full-time blue-collar/service occupations. 
b Standard controls include age, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children, subjective health status, 
ASVAB score, missing ASVAB score, residence in an urban area, missing residence in an urban area; 
months since college graduation, non-response at least one wave, NLSY97 oversample, county 
unemployment rate, state per-capita beer consumption, state percent of population with college education 
or higher, state real income per-capita, and region and year fixed effects. 
c Instrumental variables include the mean state real cigarette  and beer excise tax for the previous four 
years; mean state blood alcohol content, social host, and Sunday sale laws for the previous four years; the 
young man’s delinquency index score in 1997 and an indicator of high school drinking. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
The fourth row of each panel of Table 17 lists estimates from binary logistic 
models that correct for unobserved heterogeneity (MNL selection model).  Each of these 
models specify occupational choice as a binary variable that is set to one if occupational 
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choice j is selected, zero otherwise.  These models examine how the results are affected 
by simultaneously modeling occupational choices using the MNL model framework.  An 
advantage of the logistic model is that it makes similar assumptions to the MNL model, 
but it is not subject to concerns about IIA.  The logistic model results appear to be very 
similar with the exception that the standard errors are larger.  However, this was 
anticipated because simultaneously modeling the young man’s choice set using a MNL 
model is more efficient.  Each logistic model has an endogeneity parameter (λ) that 
allows us to test for the presence of unobservable heterogeneity.  Wald tests of these 
parameters fail to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting underage college drinking 
behaviors may be exogenous. 
The fifth row of each panel of Table 17 lists results from two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) models of occupational choice that make the fewest assumptions about functional 
form.  Like the logistic models, the 2SLS models assume occupational choice can be 
specified using a series of binary variables.  The 2SLS estimates are directly comparable 
to the marginal effects calculated for the non-linear models, and a comparison suggests 
they produce similar results.  We test for the presence of endogeneity in the 2SLS 
occupational choice models using Hausman-Wu tests and fail to reject the null for all 
occupational outcomes. 
Because the analysis results strongly suggest we cannot reject the MNL models 
that control for selection on young men’s observable characteristics, we test for the 
presence of IIA using a Hausman test (Hausman & McFadden, 1984).  The central idea 
behind the test is that, if IIA is not present, then the MNL model coefficients will be 
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unaffected by the removal of an occupational alternative.  The full model and restricted 
model are compared, and a chi-squared statistic is generated that can be used to test for 
the presence of IIA.  We conducted the Hausman test by removing the school enrollment 
occupational choice and comparing the MNL models coefficients.  The calculated 
Hausman test statistics are 16.94, 16.71, and 17.42 for the MNL models that specify 
drinking as any underage college drinking, five or more underage college drinks on one 
or more days, and any underage college days with two or more drinks, respectively.  The 
corresponding critical value for these statistics is 73.81 with 52 degrees of freedom at the 
5% level.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, which suggests IIA is not 
present.  However, it should be noted that the test may have limited power in the present 
application.  Very few controls are statistically significant in the analysis.  Therefore, 
removing an occupational alternative may not have any effect on the other coefficients. 
In addition, an examination of the line search performed to determine starting 
values also suggests that the log-likelihood function is concave and strongly peaked at 
zero for each λj, reinforcing the conclusion that underage drinking behaviors may be 
exogenous.  See Appendix F for the line search results. 
Conclusion 
This paper uses nationally representative data from the 1997-2011 waves of the 
NLYS97 to estimate models of occupational choice for recent male college graduates.  
The analysis addresses important timing issues left unaddressed by the previous literature 
by exploiting the longitudinal structure of the NLSY97.  This allows us to examine the 
initial occupational choices of young men making similar decisions at the same point in 
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their lives.  Focusing on underage college drinking also allows us to closely align our 
measures of underage drinking with the occupational choices being made by young men.  
The results fail to reject the hypothesis that underage college drinking is exogenous, 
providing some evidence that alcohol consumption may be exogenous in young men’s 
occupational choices.  This result is consistent with the findings of Anderson et al. 
(1993).  However, the inability to reject the null hypothesis that underage college 
drinking is exogenous may be due to weak instruments or an artifact of our sample 
construction.  By focusing on recent college graduates, we may have already controlled 
for all of the unobserved heterogeneity. 
 Based on specification tests and robustness checks, our preferred specification is a 
MNL model of occupational choice that controls for selection on young men’s observable 
characteristics.  The models include controls for each young man’s demographic and 
background characteristics, economic characteristics, survey design, and region and year 
fixed-effects.  The results suggest underage college drinking, regardless of how it is 
measured, is not associated with the probability of being employed full-time in white-
collar occupations, other occupations, or neither in school nor employed full-time.  In 
contrast, young men with any underage college days with two or more drinks are five 
percentage points (29.8%) less likely to be enrolled in school after completing a 
bachelor’s degree.  This result, while large, is consistent with the findings of Dee and 
Evans (2003).  As a result, underage drinking has important implications for young men 
who wish to pursue further education. 
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 While the findings of this study suggest underage college drinking has no effect 
on the occupational choices of young men, the results should be interpreted with caution.  
All of the results from this study were generated using a highly selective sample of 
college graduates.  Underage college drinking may be affecting occupational choice 
through male’s acquisition of skills.  Therefore, excluding college dropouts may be 
biasing the results downwards because only the highest skilled individuals remain in the 
sample.  The study also does not account for differences in college quality, which may 
have an important impact on young men’s drinking behaviors and occupational choices.  
In addition, the findings of the study are limited by the small sample size.  A larger 
sample may generate results that are statistically significant. 
 Our results indicate underage college drinking is not associated with the initial 
occupational choices of young men that have recently completed a bachelor’s degree.  
However, we find evidence that more severe forms of underage college drinking have 
large effects on the decision to continue one’s education.  These results are particularly 
applicable for young men who intend to become professionals, especially since 
approximately 80% of college students drink and half of those who report drinking drink 
in excess (NIAAA, 2014).  For these students, any comparative advantages they possess 
cannot overcome the detrimental effects of excessive underage college drinking.  Since 
professional occupations rely heavily on human capital, the mechanism that is occurring 
here is likely a reduction in study effort, which translates into poor grades.  College 
administrators and public policy makers can use the evidence presented in this analysis to 
target polices at the drinking behaviors of students in pre-professional programs.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
QUESTIONS IN THE FOOD SECURITY MODULE 
 
 
Questions asked of all households: 
1. “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.”  
Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
2. “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get more.”  
Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
3. “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.”  Was that often, sometimes, or never 
true for you in the last 12 months? 
4. In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of 
your meals or skip meals because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
5. (If yes to question 4) How often did this happen—almost every month, some 
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
6. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there 
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
7. In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because there wasn’t 
enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
8. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there wasn’t enough money for 
food? (Yes/No) 
9. In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for a 
whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
10. (If yes to question 9) How often did this happen—almost every month, some 
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
Questions asked only of households with children under 18 years of age: 
11. “We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we 
were running out of money to buy food.” Was that often, sometimes, or never 
true for you in the last 12 months? 
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12. “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford that.”  
Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
13. “The children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough 
food.”  Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
14. In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals 
because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
15. In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford 
more food? (Yes/No) 
16. In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip a meal because there 
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
17. (If yes to question 16) How often did this happen—almost every month, some 
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
18. In the last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because 
there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
Note:  “Affirmative” responses indicated in bold. 
 
Definitions of food security status for households with and without children 
 
 
Food security status 
Households with 
children 
Households without 
children 
Food secure 0-2 affirmative responses 0-2 affirmative responses 
Low food security 3-7 affirmative responses 3-5 affirmative responses 
Very low food security 8-18 affirmative responses 6-10 affirmative responses 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALYSIS HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
 Households with children 
and unmarried parents 
Households with children 
and married parents 
Households with all 
elderly members 
Other adult-only 
households 
  
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
Received 
SNAP 
last 
month 
 
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP 
last year 
Receive
d SNAP 
last 
month 
             
Food Insecure 0.347 0.534 0.525 0.287 0.524 0.511 0.135 0.425 0.415 0.270 0.584 0.579 
 (0.476) (0.499) (0.499) (0.453) (0.500) (0.500) (0.342) (0.495) (0.493) (0.444) (0.493) (0.494) 
Real SNAP  0.000 3.153 3.376 0.000 3.020 3.297 0.000 1.119 1.170 0.000 1.593 1.708 
Ben. ($000) (0.000) (1.753) (1.670) (0.000) (1.841) (1.767) (0.000) (0.880) (0.880) (0.000) (1.183) (1.181) 
Standard explanatory variables 
Female head 0.750 0.858 0.863 0.435 0.469 0.464 0.643 0.706 0.709 0.453 0.567 0.574 
 (0.433) (0.349) (0.344) (0.496) (0.499) (0.499) (0.479) (0.456) (0.454) (0.498) (0.496) (0.495) 
Age 38.597 35.336 35.323 40.767 36.831 37.001 73.407 70.468 70.580 42.668 47.443 47.790 
 (12.940) (11.567) (11.530) (11.107) (10.174) (10.284) (8.140) (7.756) (7.821) (15.743) (13.173) (12.973) 
White (reference) 0.663 0.587 0.585 0.796 0.797 0.796 0.815 0.729 0.734 0.735 0.639 0.647 
 (0.473) (0.492) (0.493) (0.403) (0.403) (0.403) (0.388) (0.445) (0.442) (0.441) (0.480) (0.478) 
Black 0.268 0.359 0.362 0.111 0.127 0.123 0.139 0.225 0.222 0.184 0.304 0.298 
 (0.443) (0.480) (0.481) (0.314) (0.333) (0.329) (0.346) (0.418) (0.416) (0.388) (0.460) (0.457) 
Other 0.069 0.053 0.053 0.093 0.076 0.080 0.046 0.046 0.044 0.081 0.057 0.055 
 (0.254) (0.225) (0.224) (0.290) (0.266) (0.271) (0.209) (0.210) (0.204) (0.272) (0.231) (0.229) 
Hispanic  0.309 0.240 0.236 0.403 0.360 0.344 0.088 0.162 0.157 0.157 0.137 0.141 
 (0.462) (0.427) (0.425) (0.491) (0.480) (0.475) (0.283) (0.368) (0.364) (0.363) (0.344) (0.348) 
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 Households with children 
and unmarried parents 
Households with children 
and married parents 
Households with all 
elderly members 
Other adult-only 
households 
  
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
Received 
SNAP 
last 
month 
 
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP 
last year 
Receive
d SNAP 
last 
month 
Standard explanatory variables (cont.) 
Married, spouse 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.238 0.099 0.098 0.207 0.139 0.134 
present       (0.426) (0.298) (0.298) (0.405) (0.346) (0.340) 
< high school 0.265 0.302 0.306 0.316 0.352 0.354 0.352 0.460 0.460 0.192 0.325 0.337 
(reference) (0.441) (0.459) (0.461) (0.465) (0.478) (0.479) (0.478) (0.499) (0.499) (0.394) (0.468) (0.473) 
Some college 0.651 0.661 0.661 0.562 0.592 0.590 0.555 0.475 0.481 0.642 0.620 0.609 
 (0.477) (0.474) (0.474) (0.496) (0.492) (0.492) (0.497) (0.500) (0.500) (0.479) (0.485) (0.488) 
College graduate 0.084 0.038 0.033 0.122 0.056 0.055 0.093 0.064 0.059 0.166 0.055 0.055 
 (0.278) (0.190) (0.179) (0.327) (0.231) (0.229) (0.290) (0.246) (0.236) (0.372) (0.227) (0.227) 
Immigrant 0.271 0.156 0.146 0.465 0.366 0.355 0.138 0.204 0.196 0.189 0.103 0.106 
 (0.445) (0.363) (0.354) (0.499) (0.482) (0.479) (0.345) (0.403) (0.397) (0.391) (0.303) (0.308) 
No. of adults in 1.882 1.639 1.617 2.535 2.432 2.426 1.282 1.160 1.161 1.813 1.688 1.678 
household (1.087) (0.890) (0.870) (0.918) (0.838) (0.842) (0.467) (0.410) (0.415) (0.974) (0.881) (0.875) 
Number of children 1.845 2.125 2.133 2.241 2.602 2.637 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
in household (1.034) (1.149) (1.146) (1.230) (1.319) (1.326)       
Number of disabled 0.124 0.200 0.208 0.127 0.245 0.261 0.138 0.416 0.429 0.235 0.654 0.678 
in household (0.389) (0.466) (0.475) (0.402) (0.565) (0.587) (0.374) (0.562) (0.570) (0.514) (0.684) (0.679) 
Age youngest 7.250 5.713 5.705 6.208 4.691 4.706       
in household (5.334) (4.916) (4.899) (4.929) (4.264) (4.273)       
Any elderly in 0.071 0.041 0.041 0.065 0.034 0.038 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.107 0.104 0.104 
household (0.257) (0.199) (0.199) (0.246) (0.181) (0.191)    (0.310) (0.305) (0.306) 
Urban residence 0.828 0.812 0.807 0.821 0.771 0.768 0.739 0.765 0.760 0.817 0.777 0.771 
 (0.377) (0.391) (0.395) (0.384) (0.420) (0.422) (0.439) (0.424) (0.427) (0.387) (0.416) (0.420) 
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 Households with children 
and unmarried parents 
Households with children 
and married parents 
Households with all 
elderly members 
Other adult-only 
households 
  
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
Received 
SNAP 
last 
month 
 
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP 
last year 
Receive
d SNAP 
last 
month 
Standard explanatory variables (cont.) 
State unemp. rate 9.427 9.274 9.246 9.583 9.459 9.440 9.278 9.014 8.989 9.364 9.177 9.163 
 (1.750) (1.696) (1.697) (1.796) (1.698) (1.715) (1.727) (1.519) (1.521) (1.757) (1.622) (1.618) 
Economic explanatory variables 
Head employed 0.588 0.421 0.406 0.604 0.445 0.427 0.100 0.043 0.038 0.489 0.212 0.187 
 (0.492) (0.494) (0.491) (0.489) (0.497) (0.495) (0.301) (0.204) (0.192) (0.500) (0.409) (0.390) 
Real total HH inc. 1.611 1.215 1.187 2.107 1.782 1.761 0.997 0.896 0.905 1.022 0.909 0.896 
($0000) (0.869) (0.810) (0.805) (0.965) (0.931) (0.936) (0.373) (0.329) (0.322) (0.584) (0.519) (0.514) 
Own home 0.341 0.188 0.187 0.533 0.343 0.341 0.624 0.300 0.306 0.365 0.251 0.246 
 (0.474) (0.391) (0.390) (0.499) (0.475) (0.474) (0.484) (0.458) (0.461) (0.481) (0.434) (0.431) 
Real subjective food 116.430 139.683 141.283 134.392 152.152 153.790 53.291 62.534 60.721 77.360 90.319 90.299 
needs (88.146) (104.475) (104.762) (92.598) (102.766) (104.168) (48.859) (53.454) (51.295) (63.508) (75.075) (75.285) 
Missing food needs 0.085 0.054 0.053 0.069 0.040 0.038 0.167 0.097 0.099 0.094 0.070 0.065 
 (0.279) (0.227) (0.224) (0.253) (0.196) (0.190) (0.373) (0.296) (0.299) (0.291) (0.256) (0.247) 
Other assistance 
SBP last month 0.314 0.589 0.598 0.307 0.597 0.612       
 (0.464) (0.492) (0.490) (0.461) (0.491) (0.488)       
NSLP last month 0.396 0.698 0.709 0.399 0.723 0.733       
 (0.489) (0.459) (0.454) (0.490) (0.448) (0.443)       
WIC last month 0.135 0.303 0.307 0.157 0.366 0.380       
 (0.342) (0.460) (0.461) (0.364) (0.482) (0.486)       
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 Households with children and 
unmarried parents 
Households with children and 
married parents 
Households with all elderly 
members 
 
Other adult-only households 
  
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
Received 
SNAP 
last 
month 
 
No 
SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
year 
 
Received 
SNAP last 
month 
 
 
No SNAP 
last year 
 
Received 
SNAP 
last year 
Receive
d SNAP 
last 
month 
Other assistance (cont.) 
Food bank last month 0.098 0.264 0.274 0.086 0.250 0.261 0.054 0.265 0.262 0.097 0.369 0.376 
 (0.297) (0.441) (0.446) (0.281) (0.433) (0.439) (0.226) (0.441) (0.440) (0.295) (0.483) (0.484) 
Soup kitchen last 0.004 0.023 0.025 0.004 0.013 0.014 0.007 0.022 0.021 0.016 0.078 0.079 
month (0.062) (0.150) (0.157) (0.063) (0.113) (0.117) (0.086) (0.146) (0.143) (0.126) (0.268) (0.270) 
Instruments 
Non-citizen 0.185 0.104 0.095 0.305 0.274 0.266 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.113 0.037 0.037 
 (0.388) (0.306) (0.294) (0.461) (0.446) (0.442) (0.191) (0.185) (0.190) (0.316) (0.188) (0.190) 
Median state 9.121 9.170 9.233 9.114 9.021 9.094 9.220 9.268 9.256 9.128 9.227 9.292 
cert. interval (2.987) (2.979) (2.975) (2.982) (2.984) (2.982) (2.980) (2.981) (2.985) (2.987) (2.977) (2.971) 
             
Observations 2266 3529 3130 2655 1591 1344 4391 1090 1004 6523 2824 2489 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) estimated using weighted household data from the 2009-11 CPS-FSS.
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APPENDIX C 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALYSIS HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
Table C.1 
Means of the Analysis Variables for Households with Income Less Than 130% of the 
Federal Poverty Threshold 
 All 
Households 
Unmarried 
Parents 
Married 
Parents 
All 
Elderly 
Other 
Adults 
Head Demographic Characteristics 
Female 0.614 0.857  0.673 0.500 
 (0.487) (0.350)  (0.469) (0.500) 
Age 47.807 36.243 38.039 72.696 42.789 
 (19.076) (12.080) (11.099) (6.761) (15.902) 
White (Reference) 0.719 0.592 0.797 0.797 0.711 
 (0.450) (0.491) (0.402) (0.402) (0.453) 
Black  0.223 0.361 0.122 0.163 0.222 
 (0.416) (0.480) (0.328) (0.369) (0.415) 
Other  0.058 0.047 0.080 0.040 0.067 
 (0.234) (0.212) (0.272) (0.197) (0.251) 
Hispanic  0.203 0.236 0.413 0.112 0.140 
 (0.402) (0.424) (0.492) (0.316) (0.347) 
Married, Spouse Present 0.276   0.189 0.169 
 (0.447)   (0.391) (0.375) 
< High School Grad (Reference) 0.354 0.316 0.383 0.487 0.271 
 (0.478) (0.465) (0.486) (0.500) (0.444) 
Some College 0.568 0.649 0.545 0.454 0.605 
 (0.495) (0.477) (0.498) (0.498) (0.489) 
College Graduate 0.078 0.036 0.072 0.059 0.124 
 (0.268) (0.185) (0.259) (0.235) (0.330) 
Immigrant 0.209 0.184 0.424 0.145 0.165 
 (0.407) (0.388) (0.494) (0.352) (0.371) 
Household Characteristics 
Number of Adults 1.673 1.573 2.402 1.224 1.703 
 (0.861) (0.856) (0.795) (0.431) (0.885) 
Number of Children  0.901 2.047 2.410   
 (1.323) (1.123) (1.250)   
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 All 
Households 
Unmarried 
Parents 
Married 
Parents 
All 
Elderly 
Other 
Adults 
Household Characteristics (cont.) 
Number of Disabled 0.243 0.175 0.176 0.189 0.362 
 (0.503) (0.437) (0.464) (0.426) (0.587) 
Age Youngest HH 32.874 6.435 5.448   
 (27.703) (5.142) (4.811)   
Elderly HH Member 0.306 0.052 0.051  0.110 
 (0.461) (0.221) (0.219)  (0.313) 
Urban HH 0.763 0.794 0.771 0.702 0.782 
 (0.425) (0.404) (0.420) (0.458) (0.413) 
Economic Characteristics 
Head Employed 0.400 0.543 0.587 0.082 0.437 
 (0.490) (0.498) (0.492) (0.275) (0.496) 
Real Total HH Income ($10,000) 1.028 1.110 1.684 0.808 0.803 
 (0.637) (0.670) (0.782) (0.293) (0.446) 
Own Home 0.387 0.244 0.477 0.560 0.316 
 (0.487) (0.430) (0.500) (0.496) (0.465) 
State Unemployment Rate 5.368 5.395 5.451 5.319 5.343 
 (0.981) (0.978) (0.964) (0.972) (0.996) 
Instrumental Variables 
Real Annual Outreach Per Cap, Lag 1 0.366 0.357 0.322 0.383 0.381 
Year (1.117) (1.095) (1.013) (1.143) (1.162) 
All Vehicles Exempt 0.377 0.392 0.312 0.387 0.393 
 (0.473) (0.476) (0.452) (0.475) (0.476) 
State Median Recertification Period 8.019 7.957 8.089 7.976 8.057 
 (3.156) (3.148) (3.223) (3.127) (3.148) 
Head is a Non-Citizen, Immigrant 0.127 0.123 0.309 0.036 0.103 
 (0.332) (0.328) (0.462) (0.186) (0.304) 
      
N 54,298 12,918 9,317 13,417 18,646 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) estimated using weighted household data from the 2001-2008 
CPS-FSS. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALYSIS RESPONDENTS 
 
 
   
 
Any Underage College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage College 
Drinks on One 
or More Days 
 
Any Underage College 
Days with 2 or More 
Drinks 
 All Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers 
Occupational Choice Variables 
Full-time, White-collar  0.365 0.365 0.363 0.365 0.364 0.370 0.356 
Occupations (0.482) (0.482) (0.483) (0.482) (0.482) (0.483) (0.480) 
Full-time, Other Occupationsa 0.290 0.303 0.240 0.310 0.262 0.311 0.251 
 (0.454) (0.460) (0.428) (0.463) (0.441) (0.463) (0.435) 
In School 0.118 0.110 0.144 0.112 0.126 0.104 0.142 
 (0.322) (0.314) (0.352) (0.315) (0.332) (0.306) (0.350) 
Not In School Nor Employed  0.228 0.221 0.253 0.213 0.248 0.215 0.251 
Full-Time (0.420) (0.415) (0.436) (0.410) (0.433) (0.412) (0.435) 
        
Standard Explanatory Variables 
Age 23.585 23.470 24.007 23.355 23.902 23.420 23.891 
 (1.700) (1.619) (1.917) (1.519) (1.880) (1.533) (1.939) 
White 0.747 0.790 0.589 0.838 0.622 0.814 0.623 
 (0.435) (0.408) (0.494) (0.369) (0.486) (0.390) (0.486) 
Black 0.137 0.099 0.274 0.061 0.241 0.077 0.247 
 (0.344) (0.299) (0.448) (0.239) (0.429) (0.267) (0.432) 
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Any Underage College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage College 
Drinks on One 
or More Days 
 
Any Underage College 
Days with 2 or More 
Drinks 
 All Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers 
Standard Explanatory Variables (cont.) 
Other  0.116 0.110 0.137 0.102 0.136 0.109 0.130 
 (0.321) (0.314) (0.345) (0.302) (0.344) (0.312) (0.337) 
Hispanic 0.115 0.114 0.116 0.112 0.119 0.116 0.113 
 (0.319) (0.318) (0.322) (0.315) (0.324) (0.320) (0.317) 
Married 0.129 0.122 0.158 0.089 0.185 0.104 0.176 
 (0.336) (0.327) (0.366) (0.285) (0.389) (0.306) (0.381) 
Number of Children  0.088 0.084 0.103 0.048 0.143 0.063 0.134 
 (0.377) (0.360) (0.435) (0.248) (0.500) (0.287) (0.501) 
Subjective Health Status 1.779 1.794 1.726 1.799 1.752 1.789 1.762 
 (0.789) (0.772) (0.851) (0.770) (0.815) (0.768) (0.829) 
ASVAB Percentile Score in 1999 0.725 0.738 0.677 0.739 0.705 0.732 0.711 
 (0.211) (0.203) (0.230) (0.204) (0.218) (0.204) (0.221) 
Missing ASVAB Score  0.137 0.131 0.158 0.129 0.147 0.138 0.134 
 (0.344) (0.338) (0.366) (0.336) (0.355) (0.346) (0.341) 
Urban Residence  0.853 0.839 0.902 0.853 0.852 0.855 0.847 
 (0.347) (0.359) (0.295) (0.345) (0.350) (0.344) (0.353) 
Missing Urban Residence  0.043 0.051 0.014 0.051 0.031 0.043 0.042 
 (0.202) (0.219) (0.117) (0.220) (0.175) (0.203) (0.201) 
Months Since College Graduation  6.847 6.779 7.096 6.754 6.976 6.689 7.138 
 (6.457) (5.643) (8.838) (6.037) (7.002) (5.824) (7.491) 
Missing Information At Least 1  0.144 0.139 0.164 0.137 0.154 0.138 0.155 
Wave (0.351) (0.346) (0.372) (0.344) (0.361) (0.346) (0.362) 
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Any Underage College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage College 
Drinks on One 
or More Days 
 
Any Underage College 
Days with 2 or More 
Drinks 
 All Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers 
Standard Explanatory Variables (cont.) 
NLSY Oversample 0.119 0.105 0.171 0.084 0.168 0.102 0.151 
 (0.324) (0.307) (0.378) (0.277) (0.374) (0.303) (0.358) 
Northeast Region 0.190 0.195 0.171 0.195 0.182 0.195 0.180 
 (0.392) (0.396) (0.378) (0.397) (0.386) (0.397) (0.385) 
North Central Region 0.249 0.245 0.260 0.266 0.224 0.254 0.238 
 (0.432) (0.431) (0.440) (0.443) (0.418) (0.436) (0.427) 
South Region 0.347 0.335 0.390 0.305 0.406 0.311 0.414 
 (0.476) (0.473) (0.490) (0.461) (0.492) (0.463) (0.494) 
West Region 0.215 0.225 0.178 0.234 0.189 0.240 0.167 
 (0.411) (0.418) (0.384) (0.424) (0.392) (0.428) (0.374) 
County Unemployment Rate 0.574 0.566 0.603 0.552 0.603 0.564 0.591 
 (0.219) (0.204) (0.264) (0.198) (0.242) (0.207) (0.238) 
State Per-Capital Beer  1.188 1.195 1.164 1.196 1.178 1.193 1.179 
Consumption (0.176) (0.176) (0.175) (0.175) (0.177) (0.175) (0.178) 
State Percent of Population with  0.285 0.284 0.288 0.286 0.284 0.286 0.283 
College Educ. or Higher (0.047) (0.045) (0.053) (0.044) (0.052) (0.045) (0.051) 
State Real Income Per Capita  43.185 43.079 43.572 43.296 43.031 43.274 43.020 
($1,000) (5.972) (5.840) (6.438) (5.575) (6.485) (5.674) (6.494) 
2001-2004 0.249 0.257 0.219 0.251 0.245 0.243 0.259 
 (0.432) (0.437) (0.415) (0.434) (0.431) (0.429) (0.439) 
2005 0.162 0.167 0.144 0.173 0.147 0.166 0.155 
 (0.369) (0.373) (0.352) (0.378) (0.355) (0.372) (0.362) 
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Any Underage College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage College 
Drinks on One 
or More Days 
 
Any Underage College 
Days with 2 or More 
Drinks 
 All Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers 
Standard Explanatory Variables (cont.) 
2006 0.191 0.210 0.123 0.231 0.136 0.227 0.126 
 (0.394) (0.408) (0.330) (0.422) (0.344) (0.419) (0.332) 
2007-2008 0.268 0.251 0.329 0.254 0.287 0.261 0.280 
 (0.443) (0.434) (0.471) (0.436) (0.453) (0.440) (0.450) 
2009-2011 0.131 0.116 0.185 0.091 0.185 0.104 0.180 
 (0.338) (0.321) (0.390) (0.289) (0.389) (0.306) (0.385) 
Instrumental Variables 
Mean State Real Cigarette Tax  1.026 1.038 0.980 1.071 0.942 1.054 0.986 
previous 4 years ($) (0.614) (0.613) (0.617) (0.602) (0.627) (0.591) (0.642) 
Mean State Beer Tax previous 4  0.270 0.275 0.252 0.259 0.289 0.260 0.283 
years ($) (0.203) (0.208) (0.186) (0.196) (0.215) (0.194) (0.215) 
Mean State  Blood Alcohol  0.856 0.847 0.890 0.845 0.877 0.839 0.880 
Content Law Previous 4 years (0.266) (0.276) (0.224) (0.280) (0.237) (0.287) (0.233) 
Mean State Social Host Law  0.422 0.426 0.407 0.445 0.381 0.440 0.397 
previous 4 years (0.461) (0.461) (0.463) (0.464) (0.454) (0.460) (0.463) 
Mean State Sunday Sale Ban Law 0.273 0.266 0.299 0.267 0.285 0.259 0.293 
previous 4 years  (0.410) (0.406) (0.423) (0.404) (0.421) (0.401) (0.421) 
Delinquency Index Score in 1997 1.016 1.137 0.575 1.197 0.682 1.259 0.682 
 (1.404) (1.490) (0.908) (1.525) (1.073) (1.580) (1.029) 
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Any Underage College 
Drinking 
Five or More 
Underage College 
Drinks on One 
or More Days 
 
Any Underage College 
Days with 2 or More 
Drinks 
 All Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers Drinkers Abstainers 
Instrumental Variables (cont.) 
High School Drinking  0.526 0.620 0.185 0.678 0.247 0.716 0.266 
 (0.500) (0.486) (0.390) (0.468) (0.432) (0.452) (0.442) 
N 680 534 146 394 286 441 239 
Note. Means estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 NLSY97.  Farming and military occupations are excluded from the 
sample. 
a Other occupations is defined as full-time blue-collar/service occupations.
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APPENDIX E 
 
DELINQUENCY INDEX QUESTIONS 
 
 
1. “Have you ever run away, that is, left home and stayed away at least overnight 
without your parent’s prior knowledge or permission?” (Yes/No) 
 
2. “Have you ever carried a hand gun?  When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm 
other than a rifle or shotgun.” (Yes/No) 
 
3. “Have you ever belonged to a gang?” (Yes/No) 
 
4. “Have you ever purposely damaged or destroyed property that did not belong to 
you?” (Yes/No) 
 
5. “Have you ever stolen something from a store or something that did not belong to you 
worth less than 50 dollars?” (Yes/No) 
 
6. “Have you ever stolen something from a store, person or house, or something that did 
not belong to you worth 50 dollars or more including stealing a car?” (Yes/No) 
 
7. “Have you ever committed other property crimes such as fencing, receiving, 
possessing or selling stolen property, or cheated someone by selling them something 
that was worthless or worth much less than what you said it was?” (Yes/No) 
 
8. “Have you ever attacked someone with the idea of seriously hurting them or have a 
situation end up in a serious fight or assault of some kind?” (Yes/No) 
 
9. “Have you ever sold or helped sell marijuana (pot, grass), hashish (hash) or other hard 
drugs such as heroin, cocaine or LSD?” (Yes/No) 
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10. “Have you ever been arrested by the police or taken into custody for an illegal or 
delinquent offense (do not include arrests for minor traffic violations)?” (Yes/No) 
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APPENDIX F 
 
LINE SEARCH RESULTS FOR MULTINOMIAL 
LOGISTIC SELECTION MODELS 
 
 
 
Note: Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 waves of the NLSY97.  Base outcome 
is employed full-time in white-collar occupations. 
 
Figure C.1. Line Search Results for Multinomial Logistic Selection Models of 
Occupational Choice and Any Underage College Drinking. 
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Note: Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 waves of the NLSY97.  Base outcome 
is employed full-time in white-collar occupations. 
 
Figure C.2. Line Search Results for Multinomial Logistic Selection Model of 
Occupational Choice and Five or More Underage College Drinks on One or More Days. 
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Note. Models estimated using unweighted data from the 1997-2011 waves of the NLSY97.  Base outcome 
is employed full-time in white-collar occupations. 
 
Figure C.3. Line Search Results for Multinomial Logistic Selection Model of 
Occupational Choice and Any Underage College Days with Two or More Drinks. 
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